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INTRODUCTION
The mining industry has long been criticised
or its high rate of accident occurrence.

severe~

because

Statistics, which, how-

ever, are not strictly comparable show that the accident-frequency
rate in all mining is currently about three tines and the accidentseverity rate is about seven times as great as the average for gen-

(1)
eral industrial work in the United States.
(1)

Figures such as these

Harrington, D., East, J. H. Jr., Warnecke, R. G., Safety in
the mining industry: u.s. Bureau of Mines Int. Circ. 74S5,
p. 7, April, 1949.

------~----~ .....--_.......__
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are by no means comforting to mining men.

They constitute a chal-

lenge to the industry that cannot be ignored.
It must be rem.anbered that any type of mining is more hazardous than most or the other major occupations.

The greater number

ot workers are generally employed underground and are subject to
such risks as falls of grom1d, use of explosives, haulage or transportation difficulties, poor lighting, handling moving machinery in
cramped places, and of't.en inadequate ventilation with explosive
gases and dusts present.

It can readily be realized that the tasks

that must be performed in most industries must likewise be performed
in mining under these, as well as other adverse conditions.

The

natural result is that mine accidents are more frequent and generally more severe than in other industries.

This does not, by any

means, present an excuse for the high rate of accident occurrence
in the mining industry.

It should be kept in mind, however, tba. t

very little can be gained by contrasting the accident rates of min-

ing with such an industry as manufacturing since the hazards involved are not comparable.
For pm-poses of this paper the mining ird ustry may be divided
into three major classifications, namely; coal mining, metal and
nonmetallic mining, and quarrying.
Metal and nonmetallic-mineral mines, except in a few instances,
have little in conmon with coal mines insofar as mining methods and
actual conditions inside the mine are concerned.

Generally speak-

ing, coal mines have two hazards that rarely exist in metal and nonmetall.ic mineral mines •

These are methane gas and coal. dust, both

of which are · expl.osi ve.

Explosive gas and expl.osive dust. have been

found to exist in isolated instances in non-coal mines and have resulted in major disasters, but such cases are rare.
However, as both coal and noncoal mines have many hazards in
common such as falls of rock or roof, haulage, electricity, explosives and others, this paper "td.ll be devoted to a general discussion
of the problem of safety and health in mining.

From time to time,

reference will be made to one or the other of the classifications
or the industry.
This paper describes the hazards to health and safety and the
problem of accident prevention that exists in the mining industry.
The principal causes of accidents, and the preventative action that
can be taken to prevent recurrence of these accidents are presented.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a source of information
on the principles or mine safety, as applied to the chief causes of
mine accidents, which must be practiced in the

day-to-d~

operation

of the minmg industry.
It carmot be too strongl.y emphasized that safety in :aWling,
or in any industry, cannot be attained unless all concerned are
safety conscious.

4.

RE\TIEW OF LITERATURE

Review o£ t.be literature on sa£ety in the mining industry
reveals a rather prolific source of scattered in£o:nnatian.

u. s.

The

Bureau of Mines has published much information in the form

of' Information Circulars, Bulletins and Miners• Circulars, etc.,
pertaining to mine accidents and their prevention.

Various arti-

cles on saf'ety in mining are also found in technical magazines and
publications such as Mining Engineering, :Engineering and Minipg

Jouma1, and Explosives Engineer.
There is, however, no one source known to the writer, which
attempts to compile into one writing the principal causes of accidents in mining along with a detailed discussion of preventative
measures that can. be taken to avoid their recurrence.
A large number of references have been used in preparation
of this treatment, especially various sources of information published by the u. s. Bureau of Mines.

5.

PROGRESS OF SAFETY IN MINIW

The history of the safety movement as applied to mining has
been a story of gradual improvement over a long period of time.
There remains much to be done before our mines can be considered
as being operated with anything like the degree of safety that can
and should be reached.

Although mine disasters continue to occur,

especiall.y' coa:L-mine disasters, they occur far less frequently and
with much smaller loss of life than in the past.
In a discussion of the progress of safety in the mining indus-

try a great deal of credit must be given to the U. S. Bureau of
Mines.

There is no doubt that much of the improvement 'Which has

been made in reducing accidents has been due to t.he fact that the
Federal Bureau of Mines has acted as more or less of a

11

sparkplug"

since its inception in keeping safety to the front through its numerous health and safety activities.
Prior to the present century there existed a rather persistent
demand for the establishment of a Federal Department . of Mines.
ative~

Rel-

little was done about it until a considerable number of ser-

ious coal mine disasters occurred in 1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909.

These

created a serious scandal and made it imperative that the Federal.
Government take action toward trying to solve the problem of' the
causes and prevention of such disasters.
eau of Mines was created July 1, 1910.

As a result, the

u. s.

Bur-

Although the Bureau was given

numerous functions it was clearly indicated that promoting the health
and safety of mine workers constituted its chief duty.
Generally speaking, the Bureau follows two general lines of in-

vestigation; field and laboratory study designed to bring about safer
and more healthful working conditions in mining am allied industries; and an extensive study of new and improved methods of mining
treatment and utilization.
The Bureau has no legal authority to Enter mines or other establishments or to enforce its recommendations as to health, safety
and efficiency.

As a resul.t the Bureau relies upon cooperaticn of

the mining industry and of various state mining and other departments to make its findings and recamnendations effective toward
try:ing to improve corv:iitions as to health and sa.f'ety as well as to
efficiency and conservation.

It has long been believed by personnel

associated with the Bureau that nearly all matters pertaining to
health, safety, and efficiency in the mineral industry are so closely
interrelated that an attempt to engage in acy one without. paying due
attention to the others is certain to be ineffectual.
has no authority to enter mines or

«~.force

As the Bureau

its recODIJlendations, the

Health and Safety Branch functions chiefly through edueati011al. work
such as the giving of First Aid

am

other safety training courses

and the issuance of published papers and phamphlets.
The first;..aid training program constitutes perhaps the most
intimate and in some ways the most effective means of placing before
the mining industry {both employer and employee) uP-to-date health
and safety data.

The course is excellent accident prevention "pro-

paganda" and probably its greatest asset is that it reaches workers
in large numbers.

taken this course.

In 1.9.39 more than 1,000,000 mining people had
It is estimated that because of the training at

least 200 lives are saved annual.]¥ and probably at least 10,000 non-

7.
fataJ. accidents are prevented fran occm-ring in the mining and aJ.lied
(2)
industries.
(2)

Harrington, D., Safety work of the Bureau of Mines and some of
its results: u.s. Bur. Mines Inf. Circ. 7070, P. 4, May, 1939 •
. To encom-age persons proficient in first-aid work or in the

teaching of it, the Bureau issues first-aid instructors certificates
to persons cc:ap1eting the prescribed course of training.

These are

much in demand as the hol.d.ers are often given a preferent. ial right
to obtain or retain emp1oyment.
The Blreau offers courses of training in mine rescue, advanced
mine rescue, advanced recovery work to those interested in knowing
correct and advisable procedures in case of a mine disaster.
An accident prevention course has been devised to nput over"

to mining peop1e, particularly such supervising official.& as superintendents, foremen, .fire bosses, and face bosses, the sa:Cety
sons 1earned and data assembled by the Bureau.

~s-

This course requires

severa1 weeks of instruction and since its innauguration a large
number of mining men, especia11y officia1s, have completed the com-se.
Since creation of the Bureau, one of the important activities
of the .field safety personnel has been attendance at mine accidents
and disasters.

Reports are prepared on them after investigation to

determine the causes and possible methods of prevention.

A report

is published every year containing essential data on explosions,
fires, and other accidents about which information has been obtained.
The causes as we11 as the probab1e feasible methods of preventing or
at least reducing the seriousness of these mishaps of various kiD:ls

s.
are presented.
Each year the field workers make scores of underground inspections; ·investigating health and safety conditions.

They later sub-

mit written reports, giving the ascertained data with recamnendations as to improvement.

In the investigations or visits prior to

the making or these reports, the field men are able to not only
observe and learn many details on health and safety in mining, but
also transmit to the mining people much in.fonnation on health and
safety obtained elsewhere in making investigations.
Another service which is offered to the industry by the field
workers of the Safety Divisicn is the inspecticn of privately owned
mine rescue stations ani their equi}Dent.

Oral recaunendations are

made durillg the inspection and these . are usually supplemented wi.th
written reports.

Though not invariably, these inspections generally

find the respiratory equipment in unsafe eon::lition.

This is often

due to the tact it has not been used or inspected much during the
past several years. because of the comparative lack of fires and
explosions.
In an attempt to give the mining industry as much as possible

of the safety and health information obtained by the Safety Division, manuscripts of various kinds such as Infonnation Circulars,
Reports of Investigati ens and Miners' Circulars are prepared for
publication by mEIII.bers of the division.

Some of these are issued

through government sources while others are pub1ished in teclmical
journals or in the proceedings of various technical organizations.
Other activities engaged in b.Y the Bureau are motion pictures,
safety exhibits or demonstrations at conventions, state, or county

9.

fairs, and similar assemblages, attendance by safety employees at
safety meetings, chiefiy at mines or in mining camnunities, and establishment of safety clubs in mining communities.
The foregoing discussion shc:Ms some of the numerous educational
activities that are engaged in by the

u. s.

Bureau of Mines in their

constant effort toward the objective in mine safety work which is
the preventioo of accidents to those who work in and arour¥1 mines.
WithoUt question, much progress has been made in eliminating
health and safety hazards in the mineral industries since the establisbJnent of the Bureau of Mines in 1910. However, t.he mining industry seldan receives the publicity it deserves with respect to mine
safety.

Although accidents and disasters are given wide publicity

and much is written about the dangers of mining it seems that progress in.making mines safer has little news interest.
The mining industry as a l'lbole has made great progress in accident prevention.

Canparison of present-dq fatal and non-fatal

accident rates with t.hose of a few decades ago proves this.
sums have been spent in accident prevention

~rk.

Large

These expendi-

tures have paid dividends, not only in money saved but in lives
saved and prevention of suffering of

~rkers.

The monetary saving

has compensated for far more than the cost of accident-preVEntion
work.

It is highly improbable that this country would have been

able to attain the high rate of mineral prcxiuction that undoubtedly
enabled it and its allies to win World War II had it not been for
the immense strides forward in accident prevention in 'the mines of
the United States.

10.

The on:ly tangible means by which progress in safety in the mining industry can be measured is from statistics on injuries (fatal and
nonfatal) received annually.

A reduction in fatal and nonfatal acci-

dents over an extended period of years can justly be attributed to
work that has been done to make the mines safer and improve conditions.
All states :require fatal accidents to be reported to the proper
authorities.

However, this is not nniversally true of nonfatal acci-

dents, and there is wide variation in reporting them.

Consequently,

fatal-accident statistics are more inclusive and much more comparable
than nonfatal-accident statistics, and at present serve relatively
well for measuring the progress of safety in mining.
Coal Mines
A picture of the definite progress that has been made in accident prevention by the coal mining industry in the United States is
gained by comparing the statistics of the industry over a long per. iod.

The progress made in accident prevention in coal mines is shown
in Figures 1 and 2.
of coal mined.

In 1907, 6. 78 men were killed per million tons

In 1946 this had been reduced to 1.64 :aen killed per

million tons ·of coal mined.

In other words, only' 24 per cent of the

number of men killed in 1907 in producing one million tons of coal
were killed in 1946.

Some of the reduction in the number of fatal

accidents per million tons mined is due to safer procedures and equipment, and some to improved methods of mining and to mechanization,
which increased the output per man-shift.

The increased percentage

of open-cut coal has also exerted a beneficial influence.

11.

7-------~----~----~----~------~----~----~----~----~------7

Figure 1. Number of man killed per million tons of coal produced
_in bituminous-coal and anthracite mines.

(3) Reprinted from Harrington, D., East, J. H. Jr., Warncke, R. G., Safety in the mining
industry: u.s. Bur. Mines Inf. Circ. 7485, following p. 12, April, 1949.
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Another measure of the progress made in accident preventicm in
coal mines is shol'Jfl by a compa.riscn of the fata1ity rates per million
man-hours of exposure.

The fatality rate per million man-hours of

exposure in 1911 was 2.04, and by 1946 the rate was reduced to 1.1.3;
hence, only 55.4 per cent of the number of men killed per million
(5)
man-hours of exposure in 19ll in coal. mines were killed in 1946.
(5)

Harrington, D., East, J. H. Jr., Warneke, R. G., Safety in
the mining industry. U. S. Bur. Mines Inf. Circ. 7 4135, p. 1.3,
April, 1949.
Although statistics show that great progres::;; has been made in

the safety of coal mining, there remains much to be done.

Without

question the mines can be made much safer and the number of fatal.
and nonfatal accidents reduced considerably below what they are now.
There is no reason to believe that this reduction cannot be made without increase in production cost if both mine operators and mine w:orkers handle the project in a reasonably cooperative manner.
Metal. and Nonmetallic Mines
The number of fatalities in metal and nonmetallic mines and the
number killed per thousand .300-da.y workers are shown in Figures .3 and

4. The fatal accident rate per 100,000 employed in noncoal mines in
(6)
1911 was 4.45 as against the 1.62 rate of 1945.
(6)

Ibid.,

p. 95.

It is evident the noncoa.l. mines of the United States have done
a good job in the reduction of the fata1 accident rate since 19ll.
The over-all trend is s1owq downward with many fluctuations in the
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individual years.
Quarries
The quarq.ing industry as a whole has reduced both the number
of accidents and the accident rate per million man-hours or employment.

In the 10-year period 1911 - 1920 an average or 164 men were

killed and 9,299 men were injured annually, whereas in the 10-year
period, 1936 - 1945, an average of

76 men were killed and 5,446

men injured each year, a decrease or 53.5 percent in the nwnber
(9)
of fatal injuries.
The £ atal-injury rates per mil.J.?..on man-hours
(9)

Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warneke, R. G.,
p. us.

o£ employment for

193~

~945

have

dec~ined

~.,

The rate was
(10)
o.46 in 1~31, o.62 in 1936, o.44 in 19U, and o.42 in 1945.
(10)

-

.22•

little.

Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warneke, R. G.,
p. ·118.

2E.•

ill••

A!3 would be expected the quarrying industry as a whole has
a much lower fatality rate per million man-hours worked than underground mining.

The trend of fatal accidents in the limestone in-

dustry is definitely upward and is

~arge~y responsib~e

for the rel-

atively small improvement in the record of the quarrying industry
in general.

17.
COAL lUNING

Classification
Coal technologists divide coal into three general classes;
(1) anthracite, {2) bituminous coal, and (3) lignite, with ~
subdivisions.

However, for discussion of the status of safety

in mining all coal is divided into two classes, {1) anthracite
and {2) bituminous coal and lignite.

This is done chiefly be-

cause the mining methods, hazards, and the general conditions
inherent to bituminous-coal and lignite mines are almost identical.

Anthracite mines, however, have numerous features not com-

mon to other coal mines.
Accidents
The coal mining industry has been and still is wasteful of
human life in comparison with other less hazardous occupations.
There has been considerable discussion regarding methods of canputing fatal-accident statistics and the relative value of using
on one hand the fatality rate per million tons of coal mined, and
on the other the rate per million man-hours of exposure.

The fact

remains that irrespective of the method used, the number of men
killed annually while engaged in mining coal has declined graduaJJ..y
through the years.

At the same time that mine fatalities have de-

creased, the tonnage of coal has materially increased.
Mechanization of coal mines, while greatly increasing the number of tons mined per man-shift, has also introduced new hazards
that were not present when coal was hand-loaded.

In a mechanized

1.8.

mine,

~ere

operations are more concentrated, workers are concen-

trated in a relatively smaller area am thus have the advantage
of better instruction and supervision than in a hand-loading mine,
where the workers are scattered and supervision is difficult to attain.

This aids material.l.y in trying to overcome the imreased

hazards due to mechanization, but it also makes it much more

dif'~

ficult to avoid the occurrence of major disasters (those in which
(1.1)
five or more are killed) •
The concentration of workers in coni

(ll)

Harrington, D., East. J. H., Jr., Warncke, R. G., Safety in
the mining industry: u. s. Bur. Mines Inf. Circ. 7485. p. 29,
April., 1.949 •

fined

~eas

causes them to be in the path of roof' f'al.l.s, blasts

fran expl.osives, gas or dust explosions, etc., which may cause
little property damage but because of the heavy concentration of'
workers cause l.arge loss of' l.if'e.
The bituminous-coal. and lignite deposits of' the United States
are mined by underground nethods and stripping.

The rapid increase

in the production of' coal by stripping in recent years makes it
necessary fer accident-statistics purposes to consider the tonnage

mined by both methods as well as the combined tonnages.

If these

were not considered separately, as well as the total for the industry, erroneous concl.usions woul.d probably be reached in a study of
mine safety.

In considering the accident statistics of the bitum-

inous-coal and lignite industry it shoul.d 'be remembered that over
l., 000 £ewer workers are now killed each year in mining coal than
were killed in mining approxima.tel.y the same or smal]er tonnages

19.
(12)
t-wenty years or more ago.
------""·~· -"---------·----------------

{12)

Ibid., p. 23.
The production of bituninous coal. and lignite classified into

underground workings and strippings is shown in Table I.

It is

noted that coal mining by stripping was a rather insignificant factor in the over-all coal production of the United States in 19.30,
amounting to only' 4.3 per cent o:f the total..

Stripping operations
1~5 and

produced apprcoci.mately 19 per cent o:f the total, by

1946,

clearly indicating the rapid increase in the productiQ'l o:f coal by
stripping.
The accident rates :for fatal and non:fatal injuries, based upon
millions o:f tons of coal mined, are shown in Table II.
"

The total

.

number o:f .a ccidents is subdivided into those occurring undergrcnmd
and at stripping operations.

The statistics for underground work-

ings include the injuries received at the surface plants o:f these
mines.

It is evident from this table the rates have been consis-

tently downward in trend over the period.
The :fatal and nonfatal injury rates per million man-hours of
expostn'"e are shown in Table III.

The total man-hours o£ exposure

is subdivided into underground wPrkings, surface plants at underground mines, and stripping.
As mentioned previously, anthracite mines have many essEntial
differences when compared with most bituminous-coal and lignite
mines.

For this reason anthracite mines should be considered seP-

arately :for accident statistics purposes and safety comparisons.
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TABLE

I

.
(13}
Production of Bit_uminous Coal and Lignite

Year

Tonnas;e m.:ined 1 in 1 1 000' s of tons
Underground
Stripping
. workings
Total

Percentage of
total production
mined b,y stripping

1930
1931
1932
1933
1934

447,684
363,254
290,068
315,394
338,576

19,842
18,849
19,640
18,237
20,792

467,526
382,105
309,710
333,631
359,368

6.3
5.5
5.8

1935
1936
1937
1938
1939

348,722
409,251
415,425
319,242
359,371

23,647
. 27,218
31,622
30,305
37 ,26o

372,369
436,468
447,047
349,548
396,631

6.4
6.2
7.1
8.7
9.4

1940
· 1941
1943
1944

U8,96o
460,292
516,222
513,651
*518,678

42,358
55,478
65,482
79,821
*l.00,898

461,319
515,769
581,705
593,471
619,576

9.2
10.7
11.2
1.3.5
16 •.3

1945
1946

*467,630
*423,000

*109,987

*577,617
*532,000

*19.0
*18.7

19/~

~-109,000

4.3

4~9

*From Coal Economics Division,
Bureau of Mines.

(13)

Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R. G.,
p. 24.

~· ~ ••
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TABLE II
(~)

-

Accident Rates Based on Millions of Tons Produced
at Bituminous-coal and Lignite Mines

Year
~9.30

Underground
workings
Fatal. Nonfatal.

Stripping
Fatal. Nonfatal

Total.*
Fatal Nonfatal.

0.504
.1.06
.56o
.494
• .385

4.3.941>
.31.514
.39.00.3
46.938
34.868

.3.46.3
2.826
.3.09.3
2.497
2.666

1.52 • .327
1.41.257
127.061
131.721
130.735
127.639
115.7.3.3
ll8.2l3
3.05.262
97.179

~9.34

2.640

146,92.3
1..38.4.32
1.2.3.84.3
126.991
1.26.548

1935
1936
19.37
19.38
19.39

2.595
2.527
2.715
2.578
2.290

125.21.7
1.13.38.3
116.189
105.5.37
96.8crt

.592
.551
.25.3
.594
2.42

31.082
44 •.38.3
40 • .320
34.186
30.408

2.600
2.516
2.680
2.518
2.186

2.7ll
1941
2.160
1942
2.214
2.200
194.3
1944 **2.020

94.749
91.720
9.3.500
87.676

.5~9

.61.3
.47.3

.31.6l.l
26.1.37
22.296
19.181

2.6J.o
2.(YJ8
2.140
2.064
**1 .807 **

1945 **1.800
1946 **1.7.30

***
***

19.31
19.32
193.3

.3.45.3
2.824
.3.085
2.1..48

~940

***

.413
**.297

***

**.219
**.201

***

~~-*

95..366

90.422
91.44.3
86.048
85 •.380

**1.620 H-82.667
**~.504 **82.707

*

Includes injuries to surface -workers ar unlerground
mines as well as those injured in unierground workings and in strip mines.
** Prel.imina.ry'.
Not yet avallab1e.

***

(14)

Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R. G., 2R.• .2!,1.,
p. 26.
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TABLE

In

Accident Bates Based on Mil.lions ot Han-hours ot Exposure
at Bituminous-coal and Lignite Mines

(15)

Surface pianfls
at underground
Total
mines
working!!
striJ2;e1ns
Year Fatal Nonfatal Fatal Nonfatal Fatal Nonfatal Fatal Nonfatal.
Underground

1930
1931
19.32
19.33
19.34

2.386 101.50'7 0.685 49.714
2.010 98.529 .680 40.451
2.21.4 88.878 .763 40.098
1.628 84.475
.642 .37.501
1.801 86 •.307 .657 40.000

0.977
.220
1.24.3
.969
.856

85.176
65.270
86.527
92.177
71.566

2.158
1.812
1.998
1.476
1.621.

1935
1936
19.37
1938
1939

1.865
1.847
1.996
1.972
1.797

89.970
82.900
85.419
80.729
76.036

l..£>73 82.157
1.6.39 75.405
1.773 78.226
1.741 72.814
1.562 69~451

1940
1941
1942
1943
1944

2.200
1.765
1.839
1.850

1945
1946

.516
.667
.554
.447

.600 38.274

.30.558
35.359
28.830
.3.3.049

1.223
.991
.456
1.104
.482

64.228
79.821
72.741
6.3.523
60.647

74.956
77.666
7.3.727

.526
.449
.610
.490

3.3.817
30.265
29.785
35.601

.994
1.144
.886
.8ll

60.512
48.802
41.729
.37.610

*

*

*

*

ii*.CJ(TI

*

*
*

*
*

*
*

*
*

'**.420

*
*

76.~9

*

1.923
1.551
1.6ll
1.575
**1.334

94.937
90.565

B2.crt8

77.860
79.488

70.281
67.487
68.829
65.641
6.3 .05]j.'*

62.664
1.190 65.070

~'*1.228

Not yet available
** Estinated.

*

(15) Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke. R. G., .2E• ill••
p. 28.

2.3.

The accident rates for fatal and nonfatal injuries based upon
millions of tons mined are shown in Table IV.

The table shows

the rates for underground workings and stripping operations.

The

accident rates, both fatal and nonfatal, based upon millions of
man-hours of exposure is shown in Table V.
Principle

Caus~f

Accidents

All Coal Mines
The

u. s.

Bureau of Hines classifies all accidents that occur

in bituminous-coal and lignite mines and anthracite mines as resulting from the same general principle causes, since the mines
have essentially similar general over-all hazards. · As mentioned
previously however, anthracite mining is distinct in many of its
hazards, mining methods, ani gEl'leral conditions.
The underground injury rates per million man-hours of expoeure for bituminous-coal and lignite mines, anthracite mines, and
all coal mines classified according to the principal. causes is

shown in Table VI.

The difference in the hazards of anthracite

mines and bituminous-coal mines is clearly shown in the table.
The two principal causes of fatal accidents in coal mining are
falls of roof or face and haulage.

Falls of roof or face is the

principle cause of fatal ani nonfatal accidents at all coal mines;
but as shown in Table VI, "rush of coal, rock, or gobtt is a much
mare serious hazard in anthracite mines than in bituminous-coal and
lignite mines.

The reason for this being true is that a large part

of the tonnage of anthracite is obtained from rather steeply diP-

24.

TABLE IV

Accident Rates Based U;eon Mil.l.ions of Tona<16 )
Produced at Anthracite Mines

unaergrOUiid
working

Year

Fata! ..J!.onfata1

19.30
1931
19.32
1933
1934
1935

6.222
6.584
5.362
4.980
4.900
5.459

1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946

398.853
398.524
339.798
283.140
325.828
305.416

Stripping
Fatal. Nonfatal
**1.794 **46.874

Total.***
Fatal Nonfatal.

.663
** .466
** .465
**1.415

**16.254
**43. 611
**45 .150
**67 .217

6.399
6.421
4.994
4.663
4.688
5.243

4.96.3 321.331
4.463 277.567
5.348 298.776
4.4~ 269.946
4.144 289.877

1.290
1.053
1.766
1.276
.814

79.635
43.539
34.149
28.434
24.571

4.463
4.155
4.876
4.109
3.574

4.122 302.942
4.736 267.618
4.623 270.418

.832

23.851
14.956
35.216

3.585 266.470
3.875 232.886
3.798 227.323
2.753 *205.714
2.616 *212.168
2.867 *214.221

** .809 **27.669

**

.w

.640

....

414.557
402.091
339.6o3
306.471
324.953
304.174
311.430
259.192
278.272
257.646
267.666

Preliminar.r

*·
** Inc1uies stripping, washery,
***

(16)

and

dredge operations.
Includes injuries to surface workers
at underground mines, strippings, an::l
washery and dredge operations.

Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R.
~.,
P. 87.

G.,

.2£._
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TABLE

V

Accident Rates Based Upon Millions ot Man-hours
of ::kposure at Anthracite Mines

Year

Undergrowr:i
workin§s
Fatal Nonfatal.

1930
1931
19.32
19.33
i934
19.35

2.029
2.204
1.971
1.767
1.771
2.083

1936
1937
193£!
19.39
1.940

1.921
1.871
2.357
2.091

***

..
. ..
Surface _,.Od(s
Fatal. Nonfatal.

130.086 o.658
133.431 .579
124.914 .294
100.448 .685
117.804 .702
1.16.527 .723

124.372
116.326
131.672
1.25.780
1.900 132.943

1941 1.796 131.966
1942 2.112 119.329
194.3 1.872 109.482
1944
1945

54.637
55.801
56.983
95.564
63.740
61.414

Stripping
Fatal Nonfatal

*1.664
*1.303
*1.092
* .707
* .574
*1.598

*43.475
*44.564
*26.753
*66.072
*55.711
*75. 91.1

(17)

Total.
Fatal Nonfatal

1.758
1.838
1.587
1.493
1.502
1.778

113.898
115.074
107.879
98.130
104.147
103.163

65.253
47.650
51.734
59.305
61.866
.568
.381

.6os

57.087
50.16o
44.210

.973 Z7.888
.604 20.388
.776 42.685
**1.074 **80.247
**l.O<X> **81.119

*
**

***

Includes stripping, washery, and dredge
operations.
Preliminar.y.
Data for 1930-35 include only surface operations (tipple, breaker, shops, and yards)
at underground mines; data for 1936-43 include
surface operations at underground mines, and
washery and dredge operations.

(17) Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Wamcke, R. G., 22•
P. 87 - sa.

~.,
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TABLE VI
ComParisc:m of Inj:uJZ Rates UnderS!:ound at All. Coal.
!?z Princi:eaJ. Causes 1 12~
Fatal. accident rates
E!r mj]]jon man-hours
Bitum.coal. .Anthra- lll.
& limite cite coal.

s

(18) ..

Nonfatal accident rates
E!r million man-hours
Bitum.coal. .Anthra- All
&·limite cite coal.

[alls o' ~oof (togk• coal.,
sl.ate):
1.007
.950 1.019
l.94J.. • • • • • • • •
.951 1.246 .991
19.42. • • • • • • • •
.961
.988 .965
1943 •• • • • • • • •
Bush of coa1 1 rock 1 or sob:
.012
.094 .024
194l.. • • • • • • • •
.oeJ. .013
.002
1942. • • • • • • • •
.oo8
1943. • • • • • • • •
.076 .018
Haul.afe:
.282
.331
.339
. 941 ••• • • • • • •
1942. • • • • • • • •
.372 •.386
~.389
.372
1943 •• • • • • • • •
.342 .367
Handl.infrmaterials:
.004
.031 .008
19 • • • • • • • • •
.020 .oos
.oo6
1942. • • •
• • •
.020
.029 .021
1943 •• • • • • • • •
Hand 'tool.s:
.002
.002
1941••• • • • • • •
.oo6
.oo6
1942 •• • • • • • • •
o.oo9 .00.3
.002
194.3 • • • • • • • • •
Falls or J2!rSons:
.031 .009
.005
1941. • • • • • • • •
.oo6
.oo6
1942. • • • • • • • •
.008
.oo2 0.047
1943. • • • • • • • •
MachineJ!:
.059
.069
19 • • • • • • • • •
1942. • • • • • • • •
.079 0.010 .069
.051
.029 .047
194.3 •• • • • • • • •
El.ectricitz:
.052
.071
.075
1941 •• • • • • • • •
.o6o .079
.082
1942. • • • • • • • •
.019 .049
.054
194.3 •• • • • • •••
Ex;elosi ves:
.055
.125
.043
1941 •• • • • • • • •
.026
.l30 .040
1942. ••• • • • • •
.o86 .050
.044
1943. • • • • • • •
ExPlosions or ,sas or coal •
DUST:
.158
.147
.084
194J. •• ••• • • • •
.218
.2.38
.090
1942 •• • • • • • • •
.25.3
.272
.14.3
194.3. • • • • • •••
(18) Harr.lngton, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R.

...

~

21.566
20.962
17.156
.542
.317
.234

26.391 22.268
25.070 22.042
1.8.298 17 •.323
2.192
1.740
1.3ll

.781
.5l3
.393

17.458
1.8.6.35
1.8.7.38

1.8.13.3 17.566
1.8.765 18.653
14.441. 18.1(17

10.912
ll.955
10.826

37.144 14.725
37.671 15.50.3
23.561 12.698

5 •.303
5.294
5.474

15.628
12.048
ll •.362

.3.235
.3.192
2.629

12.966 4.649
11.595 . 4 •.351
10.735 3.821

6.804
6.226
6•.340

7.913
7.902
8.136

8.091
7.241
4.855

7.939
7.8ll
7.654

1.309
1.498
1.637

.981.
1.418
.684

1.261
1.4S7
1.497

.435
.512
.570

1.399
1.086
.855

.575
.591
.612

.266
.183
.154

1.242
.724
•.323

.408
.258
.179

G.,

~· ~.,

p. 20.
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ping beds and much of the producti<X'l is derived fran eoctracting pillars on second or third mining.
As the rates in1icate, haulage creates approxin:atel.y the same
hazards in all coal mines.

It is necessary to handle timber and

other materials up to the working faces fran the gangwcqs in anthracite mining and this resul.ts in higher injury rates than when handling the same type of material in bituminous-coal. md lignite mines
where the beds are usual.l.y fl.atter.

In l.ike manner, there are num-

erous chutes and other openings with differences in level. in anthracite mines, and "fal.l.s of persons" is an important cause of injury
because of falling to a l.ower level.
Mechanizatim is much more prevalent in bituminous-coal and
lignite mines than anthracite mines.

As a result, "machinery" is

much more important as a cause of :injury in them than in anthracite
mines.
Injury rates due to explosives are several times higher in anthracite mines than at bituminous-coal and lignite mines.

A much l.ar-

ger amount. of expl.osives is used in anthracite mines chiefly because
of the steep pitches, a large part of the coal is "shot from solid,"
requiring larger amounts of explosives than if the coal
fore blasting.

~e

cut be-

Thus, the more extensive use of explosives as well

as the greater difficulty in using them is reflected in the injury
rates due to expl.osives in anthracite mines.
Anthracite mines are usually gassy but the dust is not. considered to be expl.osive.

Al.though gas ignitions occur relatively fre-

quently, the resultant expl.osion is not. propagated by coal dust, as

in bituminous mines.

Consequently, the loss of lif'e is lower than

in bitUminous mines.

The effect of the much greater explosibility

o:t bituminous-coal. dust than

~&cite

dust is reflected in the

number o:C :Catal.ities fran explosions o:C gas or a)al <hst, being much
higher in bituminous-coal and lignite mines than in anthracite mines.
Bituminous Coal and Lignite M;ines
The causes of fatal accidents in bituminous-coal. and lignite
mines are classified by the Bureau of Mines into:

1. Falls o:C roo:t and coal
2.

Haulage

3.

Gas or dust explosions

4. Explosives
5. Electricity

6. Shaft
7. All other causes underground.
It is seen that falls of roo! and coal, haulage, and gas and
dust explosions are the three J;rincipal causes of fatal accidents.
GeneralJ.¥, the numbers or persons killed

annu~

by each cause

fall in the same order •
Falls of root and coal. kill one or more persons at a time but
seldom result in a major disaster in which .tive or more men are
killed.

Owing to the :frequency of such tal.ls, the number of wor-

kers killed annually from this cause usually totals more than 50
per cent af all undergrOWld fatalities.
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Anthracite Mines
The three principal causes of fatal. undergrO'Wld accidents
at anthracite mines in the relative order of their importance
are:
1.

FaJ.ls of roof and coal.

2.

Haulage

3. Explosives
Approximately 80 per cent of fatal. accidents underground at anthracite mines are due to these three causes.

It is significant to

note that explosives as a cause of accidents replace expl.osions of
gas or dust as the the third highest cause o.f accidents in bituminous mines.
Explosions of gas, electricity, and shafts are the next three
important causes of accidents but vary in rank from year to year.
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MEl'AL AND NONMETALLIC MINING
Classification
The metal and nonmetallic-mineral mines of the United States
are classified by the Bureau of Mines into five groups for statistical purposes.

These are: (1) copper mines, (2) iran mines, (3)

gold, silver, and miscellaneous mines, (4) lead-zinc mines (Mississippi Valley), and (5) nonmetallic-mineral mines.
of the mines was changed in 1942.

The grouping

Thus, the data since that year

are not comparable with those of the period 1911 - 1942.
11

The mines included in the classification •nonmetallic-min-

eral minest are those that produce asbestos, asphaltum, barite,
borax, amery, feldspar, fluorspar (except in Illinois and Kentucky) ,
garnet, graphite, gypsum, lithiura, magnesite, mica, mineral paint,
phosphate rock, potash, quartz, salt, soapstone, sulfur, tal.c, and
(19)
tripolic."
(19)

Harringt.on, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R. G., Safety in
the mining industry: U.s. Bur. Mines Inf. Circ • 7~5. p • 112,
April, 1949.

Accidents
As mentioned previously', metal and nonmetallic mineral mines
have little in conmon with coal mines, insofar as mining methods
and actual conditions inside the mines are concerned, ex.cept in a
few instances.
Most metal mines are in fairly steeply dipping deposits and
mining is conducted from several level.s.

Generally', coal mines
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produce coal fran <Xlly one l.evel. , though in some cases mining is
conducted :f'rom two or more l.evels.
racite mining.

This is especial.ly true in anth-

Vent.ilaticn of coal mines is regul.ated by l.aw in

most states, and mechanical ventilation is essential because of the
danger fran accumul.ations of methane.

Mechanical

VEI'l til.ation

of

metal. mines is by no means general. except in the l.arger mines.
Some of these use mechanical. ventilation only for l.ocal. distribution., depending on natural. ventilation for the main supply of air.
The accident statistics o:f' the metal. and nonmetal.l:ic-mi.neral
:industries :is much less comprehensive than the coal :iniustries.
Thus, ana)¥sis or the status of safety is not. near as complete as
in coal. mining.
The tonnage of ore and rock produced at metal and nonmataJ.l.ic
mineral mines is seldom reported except; as to ircn ore, gypsum, etc.,
in some cases.

Therefore, statistics usual.ly must be canpared on

the basis or empl.oym.ent or workers in the various branches of the
industry. Man-hours were reported to the Bureau
first time in 1931.

ot Mines :f'or the

This reporting is voluntary and consists chiefly

of rough estimates, especially those prior to 1930.
Comparison of the fatality rates per million man-hours for the
various branches of the industry .from 1931 - 1946 are shown in
Tabl.e VII.
Princ:ipl.e Causes
The principal cause:J of accident.s in underground metallic and
nonmetall.ic mineral mines are:
1.

Falle o:f' rock or ore fran the roof (back) or wall.

TABLE Vll
Comparison o£ Fatalitz Bates ;eer Mi111.on Man-hours in Various
Branches o£ the Metal. and Nonmetallic-mineral.
lndustries 1 12.Z1-19~ · (20 ~

Year

Copper

1931
· 1932
1933
1934
1935

1.24
1.24
1.04
.s1
.85

1936
1937
1938
1939
1940

1.09
.94
.69
.flO
.99

19U
1942
1943
1944
1945

1.12

Gold 1 sllver,
misce1laneo\lS'H·
Iron*

Lead
and

0.72
.44

1.19
1.52
1.34
1.42
1.21

1.06
1.63
.35

1.l2
1.os
.94

.72
.66
.89

.S4

.72
.70
.64

.ss

.77

1.03

1.15
.so
.65

.86
.84
.69
.67
.67

.89
1.27
.92
.65

1946lUUOl K·.77

.56

.83

*
**

***
~"**
~~*

(20)

Ibid,

Nonmetallic
zinc*** mineralsiHE-H-

Total

.94

o.61
.59
.57
.53
.43

r.o1
1.16
1.01
1.00
1.02

1.38
.61
1.42
1.20
1.38

.19
.63
.34
.58
.74

.98
.91

.73

.38

.83

.84

.en

.89

.44

.71
.57
1.07
1.06
.85

.65

.91
.94
.94
.78
.67

.39

.86

.87

.69

.so
.66

Data £or 1911-42 exclude and £or 1943-46 include mangani£errous and ti tani£errous iron ores.
Data for 1911-42 inc1ude and for 1943-46 exclude figures on mangani:terrous and titani£errous iron ores. Data
for 1 9ll-42 include and fer 1943-46 exc1ude figures on
1ead-zinc mines outside the Mississippi Valley States.
Data £or 1911-42 rel.ate onl.y to 1ead-zinc within Mississippi Valley States and for 1943-46 relate to all lead-zinc
mines in the u.s. Data far 1911-42 inclule and for 194346 exclude figures on £luorspar mines within Mississippi
Valley States.
Data for 1911-42 excluie and for 1943-46 include figm-es
on £luorspar mines within the Mississippi Valley States.
Estimated

P. 99.
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2.

Explosives

3.

Haulage

4. Fal.l.ing down chutes or raises or into winzes.
Falling down shafts and riding the skip, cage, or bucket
are al.so import.ant causes o:r accidents.

In shaft mines 111 fa.lJ.ing

down shafts is the principal. cause o:r accidents, and riding the
cage, skip, or bucket is second.
Table VIII lists the fatal accidents at undergrowxi metal.
mines, classified into principal causes.
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TABLE VIII

Fatal Accidents at Underground Metal Mines, Cl.assitied
Into Principal. Causes. 1940=45 (21.)
Number of fatal accidents
1940 194l. 1942 1943 1944 1945
Fall. ot rock from root or wal.l.
Fal.l. of rock or ore while
1oading at working face. • •
Hand too1s • • • • • • • • • •
~p1osives • • • • • • •
• • •
Haul.age •• • • • • • • • • • •
Fal.l.ing down chute or raise • •
Other .:Calli of persons. • • • •
Run o.:C ore trCIIl chute or

74

70

76

49

49

0

2
0

1
0

0
2

3

0

9
2S
9

0
0
1.0
12.

26

16

15

21
0

ll
22
0

27
l.S

3

7

2

0

0

7
3

3

4

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

7
1
3
2
0
5
0
0

•
•

0
7

1.
1.2

.157

1.60

• l.2
• 1
• 0
• 0
• 6
• 2

1.6
2
0

pocket • • • • • • • • • • •

Dril.l.ing • • • • • • • • • •
Electricity • • • • • • • • •
Machiner;y • • • • • • • • • •
Mine fires • • • • • • • • •
Suffocation from natural. gas,
Inrush of water • • • • • • •
Stepping an nail • • • • • •
Handling material. other
than rock or ore • • • • •
Other causes. • • • • • • • •
Total. • • • • • • • • • •

81

1

5
5
2

2

s

6

3

0
0

0
0

1

2
0
2

0
l.2

18
1.

9

4
3

4

0
0

0

2

3

2
2

0

0

1.

0

0

1
0

0
0

2

0

0

1

7
1.70

15

5
1.08

2

7

156

85

Shaft:
Falling dO'Wll shaft • • • •
Objects falling down shaft,
Breaking cables • • • • • •
Over winding • • • • • • •
Skip, cage, or bucket • • •
Other causes • • • • • • •
Total underground fatal.ities

{21)

Harrington,
P. 1.00,

D.~

•
•
•
•
•
•

5
8
4
3
5
4
2
0
0
0
0
1
l.
1.
0
1
0
3
6
5
4
2
l.
0
5
4
3
----------------------------~---2].
23
17
22
15
9
178 183
187
1.78 123
94

East, J. H., Jr,, Wamcke, R. G., .22•

~••
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QUARRYim

c:Lassi:rication
Statistics o:C the quarrying industry usual.J.y cover both quarries and rela.ted p:Lants, such as cement pla.nts.

In many instances

emp:Loym.ent in related plants exceeds that in the quarries.
The Bureau of Mines uses eight principal. divisions of the
qua.r:eying iOOustry :Cor statistical purposes.
1.

Cement rock

2.

Granite

These are:

3. Limestone

4.

I.i..uB stone, chief product lime.

5. Marb1e
6. Sandstone

7.

S:Late

s.

Traprock
Accidents

The physica1 aspects o:C quarries vary w:ide1y.
pits in fairly f:Lat strata.

Some are open

Others are side-hill quarries with

:Low or high faces w:i..th strata at various inc:Linations.

Still,

others are underground workings.
The injury rates per million man-hours c1assified by open
quarries, tota:L quarries, and out side works are shown in Tab1e IX.
The :Catal.ity rates per mi11ion man-hours :Cor each o:C the
eight branches of the quarr,ying industry are shown in Tab1e X.
The cement industry is the largest branch of quarrying from the
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TABLE IX
Injur;l Rates 2!r Million Man-hours at Quarries
and Related Industries 1 l.~6-J.2!2 ~ 22 ~

Year

o;een · Q,!!arry .
Und.ersroUI¥1 Qua.rr:v
Total.
Accidents
Accidents
Accidents
Men emMen emMen emFatal.
Nonf'gal.
;el.ozed Fatal. Nonfatal. :El.ozed Fatal. Honfatal. ;el.ozed

1936
1937
19.38
19.39
1940

32,951
3.3,909
.30, 74D
31,489
.30,664

38
58
29
49

3,237
3,585
2,929
3,145
2,902

2,686
2,970
2,604
2,611.
2,714

1941
1942
194.3
1944
1945

.32,904
30,8.38
23,968
19,570
19,.307

48
81
43
44
28

3,768
3,190
2,467
2,005
1,830

.3,042
3,210
2,830
2,.370
2,246

48

5
9
2
2
3

297
345
199
230

6
3

5
4
5

242

35,637
36,879
.3.3 ,.344
.34,100
3.3,.378

53
47
60
31
52

3,534
.3,930
3,128
3,375
3,144

302
357
308
24.3
250

35,946
34,048
26,798
21,940
21,553

54
84

4,070
3,547
2,775
2,248
2,080

48

48
.33

Fatality rate per
Injury rate per
million man-hours
million man-hours
Outside
Outside
9J:!:arrz works Total. Quarry works Total.

Year

Outside works
Men emAccidents
Fatal Nonfatal
;el_EY~d

19.36
1937
1938
19.39
1940

44,.385
47,215
44,15.3
45,349
46,1.31

.38
.30
22
17
20

2,18.3
2,418
1,899
1,829
2,044

0.89
.74
1.15
.56
.94

0.44
•.32
.27
.19
.22

1941
1942
19h3
1944
1945

50,177 22
50,222 28
43,079 32
36,536 . .35
36,627 20

2,800
2,802
2,424
2,189
2,041

.81
1.25
.86
1.05
.76

.21
.25
.32
•.30
.24

o.62 59.14 25.00
.49 62.10 25.45
.61 59.97 2.3.27
•.3.3 60.45 20.78
.49 56.61 22.29

.38.87
40.10
.37.58
.36 •.18
.35.2.3

26.22
24.65
24.37
26.24
24.40

.39.67
35.11
.33.48
.34 •.32
32.41

61 •.33
52.82
49.70
49.00
.42 47.81

0.44
.62
.52
.56

(22) Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Wamcke, R. G., Safety in the
mining industry: u.s. Bur Mines Inf. Circ. 7485. Po 120, April 1949.

37.
TABLE X
Accident Data Classified

b~

Kind of Quar!% 1

(23)
12lt;C>-4~

Limestone.
Cement
Lime- chief proSandTrap
rock Granite stone duct ·lime Marble stone Slate rock Iota1
Nonfatal injury rates
per million
man-hours at
quarry:

14.21
15.73
17.78
21.17
20.41
16.09

58.22
6o.45
51.56
54.30
57.51
55.48

62.19
64.99
53.83
37.82
45.00
44.85

69.96
82.88
69.13
67.51
66.38
64.89

58.09
54.85
45.76
37.77
34.34
38.76

57.48
68.69
63.87
67.12
70.85
64.44

73.05
64.66
71.6o
45.61
58.90
79.68

69.87
77.01
75.41
69.85
66.48
62.12

56.61
61.33
52.82
49.70
49.00
47.81

1940. • •
1941. • •
1942. • •
1943. • •
19M.. • •
1945 •••

9.44
10.93
11.07
l2.99
13.92
12.48

44.26
49.40
42.39
41.94
43.00
45.97

52.54
55.96
48.98
42.96
42.21
39.25

47.07
61 •.30
52.35
50.33
47.00
48.99

40 •.32
46 •.3.3
38.55
.37.04
.30.68
43.24

50.80
59.76
59.49
56.82
60.54
56.73

70.8.3
57.21
74.44
50.07
61.17
49.97

62.94
68.31
59.43
58 .• 98
58.58
49.15

.35.23
39.67
35.11
33.48
34.32
.32.41

1940. • •
1941. • •
1942. • •
1943. • •
1944. • •
1945 •••

0.72
.6o
3.58
.94
54
.36

1.54
.72
1.84

o.so

0.96
1.48
.84
.70
1.12
.47

0.51

1.39
1.65

.78
.68
.90
1.06
.78

0.98
.55
1.12
.52
.67
.a1

0.56
.64
.58
.69
.77
.68

0.53
.67
.47
.59
.63
.41

0.50

1943 •••
1944. • •
1945. • •

0.27
.22
.65
.35
.33
.19

1940. • •
1941. • •
1942. • •
1943. • •
19M.. • •
1945 •••
Nonfatal. injury rate
per million
man-hours,
total:

Fatality rate
per mil.l.i.on
ma.n-hO\n'S at
quarry:

Total fatality rate per
million manhours:
1940. • •
1941. • •
1942. • •

(23)

.so

Ibid., P. 126 - 128.

.oo

.93

2.l.O

.oo
.45

.30
.53

1.52 0.52 1.07 0.94
.1...7
.92 .81
.50
.28 1.23 1.57 1.25
1.72 .86
.65
.79 4.42 .92 1.05
1.02
.76

1.02 o.2o 0.70 0.49
.34 .18 .76 .44
.19 .45
.89 .62
.82
.93 .52
.41 1.26 .77 .56
.55
.42

standpoint of employment.

Most of the -workers are empl.oyed in the

plants and surface works.

The industry has established by far the

l.owest accident rate per mil.l.ion man-hours of Empl.oyment during
1940 - 1945 of any of the eight branches of quarrying.

The fatal-

accident rate per mil.l.ion man-hours in 1945 was 0.19 and the nonfatal.-injury rate was l.2 .48.

These rates compare favorabl.y with

those for the entire quarrying industry for l.945 •
Limestone quarrying is the second largest branch of the quarry
industry- with respect to empl.oym.ent.
operating quarries.

It is the l.argest in number of

Many of the operations have side-hil.l. quarries

with high working faces and highly inclined strata.

A frequent

cause of accidents is slides of rock or overburdEn.

Handling mater-

ial.s, flying objects, fal.ls of persons, and haul.age are also important
causes.

In the three-year period 1943 - 1945, limestone quarries

had approximately 50 per cent of fatal. accidents that occurred in
all the quarries of the various di vi.sions and nearly 40 per

CEnt

the fatal. accidents that occurred in quarries and related plants.
Princiea;l. Causes of Accidents
The four principal causes of fatal accidents in quarries in
the relative order of their importance are:
1.

Fal.l.s or sl.ides of rock

2.

Explosives

3.

Haul.age

4.

Fal.ls of persons

The causes of fatal and nonfatal injuries in open quarries,
underground quarries, and shafts and sl.opes are shown in Tabl.es
XI, XII, and XIII, respectivel;r.

of
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TABLE XI
(24)
Open

~a.rries 1

Causes o:r Fatal. and Non:!atal .Injuries 1 · 1~6-~

Cauee o:r injurz
):9.26 12.,2(. 1~8
Fatalities:
Fal.ls or sl.id.es
or rock. • •
13 12 18
Handl.ing
1
1
materials • •
3
0
0
0
Hand tool.s. • •
Exp1osives • • •
14
7
9
6
6
4
Haulage • • • •
6
Falls o! persons
2
3
Falling objects
1
1
3
2
Flying objects.
0
0
l.
El.ectricity • •
3
4
Drilling and
1
0
0
cl:aMnel.ing •
0
Machinery • • •
4
7
Stepping on nail.
0
0
0
Boiler and air
ta.nk expl.osions 0
0
0
0
0
1
Burns • • • • •
Other causes. •
3
5
3
38
58
Total. • • •
48
Nonfatal inJuries:
Falls or slides
293 273 242
o:r rock • • •
Handling
materials • • 100810'71 858
Hand tools • • •
205 223 190
52
Explosives. • •
58
51
Haul.age • • • •
219 272 179
Fal.ls of persons 257 352 301
Falling objects
137 153
99
Fl3ing objects.
374 409 367
ll
Electricity • •
15
13
Drilling and
channeling •
155 167 165
246 278 190
Machinery • • •
Stepping on nail
12
16
30
Boiler and air
2
tank explosions
l
0
58
Bums • • • • •
34
44
Other causes • •
22~ 250 121
Total • • • • J237 J598 2929

l2J2 1~0 l2b;l 12~ 1~ 12Wt 12lz2 .
8

20

8

9

16

10

7

2
0
4
2

1
0
5
9
5
0
0
1

2
0
10
6
8
2
2
0

1
0
35
11
5

1

3

1

3
8
4

4
5

2
3
3
1
1

2

6
7
5
2
2
3

3
0

0
5
0

1
5
0

0
6
0

1
5

0
2
2

1
1
1

0
1
4

29

49

~

0
2
3
81

269 341

312

210 171 130

805
207
73
222
358
91
381
21

599 434 382
1.34 126 109
46
48
55
210 184 147
281 226 226
83
69
97
241 170 153
ll
8
15

193
256
7

141 124 127
217 200 176
2
5
4

4
0
0
2
0

288

885 914
185 182
54
53
215 173
319 284
86
117
405 320

1128
210

87
214

363

14

12

124
440
23

127
234
15

125
216
21

220
322
15

4

5

1
7

1
2

1

43

44

2
1
l
1
0
4
32
36
36 40 31
48
221 202 2~2 228 2~0 l~
3145 2902 .378~ 3190 24-7 2005

1
1
28 ·

1

53
12Q

iSJO

(24) Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R. G., .2e• ~., p. 123.
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TABLE XII
Urxlerground Quarries, Causes of Fatal and Nonfatal Injuries, 12.36=42
Cause of injur,y
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Fatalities:
Fall of rock from roof
2
2
2
1
1
0
2
5
or wall, • • • • • •
2
Handling rock at face
0
0
0
0
0
1
or chute • • • • • •
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Hand Tools. • • • • •
0
1
1
0
0
0
Explosives. • • • • •
0
5
2
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
4
Haulage • • • • • • •
2
Falling down chute raise
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
winze or stope • • •
0
0
0
0
1
Run of rock from chute
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Drilling • • • • • •
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Electricity • • • • •
0
Machiner;y, other than
0
0
0
0
0
0
locomotives & drUls
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Mine .tires. • • • • •
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Suffocation tram gas,
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inrush of water • • •
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Stepping on nail, • •
0
Handling materials
other than rock. • •
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
other causes. • • • • --....;:l:;---:O---::O:----ioo---io:--,_,.,;l;:---:1~---=::---o:----:-
Total • • • • • • ===2==~9=:::::::2::::::::::::2==3='::::6::::::::::3=::::::2:::::::l!tb:::::!4=
Nonfatal injuries:
FSil of rock fr<llll
32
55
32
19
28
42
38
39
39
34
roof or wall • • • •
Handling rock at
59 101
61
54
77 92 84 68 56 55
face or chute. • • •
28
14
8
30
17
22
8 15
14
14
Hand tools • • • • •
6
10
1
5
3
4
7
3
3
Explosives • • • • •
16 Ji3 29 14 12
35
30 16 19 23
Haulage • • • • • • •
Falling down chute,
2
8
0
4
6
3 11 12
raise, winze or stope
5
3
1
6
11
3
6
20
5
8
8
7
Run of rock from chute
60
45
46 56
32
29
34
25
29
17
Drilling. • • • • • •
1
1
0
0
1
1
3
0
0
0
Electricity • • • • •
Machinery, other than
20
10
11
10
7
5
15
8 15
7
locomotive or drill.
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1-l:ine fires. • • • • •
2
0
0
3
0
1
0
Suffocation from gas.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Inrush of water • • •
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
6
Stepping on nail, • •
Handling material other
than rock. • • • • •
34
22
9
13
14 27 17 18 13 10
Other
causes.
•
•
•
•
~6
51
2~.
32
36
32
46
52 . 38 - 3~
.....
Total • • • • •
291 342 194 229 . 242 . 301 353 300 239 244

___________________________________

(25}

Harrington, D,, East, J. H., Jr.; Warncke, R. G., ~· ~., p. 124.
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TABLE XIII
Shafts or Sl.opes at

~~rgrOWld

9lllrries, Causes o:r Fatal

and Nonfatal. Injuries, 19.26-45

1.936 1937 1.938 1.939 1940 1.941 1.942 1943 1.944 1.945

Cause of inj:ury

Fatalities:
Fall.ing ·down shaft • •
Objects falling
dO\Cl sha.f't • • • •
Breaking cables • • •
Overwinding • • • • •
Cage , skip, or bucket
Otber causes. • • • •
Total. •

• • • • •

Nonfatal inJuries:
Falling doVl shaft. •
Object falling
dO'Wn shaft • • • • •
Breaking cables • • •
Overwinding • • • • •
Cage, skip, or bucket
Other causes. • • • •
Total • • • •

<26)
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Harrington, D.. , East, J. H., Jr., Warncke, R. G.,~·
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PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS FROM FALLS OF ROCK OR ORE
The preventicn of rock-fall accidents requires the continuous
effort ot supervisors and men alike.

Good results can be obtained

on]¥ by providing as safe a working place as possible and by continual observance of individual safe practices with which the men
have been made familiar.

The responsibility for preventing roof-

fall accidents is a divided one.

This responsibility rests on the

shoul.ders ot management, the l«>rkers, and at least a limited part
on the state or other govemmEI'ltal inspection force.

However, the

main portico of the ·responsibility for this type of mine accident

is that of the individual worker.

In some mines the enforcement of a uniform timbering plan has
resulted in stopping or at least greatly reducing accidents from
this cause.

If' this practice is adopt:,ed uniformly

am

enforced

rigid]¥ the aecidEI'lts due to falls of roof and coal can be greatly
reduced.

It is

ated a1 together.

hi~

improbable however, that they can be elimin-

A reduction in accidents from this cause can also

be brought about by closer attention to roof and rib conditions.
This requires close cooperation between workers and management.
Causes of Loose Rock
Reports of surveys indicate· relatively small nwnbers of rockfall accidents caused by caving ground.

It has been found that a

large majority of this type of accident is caused by the fall of
rocks or ore under three tons in weight.

The most common causes

(27)
given for loosening and i'aJ.l of these rocks are as follows.
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(27)

Accidents from fall.s of rock or ore in metal mines:
Mines Miners• Cir. 52. p. 44, 1945.

u.s.

Bur.

Blasting
In mines where rock structures are not hard and firm, blasting
loosens pieces al.ready separ.a ted by slips and fractures.
Faults
As support is removed or a '\'Teak binding gives way slips and
seams due to faulting may a.ll.ow release of blocks.
Weathering
"Air slacking" is a conmon reason given for the presence of
loose rock after the wal.ls and back have been barred and scaled.
Air circulation which causes moisture and temperature changes that

affects the binding between pieces of rock can sometimes be a causative factor. as can percolating water.
Pressure
Rock bursts, bumps, and spalling are usually results of weight
or pressure of overlying ground.

Pressure is a cause of loose rock

only in recognized areas.
Area of Excavation
Opening of too wide areas without sufficient artificial support
is a common cause of failure and faJ.l of blocks or slab.

In loose

ground only a small area may be opened at a tiJOO with safety •
Time Element
The time dur:Ulg which ground is left open is an important consideration when pressure is a factor.

There is l.ike:cy- to be rel-
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atively little trouble from loose rock

~en

work in stopes or other

openings is continuous, but. when operations are slowed or intermittent bad con::litions may develop.

Where working places are timbered

this Il1.8\V be less important •
It is evident loose rock may be caused by natural forces or by
necessary mining methcxis.

Mine supervisors become fandliar with the

ground in lllhich the.r work and know which of the preceding factors
must be given attention.
Causes of Rock-fall Accidents
Causes which are common contributors to rock-fall accidents
{28}

are:
{28)

Ibid.,
"1.

P. 45~

Failure to test or inadequate testing of the surfaces at

the working place.
"2.

Faulty supervision due to improper training of bo11ses or

insufficient tine to give thorough attention to w:>rking places
visited.

"3.

Carelessness of experienced miners or mine official.s be-

cause of previous infrequency of accidents.

"4.

Carelessness of miners due to lack of or improper train-

ing.

"5. Inadequate lighting of working place for detection of
dangerous ground.

"6. Failure to use suitable

mining methods.
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"7 •

Negligence in .following and enforcing safety rules or

lack o.f safety rules."
Failure to bar down loose rock or ore .from overhead or from
the walls, failure to test the roof, and inadequate or improperly
placed timbers or excessive delay in placing timbers are largely
responsible .for this type o.f accident.

In any mine, a definite

method o.f timbering should be .followed.

Mining Method
Improvements and modifications in mining methcxls have somewhat
reduced the number o.f f'atalities and injuries fran rock falls in
some mines. · In sane instances they have had bEneficial effects on
production and costs aside from the saving in lives and compensation expense.

Although the type of mining is not the determining

factor in the causes of rock-fall accidents, there are instances
where the method of mining used is unsafe in the deposit being mined
and the men are exposed to excessive or unnecessa.ry risks.

Changes

of mining method have been made to find one giving more support to
the back or protection to the worker.

Only when a change to a dif-

ferent method is made or the one in use is modif'ied can these unnecessary risks be eliminated.
The method of mining is decided upon by the liiBJlagement.

It is

therefore their responsibility to take into account the safety factors involved when choosing the most economical method of extracting
the ore.

A certain stoping methcxl may be highl.;r desirable as to

simplicity, low cost, and high production rate but its use may be
impossible or undesirable due to limitations set by the physical char-
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acteristics of the ore deposit as they at£ect support.

Prevmti<Xl

of accidents .f'rom .f'aJ.J.s of ground is possible only lben the stoping
method affords adequate support for the gr-ound and protection to
the workmen.
Responsibility of ManagEill.ent and Supervisors
Accident prevention does not cease, by any means, wtth the
adopt. ion o£ a sate mining method.

Accidents will occur 'With any

stoping method unless safe practices are empl.oyed in every detail.

ot the work. After adoption of a suitabls mining method, the management must continue to study the proba.bl.e or existing hazards
with a view to eliminating them.

Investigations and reports of

accidents nmst be a continuing activity.

Bosses should instruct

the man in a standard routine or see that they follow a routine
in which prior instruction bas been gt ven.

They should al.so exam-

ine each -working place frequently enough to insure that it is in
safe working condition, and if a dangerous condition is discovered
they should stay <m the spot until it is corrected.

This is the

only method of insuring that the condition will be corrected.
Orders or instructions should be given speci.fical.ly •
One o.f the chief responsibilities of the mine of.ficials in the
prevention of accidents from roof .falls is to provide plenty of
suitable timber readily available to l>Drkers to use in making places
sa.fe.

Timbers in sufficient n'Wll.bers and sizes should be supplied

to working places at alJ. times together with an adequate supply of
cap pieces to enabl.e the men to set the necessary tiDbers tor their
protection.
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Responsibility of M1ners
A manta desire tor self preservaticn should be sutficient for
him to stay clear or dangerous places or to remove the danger U he
is aware of its presence and is able to do so.

It seems that sane

individuals are prone to take a chance in the bel.ie£ that tine and
work mAy be saved thereby and that his }revious i:amunity will protect him.

Unsafe working habits uay continue without. accidents for

a considerable period or time.

This usuall.y" leads to the mistaken

idea that the individual is superior to the hazard and gi. ves a tal.se
sense

or security. This is especial.ly true or older workers who

have worked in mines tor many years.

It is needless to say that

unsafe working habits will ultimately cause accidents to such a
wrker, his

re~low

workers, or both.

It is a duty or the miner

to help in trying to train himself to detect and recognize loC13e
and dangerous ground as well as to use the methods and safeguards
provided to avoid injury from it.
Testing Ground and Barring Down
One of the most important features of roof control from the
standpoint or reducing accidents from fal.ls of roof is proper sound-~

and barring down of the roof and sidewalls in each -wrking place.
S~t

and sound are used together in detecting loose rock.

A

pull with a bar is often a good test • . It a suspected piece of rock

wiJ.l. not move or come down when pried with a bar, it should be eacamined both by sight and sound.

It it can be done sateq, vibration

tests should be made by putting a hand on the .rock and striking the
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suspected loose rock with a hammer of su:fficient weight to give a
dependable amount. of vibration.

If a suspected loose rock cannot

be barred down or proved solid, a stull or stringer should be placed
under it immediat.el¥.

Many fatal accidents have occurred from falls

of rock or ore after efforts to pull it down at sane previous time
had failed.
A straight, sharp bar of a length that will enable the miner
to remain out from under the rock on which he is working should be
used for barring down.
i t desired.

One end may 'have the fonn of a pinch bar,

It is advisable to provide the bar with a handgu.ard.

Sounding, or testing of the roof, should be always done on
starting work after blastmg as well as from time to time during
the shift.
Air Cooling
It. has been knotm for saae time that

m&ny;

if not all, coal

mines have more trouble from bad roof during the warm summer months
than in winter.

In hot SUJml.er months the moisture-laden air enter-

ing a coal mine has a tendency for the moisture to condense on the
roof and ribs because the incoming air is cooled below its dew point
upon contact with the roof, ribs, and floor of the mine

passage~s.

As a result of this condensation the roof and ribs became wet and
are said to "sweat."
In many mines, as soon as this sweating begins, ·shale or slate
roof which appears solid and strong in winter months begins to deteriorate badly and fall in small slabs.

Timbering does not seem to
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be very efficient during this period because in time the roof will
shear around the supporting prop or crosspiece and either dislodge
the timber or leave it supporting only a few inches of crumbly shale.
This action occurs each summer and chokes airways with fallen slate,
tears dawn trol.qr wires, hampers haulage, endangers men and adds considerably to the deadwork cost.
The deterioration of mine roof in summer months is explained
by two theories.

One is that the moisture acts on lime or some

other ingredient of t.he roof ani causes it to crack and .fall.
other is that cold air in winter and
roof' to contract and expand
and .f'al.l.

warm air

alternately~

The

in summer cause the

and there.f'ore to loosen

'rhe belief that prevailed for sane time, and still does

to some extent, was that the roof trouble was caused by the sweating action .from the condensation of moisture on roof and ribs.

It

is now assumed, however, that the trouble is caused by expansion and
contraction of the roof due to changes of temperature.

This has

been confirmed by experiments at several mines in cooling the air as
it entered the mines.

As a result it has been found that by keeping

intake air at the normal mine temperature the roof is considerably
improved.
(29)
The following description
(29)

of the cooling plant at the mine

Fletcher, J. H., Cassidy, s. M., Air cooling to prevent falls
of rock: Am. Inst. Min. Met. Eng. Tech. Pub. 387. pp. 6-7,

1931.
of the Saxton Coal Mining Company operated in the No. IV coal just
north of' Terre Haute, Indiana. is a typical type install.ation.
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The air-cooling plant consists primarily or four
sets or water sprays through which all air passes before entering the mine fan. The sprq-heads are of a
patented, self-flushing type and the sets work in pairs,
t-wo alwqs on fresh water and the other two either on
fresh or recirculated water, depending on the temperature of the outside air.
Water issues in a fine sheet of spray, filling the
chamber with a mist, each small particle of which canes
into intimate contact with the air, thereby affording
an efficient heat exchange. Zigzag baffle plates set
vertica.l..ly beyond the innermost set of sprays prevmt
entrained moisture .from being carried through the fan
and down the shaft.
On either side of the spray chamber are by-passes
which are opened in winter to lessen air .friction. In
one of these are located the recirculating pump, piping
and automatic temperature-control apparatus. The cooler is substantially housed in a brick and concrete structure, similar in design and forming a unit with the fan
housing.
Cool water is obtained from deep wells that supply
the mine plant, a near-by village and an adjoining manufacturing plant. Used water drains away by gravity
through a tile line.
Beneficial effects on the mine roof have resulted from control
of temperature of mine air.

Saf'et.y is promoted, airwa;ys are not

choked, trolly wires stay- up, haulage is unhampered by' falls, and
deadwork cost is kept at a minimum.
Protective Equipment
The use of personal protective equipn.ent such as hard hats,
safety-toe shoes, spats, goggles and gloves have been found effective against injuries from rock falls.

These, of course, are

effective against small pieces of falling rock.

on~
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Education
A mining organization that sets out to eliminate accidents
trom rock talls must determine the causes, make needed changes in
methods where possible, and carry out a s,ystem of education to
bosses and miners designed to insure observance ot safety practices that have been well thought out.
Cooperation of management 1 bosses, and workers can be secured by :making all of them acquainted with the purposes of the
program and the means to be used in carrying it out.

This can

be accGmplished by personal contact, instruction on the job, meet.:..
ings of various groups where matters are explained, ani by studying available safety literature.

HAULAGE
Haulage and hoisting accidents general1y entai1 greater economic 1oss than any other type of mine accident except f'ires and exp1osions.

Many ac.c idents of' this type interruP:, production aBi re-

su1t in injury to persons and financia1 loss from damage to equip..
ment and property.

The obligation to provide safe working condi-

tions for empl.o;rees and the economic l.oss involved in haul.age accidents shou1d justify special. effort on the part of the mine management to reduce the hazards.

The analysis of haul.age accidents often

shows negl.igence on the part of both the employee and empl.oyer.
The attitude of the employee is a human characteristic that can be
corrected by inte1ligent selection of employees and b.y following
such selections with appropriate job instruction, adequate supervision, and enforcement of safety regulations.
Haulage injuries are usually serious.

The lesser injuries

llla\V invol.ve fingers, hands, or feet, but the number of accidents

involving broken bones, l.oss of f'ingers, or more serious permanent
disabi1ities is

relative~

l.arge, and the number of fatal.ities is

not negligible.
The prevention of haulage accidents depends largely on the
proper equipn.ent, proper maintenance of equipnent and haul.ageways,
suitable lay-out for safe as well as efficient haulage, and adoPtion and enforcement of practices to minimize haulage hazards to
mine employees.
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Causes of Accidents
Common unsa.fe practices that cause men to be killed or injured
from haulage accidents are riding on top of locomotives, on the
frame, or between cars, and getting in front. of pushed trips.

Ot.her

well-lalown causes of accidents are ;failure to secure cars on grades,
lack of clearance between cars and sidewa1ls, lack of clearance between clmte lips and haulage equipment., and electrocution during
switching o:perations.
Maintenance of Roadbed and Track
A good roadbed is the foundation of good transportation.

Such

a roadbed means good bal.last, grading, drainage, tmd proper maintenance.

Other prerequisites for safe and ef:ficient. haulage are ade-

quate weights o:f rail for the maximum load supported, correct size
and spacing of ties, proper frogs and switches, and ample radius of
curvature.
An essential part of a roadbed is the ballast..

Without it. a

track is likely to get. out of alinement or to sink, rails may bend,
or ties mq break.

A suitable ballast. material is one that a:ffords

free drainage, does not yield readily to weight, and is unaffected
by water or changes in atmospheric catdi.tions.
Wooden ties are most commonly used for track support on haul.ageways.

Regardless of the type of tie, they should be long enough

and broad enough to form a finn base urder the rails.
of ties is important..

The spacing

They must be close enough to support the mov-

.

ing load and prevent surface bending of the rails.

The weight of
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rail used and the weight o:f loads passing over the rai1 determine
tie spacing.

Permanent roads necessitate spacing not greater than

2-toot centers.
The size o:f rails depends on tbe weight of the trips to be
hauled and the speed to be attained.

Light or improperly supported

rails will bend and cause poor alinement of track, broken ties, and
eventual derail.ments that may cause serious or :fatal accidEilts.
Good switches are essential to sa:fe and efficient haulage since

a defective or poor switch installation mq cause derailment that
results in injury, death, or property damage.

A rigid-type switch

mq be used successtu.J.ly' with animal haulage or hand tramming when
cars are small and comparatively lig}lt in -weight.

When mschanicaJ.

haul.age is utilized every switch should be provided with a frog,
guardrails, points properly fitted with bridle bars, ani suitable
throw.

Automatic switch throws or positive acti<Xl, i t properly main-

tained, add materially to the s arety and efficiency or haulage.
Switch-throw levers that operate parallel to the main track and are
placed on the clearance side are recommended.

They are preferabq

placed in recesses cut into the walls, i:f operated at right angles.
The switch bar should be bridged by boards to prevent men from tripping along haulage roads.
The radius o:f track curves must be ample to perndt easy movement o:f locomotives and cars around them.

When the radius of curva-

ture is nat great enough the wheel flanges of locomotives will either
climb or spread the rails a1d cause wom tl.anges, wom or broken
rails, and derai.liUilts.

The flanges of mine-car wheels are o:ften
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broken when they are forced around short-radius curves.

Serious

accident.s or fatalities have resulted in many instances dUB to derailment o£ cars caused by pushmg long trains aro\D'ld short curves.
The motorman• s lack of adequate visibility is a constant hazard

ot

this practice.
Cl.earance
Proper clearance imp1ies sufficient space al.ong the haulage
drift or slope to enable a man to keep a safe distance from passing
locomotives and oars.

It is advisable to maintain a three-foot.

clearance continuously throughout one side ot the haulage, i f practicable. Where adequate clearance cannot be provided, it is essential that manholes or safety staticns designated by lights be constructed m the sidewalls.

A good practice is to mark such sml-

ters with whitewash and green lights.

These shelter holes are us-

ua.lly spaced at intervals not exceedmg 150 feet..
not more than 60 teet apart# is more suitable.

A distance of

An important .factor

concerning these shelters is the enforcement of strict regulations
demanding that anyone hearing an approaching train use them.
Even where there is nonnal.:cy sufficient clearance for men, improper loading of timber, drill steel, and other material may result
in their projecting too wide or too high and injuring bystanders.
Timber, drill steel, or other supplies demand handl.ing on special
trucks.

Trucks provided for timber haulage that are eq.tipped with

side stakes, which clear the bottom of all chutes on the haulage
road 1 reduce the hazard of possible injury to bystanders.

Timber

rwmers should be instructed not to load timber above these stakes.
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Accumulations of sl.ate and debris of all kinds along the travelway,
and timbers, piping, loose rails, or other material le.f't to obstruct
the clearance side of the track are all definite hazards to safe
haul.age.
Locomotives
In metal mines, storage-batteey locomotives have displaced

trolley locomotives in some small mines and in secondary haulage
in larger mines because of their greater flexibility in operation

and the ease ld. th which they can be moved from one level to another.
They have a high ..al.ue in timbered drifts that crush badl.y and mere
the high cost of maintenance of' trolley wires and the danger of fire
make the use ot trolley locomotives almost prohibitive.

They are

safer in operation due to their low voltage and slower speed and
the absence of a bare trolley wi.re.
Compressed-air locomotives are considered the safest type of
locomotive.

They have, however, been largely displaced by electric

haulage because of' the initial cost of the locomoti vee, canpressor
plants, and pipe lines; lack of operating flexibility; inability to
handle overloads; and lowmechanical efficiency.

They operate

urder self-contained power, a.n:i the absence of bare charged wires
eliminates the hazard of tire and electric shock.
Trolley locomotives are generally used for main-line haulage.
The cable-reel type of trolley is o.f't,en used for gathering in places
beyond the trolley wire installation.

The locomotive speed sane-

times exceeds the cable-reel rewin:iing speed in traTel.ing toward
the trolley circuit and arcing may occur i t the locomotive runs
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over the cable.

The cable insulation often becomes worn and defec-

tive fran abrasi<Zl. and presents a shock and fire hazard unless the
cables are inspected frequently and kept. in good repair.
The use of gasoline locomotives is prohibited by the laws of
many states because of the danger of carbon monoxide from the exhaust gases and .fire from t.he gasoline.

The poisonous gases re-

leased in the exhaust and the fire and explosion hazard of gasoline
work to prohibit the use of this locomotive underground.
Sufficient room at each end of locomotives will provide a
secure seat for motormen and brakemen that is reasonably safe from
injury if a collision occurs.
reduce the shock hazard.

Insulating seats and floor pads will

Handholds should be securely anchored to

the l.ocomotive frame and within easy reach of both the motonnan and
brakeman or triprider.

Installation of shields in the decks or

cabs of l.ocomotives will afford protection to the feet of the motorman.

It is essential that every locomotive have a well-protected

headlight at each end strong

EllOugh

to show any obstruction or

other haulage-road defect 200 or 300 feet ahead.
also have suitable warning devices.

Locomotives must

The use of relatively l.arge

trolley wheel.s has been found to reduce arcing.

A well-designed

locomotive has a safe methcxi of trunk wiring and the gearing and
cases are strong and raised far enough above the ties so that damage to this part of the equipment will be reduced to a minimum in
the event of derail.ment.
Controlling e qui:pmen t is best designed to operate without sparking and should be wel.l.-braced and grounded to the frames and floor

p~ates

of the

~ocomotiw.

The controller handle, when properly

bo~ted,

installed is keyed,

or

~ocked

in place so that there w:ill

. be no chance of it being removed when in operation.

A controller

with an interlocking device to pre.vent reversa1 unless the power
is cut off is a1so recommended.
Maximum safety demands that each

~ocomotive

be equipped with
pr~ector

fuses or circuit breakers, one main protector, and one
for each motor.
should be

The

secure~y

stee~

or wooden covers on top of

fastened in place.

~ocomot.ives

Protection is offered the

motorman by a suitable, strongly constructed cab.

Where the bum-

pers of a locomotive do n~ give adequate protection against cars
c~imbing

into the cab or onto the deck, additiona1 protection must

be provided.
Back-po~ng

is a frequent cause of broken trolley

po~es

and

also results in injuries from fragments which often strike the motorman.

It must not be permitted except. at places where the trolley

pole cannot be reversed or when the locomotive is ascending steep
grades am then only at very low speed.
A number of measures are recommended for the safe operation of
locomotives.

Motormen should be capable, careful, and alert.

It is

the duty of motormen to move locomotives only when seated in the cab.
A motorns.n should set the cent roller at neutral, set the l:rake tightly,
and remove the trolley connection from the wire before lsaving a locomotive.

A warning

~ight

is a necessary safeguard when a locomotive

is left standing on a through track.

Safe practice demands that

the motorman not sta.rrl when applying power or lhen the

locan~ive

is in motion because of the danger of losing his balance and being
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thrown .from it.
motion.

He should not get off a locomotive 'Wb.Ue it is in

Practices such as · jumping off a moving locomotive and run-

ring ahead to throw a switch or open a door are strictly forbidden.
Safe niethcxls that may be used to eliminate accidents from this
cause are: (1) using automatic

s'~tches

and doors, (2) using switch

throwers and door tenders, or (3) having the train cone to a complete stop before the brakeman goes ahead.
A practice that has caused numerous injuries is that of coasting up to a latch or switch point and the bralteman or motorman trying to throw it with the hands or feet.

Safe operation requires

the motorman to stop his train to throw the switch where switches
automatical~

controlled are not used.

Riding on cars or locomotives by persons other than those in
charge annually takes a heavy toll of life. Only authorized persons should operate locomotives and no other person should be allowed to ride on it unless specificall,y authorized by the mine
foreman.
The practice kno'Wl'l as making flying switches, that is uncoupling and speeding .up the locomotive and throwing of the switch be-

hind it by the brakeman and allowing the cars to

rtm

into another

track, is an unsafe practice and should be prohibited.

A locomo-

tive "run-around'' will permit the motorman to pull the train into
a sidetrack.
Pushing of cars, particularly a long trip of cars, is a hazardous practice that has reaul.ted in numerous accidents.

Cars that are

being pulled are less likely to be derailed than cars being
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pushed because the force is transmitted through the drawba.rs and
couplings instead of the bumpers.

Also, then trips are pushed the

motorman's vision is restricted so that a derailm.El'lt may be quite
destructive before the motorman is aware of it.
Loose clothing catching em projecting parts of cars and locomotives has been responsible for many haulage accidents.

Employ-

aes t such as motormen and especiall,y brakemen and trip riders should
be required to . wear tight-fitting clothing and either to wear boots
or high-top shoes or to keep their socks pulled up over their trouser legs.
Coal-mine haulage is kept, in intake air as far as possible.
This minimizes the likelihood of ignition of explosive gas by electric haulAge equipment.
Mine Cars and Couplings
Car brakes constitute serious hazards when not properl,y maintained.

Faulty brakes may cause a worlonan to lose control. of his

car and result in a serious wreck or possible injury.

Fail.ure of

some pa.rt of the brake rigging while he is attEmpting to set brakes
may cause him to lose his balance and be thrown umer a moving trip.
Defective brakes are 1t.0rse than no brakes at all since they may give
a feeling of false security.

\'Tell-designed, properl,y constructed,

and well-maintained brakes are essential aids to safe control o:f
standing or moving cars.

Brakes that are installed to operate from

the clearance side or end of the car are best.
The lack of, or improper design of, bumpers on mine cars is
also an important cause of haul.age accidents.

A good l:umper is one
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that provides suitabl.e contact sur.f'ace for the bumper
or l.ocomotives at al.1 degrees of'. curvat\lre
irregularities in the track surface.

or track and .for

EllOU.gh

al.l.

It is al.so long enough to

allow adequate c1earance for coupling and uncoupling.
are l.arge

or other cars

Bumpers that

and strong enough to keep the bodies of' the cars

separated by at l.east 12 inches on straight track are recommended.
Wheel atd axl.e assembl.ies are important .factors in haulage.
Proper l.ubrication of' car whee1s and keeping mine cars in good condition will not only extend the life of wheel.s and a.xls s but will
el.iminate many derailments.
Proper care in designing mine cars wil.l. avoid projecting irons
or bol.ts.

As mentioned previously, many haulage accidents have

occurred When l.oose clothing was caught on such projecting parts
of cars and locomotives.
Excessively or improperly topped cars are the cause of some
haul.age accidents.

Excessive or high topping of cars usually in-

dicates a Shortage of mine cars or inadequate haulage facil.ities.
The increase in output due to high topping is often imaginary, as
much spillage occurs in transit and during coupling of cars.

Any

advantage of increased output that may be gained is probably outweighed by dirty roadways, increased dust hazard, and the liability
to haulage accidents. ·
Trips and cars not properly blocked have caused many accidents.
Sprags, chains, or car blocks should be used on all standing cars,
regard1ess of grade, and if cars have brakes, they also should be
set.
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The responsibility for the proper blocking of cars at w:>rking
faces is placed upon the haulagemen, if they place the cars at the
face, or upon the miners i f they handle the cars at the face.
Spragging cars in lieu of proper blocking is not a safe practice because sprags are not a positive stop.

The car wheels may

slide on the rails and the protruding ends of the sprags offer a
stumbling hazard.

Sprags are generally used for retarding trips.

Both steel and wooden sprags are used.

Although steel sprags are

stronger than wooden sprags, the wooden sprag will stay in place
better than the steel sprag and is probably the more common type
used.

Spragging is a dangerous practice and has resulted in many

injuries.

Blocks placed on the rail in front of a wheel are much

safer than sprags for retarding or stopping trips of cars at partings or shaft bottan.s.
Slides or skids are recommended for trains descending steep
grades where the locomotive cannot adequate;cy- control the trains.
A skid is a steel shoe which is placed under one or both car wheels
on the same rail.

When a skid is used the car wheel no longer

rolls on the rail, but the skid acts as a sled runner sliding on
the rail.

It offers considerably greater frictional resistance

than a sprag because of greater surface of contact.

At the same

tine, use of skids avoids the uneven abrasion resulting in flat
'Wheels from the constant use of sprags.

Inserting sprags with a

trip in mot ion is a hazardous. practice.

Skids should be placed

only when a trip is statiwary.
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Coupling
The practice of coupling and tm?oupling cars while in motion
has resulted in a large number of injuries and .fatalities.

Although

a large variety of mine-car coupling devices is available; none,
except tully automatic car couplings, affords

absolute safety in

operation if coupling is attempted while cars are in motion.
ling cars without placing their bodies between the cars
feet on the rails is a

necess~ty

tor brakemen.

COUP-

or their

The hazard of a

coupler getting his body between the cars is reduced by providing
hand hooks for use or trip riders in coupling and uncoupling cars.
Cars must not be coupled by hand from the inside of curves.
The two inherent dangers in all coupling devices is breakage
and uncoupling.

Breakage can be minimized by the selection of suit-

able sizes, shapes, and materials, also. the discarding of couplings
when

wom and their proper inspection at intervals, together w.i th

heat treatment.

Accidental tmcoupling can be minimized by the use

of couplings permitting freedom o£ the movement o£ parts.

Couplers

should be protected from falling dirt that may get into the mechanism and coupler shanks should be long enough to keep the corners of
the cars from coming together on the curves.
In general, mine haulageways are very poorly lighted.

As a

. result, many haulage accidents occur because of poor illumination.
A sufficient number o£ lights must be installed at shaft bottoms
and partings to provide enough illumination tar coupling and uncoupling

cars with safety •

All lights are preferably equipped with
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reflectors to prevent glare and recessed in the roof or
or have substantial guards to prevent breakage.

side\~

Haulage men shoul.d

be provided with the newest-type, large-candlepower permissable

electric cap lamps.

The cords of these lamps can be prevented fran

catching on protruding objects by connecting them under their clothing.
Dispatching and Signal Systems
The railroads have developed a highly eff.'icient system of

transportation that has reduced congestion, delays, and accidents.
These results have been accompl.ished to a large ex:tent by a high:cydeveloped system of block signals and dispatching.

The transpor-

tati'cn problems in l.arge mines are similar to those involved in
railroad transportation.

Some transportation practices of the rail-

roads are vetry worthy of adoption in mine transportation problems.
Operation without interrupt:, ions and delays can best be attained
by arranging a schedule £or all. trips and specifying the number of
cars per trip.
in large mines.

Dispatchers or haulage f.'oremen are of.'ten employed
A dispatcher controls the movements of' all trips,

supervi.ses haulage employees directly, and maintains discipline
among them.

He also concerns himself' wi. th an equitable distribution

of rolling stock and knows the production at any hour of the shift
and the tonnage possibilities £or the shift.

A competent dispatcher

will aid materially in achieving full util.ity of the haulage equiPment with the maximum sa.tety to employees.
Electric signal lights are widel.y used and in large mines

~
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consist of a block-signal system • . They are a necessity 'Where several haulage crews are operating.

Systems using several colcr s of

globes to indicate a ·variety of conditions about chutes, supp]J'
raises, and sections of track azoe used in sone mines.

Perhaps a

better nethod for single-track systems i.s to have the motorman call
the dispatcher by telephone, as he reaches each si.detrack 6 for
i.nst.ructions as how to proceed.
The signal system serving the needs of a mine may be a simple
ham-operated light or one that is automatic with nWllerous blocks
and one or more dispatchers.
The following signals are generally used by haulage crews:
Whistling by- mouth, movement of cap lantps, pounding on trolley wire ,
and metal whistle.

It is obviously a dangerous practice to give

signaJ.s by pounding on trolley wire.

Whistling by mouth may not

be audible and in many instances the motorman may not be able to
see the brakeman•s light signal.

The most satisfactory method of

signaling by haulage crews is probably with metal whistJ.es.
Chutes
Accidents, chiefly from rolling rocks, falling chute lips, and
unsafe use of point bars, resuJ.t from car loading at chutes.

The

car loader often has very little room to work in and about the
chute, so that he must climb into the car or bend around it to start
or stop the fJ.ow of ore.

We11 constructed chutes w.i th a protected

platform and easily controlled chute gates greatq reduce the hazards.
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Haulage Crews
Selection and education of haulage crews are important factors
in the prevention of haulage accidents.

Haulage men have consid-

erable responsibility to perform their duties without injury to themselves or other employees.

Also, they must often guard and direct

other employees whose work brings them in the vicinity of haulage
operations.

Instruction and supervision of haulage men in their

duties and practices are important factors in impressing upon haulage employees the methods and procedures essential for safe operation.
Strict discipline of haulage men is probably more important than for
any other class of underground work because close supervision of such
work is not possible.
Injuries in mine haulage can be frequently traced to defects
in equipment, untrained or poorly trained or unreliable haulage

crews, and lack of adequate supervision or control of haulage movement.
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EXPIDSIVES

Misuse of explosives and disregard of wel.l.-known safety rules
covering the use of explosives cause many avoidable accidents annually resulting in the death or maiming of men in the mining industry.

Blasting accidents, when not fatal are usually serious.

E:lc-

plosives are one of mankind• s most powerful sources of energy in
highl.\Y concentrated form.

By their very nature, explosives create

a potential hazard wherever they are used.

The ease with which

they can be detonated and the suddenness and violence·with W1ich
they detonate require great care in their handling and use i.f severe accidents are to be avoided.
The decreased use of black powder and the increased use of permissible explosives in underground bituminous-coal mining have contributed much to the lowered fatality record.

Improved explosives,

blasting equipnent, and the ex:pansion in .t he use of electric blasting have also helped in the reduction in the number of blasting
accidents.
Causes of

Ex:pl~~~1!.A.cci~~.t_!

Probably the greatest cause of explosives accidents is misjudgment or chance-taking in handling ani using explosives.
is not ordinarily listed in reports of accidents.

This

It is an inex-

cusable cause and much can be done toward its elimination by proper education and supervision.

Some other causes of explosive

accidents are: short fusing, ignorance of burning rate of .fuse,
improper charging and tamping o.f drill holes, drilling into unex-

68.
ploded charges of explosives, returning too soon after a shot has
been fired or after a misfire, and shots breaking through into the
face

am

rib.

Asphyxiation from fumes of explosives is also res-

ponsible for fatal and nonfatal injuries.
Regulations and recommendations issued under the Federal Ex:plosives Act serve as an excellent guide in the prevention of explosives accidents.

The following discussion on storage, handling,

and transportation of explosives incorporates many provisions and
recommendations of the Act.
Storage
Storage magazines should be located, protected, constructed,
and managed so as to guard against accidental ex:plosion of their
contents.
The conditions of storage of explosives have a deep relation
to safety in their use.

Improper storage of explosives, detonators,

fuse, and squibs mq lead to misfires, to unexploded powder in the
hole or in the blasted material, or to the burning of charges in
the hole.

The handling of misfires, and the existence of undiscov-

erod misfires constitute two of the chief sources of accidents from
explosives.

Thus, measures to prevent mis:fires are fundarr;.ental to

safety.
Sur~ace

Magazines

It is reconnnended that surface magazines be provided for the

(30)
storage of explosives at mines.
(30)

Storage recommendations follow:

Explosives accidents in bituminous-coal mines:
Miners• Circ. 58. pp. · 39-40, 1947.

u.s.

Bur. l-1ines

1. High explosives (permissible explosives or
dynamites) in amounts exceeding 125 pounis should be
stored in permanent magazines.

2. High explosives in amounts of 125 pounds or
less may be stored in perma.nen t magazines; if not so
stored, such explosives should be stared in box-type
magazines.

3. Black blasting powder in amounts exceeding 125
pounds should be stored in permanent magazines.

4. Black blasting powder in amounts of 125 pounds
or less may be stored in permanent magazines; i.f not so
stored, it should be stored in box-type magazines.
Surface storage magazines should be constructed of incombustible material or covered with fire-resistant material and be bullet
resisting and weatherproof.

Permanent magazines are preferably

{31)
building types.

The walls should meet the .following specifications
--~-------~~--- · - - -- · ~ . ~~-

(31)

Idem, P. 42.

or be constructed of other materials that make them at least equally
bullet-and theft-resistant:
1. Solid construction, not less then 6 inches in
thickness, o.f materials such as concrete, nasonry, medium-so.ft brick, or wood; or
2. Filled construction, such as concrete blocks
with the cells .filled vri.th screened sand, weak concrete,
cement mortar, or other effective bullet-resistant filler; or exterior and int erior v10oden walls not less then
6 inches apart l-ri.th the space between filled \'Jith screened
sand, weak concrete, canent mortar, or other e:ffecti ve
bullet-resistant filler, and the exterior walls covered
tdth sheet iron not lighter than No. 26 gage, or other
fire-resistant mat erial; or

3. Lined construction such as steel plate not
lighter than No. 14 gage, lined with weak concrete, cement mortar, brick, or with soft,vood not less than 3 inches in thickness.
These wall specifications govern the construction of any arti-

70.
ficial enclosing wall for tunnel - or dugout - type magazines that
are either on or exposed to the surface of the ground.
The foundation for such a magazine may be substantiall.¥ constructed of brick, concrete, or stone.

Any space betweEil "the floor

and the ground can be enclosed in some manner to prevmt the entrance of persons, animals, sparks, and firebrands.
Magazine roofs, when properly designed, are substantially constructed to be fire-resistant and to resist theft, as for example;
wood frame and sheathing, covered with corrugated galvanized iron.
If it is possible to fire bullets directly through the roof into
the explosives, it is necessary that the roof be made bullet-resistant b,y material of construction, or by a ceiling that forms a tray
containing not less than a 4-inch thickness of sand or other bulletresistant filler erected in the interior of the magazine.
Doors of surface magazines are preferably constructed of 3/8inch steel plate lined with a 2-inch thickness of wood; or of a
thinner steel plate with a greater thickness of wood, at the rate
of one additional inch of wood for each 1/8-inch decrease in the
thickness of the steel plate; or of wooden walls at least 4 inches
apart and filled with screened sand or other effective bullet-resistant filler, the exterior being covered with sheet iron not
lighter than No. 26 gage

or

other fire-resistant material; or of

wo<Xl not less than 6 inches thick; or of reinforced concrete not
_(32)
less than 4 inches thick.
(32)

u.s.

Bur. Mines Miners• Circ. 58.

.2E•

~.,

p. 44.
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Doors installed in such a manner that the fastening is strong
and cannot be removed when the magazine is l.ocked are advisable.
They should be equipped with sturdy locks of either the padlockor mortise-lock type and al\'tays kept securely locked when nat attended by an authorized person.
Magazines
ventilation.

should have no openings except for entrance and

All vents should be covered with metal screening or

otherwise constructed to prevent the entrance of persons, animals,
sparks, or firebrands or the direct entrance of bullets that can
detonate the explosives.
It is necessary that storage magazines be l.ined inside to
guard against metal coming in contact with stored explosives.

Floors

should be snooth and constructed of nonsparking materials, preferably wood.
Safety and economy in operation nrust be considered in magazine
l.ocation.

Magazines shoul.d be detached buildings erected on suit-

ably drained pl.aces.

Insofar as possible, it is recommended that

magaz ines be located in accordance with the arnmended American Table
of Distances shown in Table 16.

Effective barricades should be

constructed i f the magazine does not conform to these requirements
and relocation is nat practicable.

The location of magazines in

some states is governed by laws and regulations.

Storage in such

states must conform to state l.aws or local requirem:mts.

Magazine

areas should be cleared and kept free of rubbish, dry grass, or
mater ial of a combustible nature for nat l.ess than 25 feet, and preferably 50 feet in al.l directions.
Magazines shoul.d be kept clean and catbustible material not per-

TABlE XIV

*American Table of

Number
Over
1,000
5,000
10,000
20,000
25,000
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
750,000
1000,000
1500,000
2000,000
2500,000
3000,000

3500,000
4000,000
4500,000
5000,000
7 500 t 000
10000,000
12500,000
15000,000
17500,000

Number
N~ Over

Pounds
Over

Pounds
Over

N~

5,o0o

10,000
20,000
25,000
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000

300,000

350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
750,000
1000,000

1.500,QOO
2000,QOO
2500,000
3000,000
3500,000
4000,000
4500,000
5000,000
7500,000
10000' 000
J-2500 '000
15000,.000
17500,000
20000,000

(33)
Dis~ances

Irihabited
Bui1dmgs,
Barricaded
Feet**
. 15

30
50

100
200

300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1500
2000

3000
4000
5000
60oo
7000
8000
9000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
55000
60000
65000
70000
75000
80000
85000

50
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1500
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
55000
60000
65000
70000
75000
80000
85000
90000

60
73
120
180
260
320
360
400
430
460
490
510

530

600
650
710
750
780
805
830
850
870
890
975
1055
1130
1205
1275
1340
1400
1460
1515
1565
1610
1655
1695
1730
1760

Public

Public
Highway
Barrica- Barricaded Feet ded Feet~*

Ra.i.l.way

10

20
35

45
70
110
155
190
215
240
260
275
295

305

320
360
390
425
450
470
485
500
410
520
535
585
635
680
725
765
805
840
875
910
950
970
995
1020
1040
1060

5

10

1.8

23
35
55
75
95
l.l.O
1.20
130
1.40
150
155
160
180
195
210
225

235

245
250
255
260
265
290
315
340
360
380
400
420
440
455
470
485
500
510
520
530
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T·ABLE XIV, continued

---- --·--- ·Nwnber
Over

Number
Not Over

-- -

Pounds
Over

--

Inhabited
Buildings,
Barricaded
Feet**

Pounds
Not Over

-- .--.-----·

Public
Railway
Barricaded Feet

---------

1790
1815
1835
- 1900
1965
2030
2095
2155
2215
2275
2335
2390
2445
2500
2555
2605
2655
2705

90000
95000
100000.
95000
100000
l25000
125000 150000
150000 . 175000
175000 200000
200000
225000
225000
250000
250000
275000
300000
275000
300000 325000
325000 350000
350000
375000
400000
375000
400000
425000
L,.50000
425000
450000
475000
500000
475000

Public
Highway
Barricaded FeetiP-:-

1075
1090
1100
1140
1180
1220
l260
1295
1330
1365
1400
1435
1470
1500
1530
1560
1590
1620

540
545
550
570
590
610
630
650

670
690
705
720
735
750
765
780
795
810

*

Assheton, Ralph, and Coy, Edmund B., American Table of Distances; Institute of Makers of Explosives, New York, revised 1919.
~B*- Barricaded, as here used, signifies that the
building cent aining explosives is screened from other
buildings, railu;,ws, or highuays by either natural or
artificial barriers. :\here such barriers do not
exist, distances should be doubled.

------ --------------··- -·- ------(33) u.s. Bur. Mines Miners• Circ.
p. 47.
------------·". . . ... __ -·-- ------58.,~.~.,

__ _......_. _ _ __ ______

,

,
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mitted to accumulate in or around a magazine.

Floors should be swept

frequently and the sweepings removed and destroyed.

If magazine

floors become stained with nitromcerin, they can be scrubbed with
a stiff broom or hard brush using a solution composed of
of water,

3i

1!

quarts

quarts of denatured alcohol, 1 quart of acetone, and

(34)
1 pound of sodium sulphide (60 per CEnt conmercial).

(34)

This liq-

Blasters• handbook, 12th. edition, p. 47, Wilmington, Delaware, E • .. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. (Inc.), 1949.

should be used freely to thoroughly decanpose the nitroglycerin.
If artificial light. is necessary, electric flashlights or
electric lanterns are recommended.

If the magazine is illuminated

electrically, the lamps should be the explosion-proof type installed
and wired in accordance with the National Electrical Code.

The wh--

ing should be installed in conduit and the electric switch placed
outside the building.
Smoking or carrying smokers• articles or open name should not
be permitted near anymagazine or While e.xplosives or detonators
are being handled.
Detonators, Cardox heater elements, tools, or materials other
than explosives must not be stored in magazines.

However, safety

and detonating fuse may be stored in any explosives or detonator
magazine.
It is best to store dynamite top side up.
may be stored on their sides or ends.

Black powder kegs

The kegs should be shaken

with the hands or rolled every 30 to 60 days to prevent the p~1der
from caking.
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Empty explosives cases are properly destroyed by burning out.
of doors.

Kegs that have contained black powder can be safely dis-

posed of by sinking them in a river or other large body of water.
It is essential that the premises of a magazine be nsrked conspicuous:cy- wi.th signs to adequate:cy- warn any person approaching the
magazine of the presence of explosives.
Box-type magazines should not be used for storing explosives
in amounts greater than 125 pounds.

They should be strongly con-

structed of wood, preferably, or i f metal should be lined with a
nonsparking material.

Doors or lids should be provided with strong

fastenings that cannot be removed when the magazine is locked.

Box-

type magazines should be equipped with a sturdy lock and clearly
marked with the work "Explosives."

This type magazine, 'When located

outside a building, should' be anchored securely •

When placed in a

building, bax-type magazines should not be stored 'With highly flammable material, or near sources of external. heat.
It is required that surface magazines be provided for the storage of detQ'lators.

Under no circumstances should detonators and

explosives or blast:ing-device heaters be stored together.

A perman-

ent detonator-storage magazine is desirably located when not less
than lGO .feet linbarricaded or 59 feet barricaded frOIJl a permanent

.

.

.

(35)

explosives-storage magazine.

(35)

u.s.

Bur. Mines Vdnerst Cir. 58.

op. cit., p. 50.

Permanent magazines, conforming to the same specifications mentioned for permanent explosives-storage magazines, should be used
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for storing detonators in quantities of more than 5000.

In quanti-

ties of 5000 or less, detonators may be stored in permanent magazines or box-type magazines.
Magazines used for distributing explosives and detonators meet
the same constructic::n specifications as storage magazines.

They are

best located not less than 200 feet from any mine opening or vital.
structure.

The a1pply kept in them should not exceed one day•s

requirement.
Underground Magazines
Unierground magasines should be so situated that in the event
of .fire or accidental explosion of the contents they shall not cl.ose
the exit from the mine, nor endanger the lives of workmen by circulation of fumes through the mine by the ventilating current.
magazine, if properly located is away from
and power lines.
rock-dusted.

roadw~s

The

and trolley

In a coal mine, the surrounding region is well

Every underground magazine should be constructed of

fireproof material, well-marked with warning signs, and should be
kept locked when not attended by an authorized person.

The general

specifications for sur face storage are also applicable to urrlerground storage, and will not be repeated.
When box-type magazines are used, explosives and detonators
must be kept in separate boxes or maga·z ines.
Not more than a 36-hour supply of explosives or detonators is
recoiiDD.ended for storage underground in a magazine or operation box.
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Transporting
All the rules .for transporting explosives and .for magazine
operations are essential for the safe transportation of explosives and explosive supplies • .from the sur.face magazine to underground magazines, and their .final handling to the point of use.
The exact procedure to be .followed in transporting explosives at a particular mine is influenced by the conditions.

HCJW'-

ever, general principles may be stated.
Surface transportation of explosives should .follow the

reco~

(36)
mendations under Transportation on Public Highways.

(36)

u. s.

Bur. l1ines Miners' Circ. 58.

_2£. cit., P.

:EKplosives

57.

and detonators should never be left unattended until they are placed
in a magazine and the magazine is locked or are delivered to someone authorized to receive them.
Transportation o.f explosives from the surface to the mine is
safely scheduled on a

dai~

basis or at short intervals.

If pos-

sible, explosives are preferably sent underground off-shift.

Long

storage in the mine is not recoliiDl.ended because of the quantities
involved and the effect on the explosives of the usually humid atmosphere.
Explosives should be transported into the mine in closed cars
designed for that purpose alone.

The bodies and covers of such cars

should be constructed substantially of nonconductive material and
should be fully insulated.

The interior of the car may be lined

with wood with no metal parts protruding.

vlhen explosives and det-
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onators are transported in the same explosives car or in the same
special.l;r designed container, they must be separated by at least
a 4-inch. securely fastened wooden partition or the equivalent.
Many state laws require ·that detonators and explosives must be

transported

individually~

This is a much safer practice.

It is

advisable that explosives of different types not be carried in the
same box or car, since one type might explode or ignite more readily
than the other.
With motor haulage, cars containing explosives and detonators
should be pulled and not pushed.

Likewise, an insulated coupling

should connect the cars and locomotive and at least tl«> empty cars
should be placed between the locomotive and the explosives car to
reduce the danger of passage of current from the locomotive into
the car.
Explosives or detonators should never be carried on the

~e

trip with workmen and trips carrying ex.plosives should not be hauled
into or out of a mine within 5 minutes preceding or following mantrips.

It is recorrunended that the explosives trip precede if trav-

eling against .the air current.
Mine cages should travel slowly when explosives are transported
in a shaft and persons should be prohibited from riding with them.
Explosives and detonators issued to individual miners should
not be carried together or should be brought to the working places
in individual, insulated containers.
Explosives or detonators are never safely transported by scraper loaders or on flight or shaker comveyors.
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Hand1ing
Priming ·
When making pritrers, one of the several reconunended DBthods
of assembling primers is advised.

All of the various DBthods of

making primers require punching one or two holes through the primer cartridge :for the insertion of caps, leg wires, or IIPrimacord .u
A satisfactory tool for punching should always be used.

Such a

tool. is a ·pointed pin of wood, brass, aluminum or other nonsparking material.

The pin should be long enough to punch a hole at

l.east a half inch deeper than the l.ongest detonator used, and o£
sufficient diameter to provide for easy insertion of caps or wires.
The detonator should be inserted deeply into the cartridge and
should be as closely as possible along its long axis for reasons
of safety and efficiency.
It is a wise precaution to be sure that fuse is warm and
flexibl.e before uncoiling.
during or after cutting.

Fuse should not be handled roughly
Loss of powder from the end of the fuse

before it is inserted in the cap may result in misfires.
The length of fuse cut must be long enough to extend beyond
the collar of the hole and to al.low time to retire safely from the
blast.

Under no circumstances should less than two feet of fuse

be used.

It is desirable that fuse not be cut lmtil ready to in-

sert :into a blasting cap.
a dry end.

An inch or two may be cut off to instn'e

Fuse should not be cut on a slant, but rather cut square

across with a clean, sharp blade.
Blasting caps should not be removed from the box until. they are

so.
to be used.

The fuse should be lightly seated against the cap

charge end twisting after it is in place or seating with any force
or violence is prohibited.
Caps are properly crimped to fuse with standard cap crimpers
"Which are instruments made especially for that purpose and which
are essential for safety.

Blasting caps should not be crimped

to fuse with a lmife or 'With the teeth.

The crimp should be tight

enough to insure that the cap is securely fastened to the :fuse •
It is necessary that fuse and blasting caps not be used in wet
work without. having a thoroughlY waterproof' joint between the
f'use and cap.
Sharp bends or kinks in fuse must be avoided.

Consequently,

fuse should not be laced through cartridges of explosives.
Leg wires of electric detonators or half hitches should not
be applied so

tight~

to the primer cartridge as to abrade the

insulation.
It is preferable to make up primers at the last possible moment before loading, if practicable.
It is usually best to have the fuse cut and the caps crimped
on at a centred station, if a large number of cap and fuse primers
is used.

If this procedure is followed, the capped fuses are de-

livered to the working places in suitable containers where the
primers are made a.s needed.

Priner makeup at the face is the pre-

ferred general procedure.
All primers must be handled with extreme care siooe their
damage potential is greater than either the detonator or explos-
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ives cartridge al.one.

All el.ectric cap wires shoul.d be provided

with the best type of shunt avail.abl.e.

Every effort should be made

to prevent contact between the l.eg wire ends or bare connections
and such potential. sources of stray currents as the ground, rail.s,
pipes or machinery.

To insure against accidental. firing the shunt

is not. removed from the cap l.eg wires U1'11;il the moment of connecting them int.o the bl.asting circuit.
Loading

The compl.ete operation of p1acing a charge with a primer, or
primers, in the desired manner and confining the charge with stemming in readiness for firing is ' known as l.oa.ding.
After boring, the condition and depth or all hol.es shoul.d be
carefully checked before loading any explosives.

It is desired

that holes be cleaned out before l.oading with compressed air or
water, or both, or i f these facilities are not avail.abl.e, hol.es
can be scraped out with a metal. spoon provided with a l.ong handl.e.
A hardwood tamping pol.e should be used for placing the charge and
pressing it firmly into place.

The tamping pole is also useful.

for making a final. test of the hole just prior to l.oading.

The so-

called nonsparking materials are unsafe for this purpose because of
a potential. hazard from friction.

The tamping pole shoul.d be l.ong

enough to reach to the bottom of the hol.e and shoul.d
tain no exposed metal. parts.

obvious~

con-

The tamping pol.e should be kept in

good condition and the end not. allowed to become frayed or pointed
from excess wear.

Before this happens a short section may be cut
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off or a special rubber or fabric tip provided.
All cartridges must be in direct contact with each other to
insure canplete detonation of the entire charge.
compacting the charge is known as tamping.

The process of

Usual.l.y two or three

light blows of the tamping pole are sufficient to produce good compaction in tamping a small charge of dynamite.
a steady push with the pole is necessary.

In soJE cases only

The · blaster or loader can

usuallY determine by the ttfeel" of the pole after a little experience,
when the charge has been properly tamped.

Additional tamping after

all the space has been filled does no good and may even be hazardous,

particularl.1' it the pole is handled too vigorous4".
The primer especially must be loaded carefully.

Obvious~,

it

should never be forced or tamped but should simply be pushed into
place, preferably with one cartridge between the primer
to act as a cushion.

am.

the pole

Great care taken to see that the fuse or the

cap leg wires do not become damaged by kinking or by pinching between the pole and the walls of the holes while the primer is being
loaded is a necessary safeguard.
It is usually advisable from the standpoint of both safety and
efficiency to confine the explosive charge by inert material known
as stenuning.

The most important function of stemming is to confine

the charge and obtain the greatest possible efficiency from the axplosi ve •

It also protects the loaded charges from accidental igni-

tion, and in rotation firing serves to retain the charges :in the delayed holes and prevents the cartridges fran being forced out of
position by ground compression or air disturbance resulting from
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earlier eXplosions.
Proper materials that

m~ be

used as stenming are: (1) a mixture

of sand and plastic clq (about 2 to 1 proportions), (2)
sand, and (4) l.oam.
hibited.

cl~,

(3)

Coal dust or other combustibl.e stemming is pro-

Quick-seal Tamping Plugs are. also used.

These plugs are

ready for use, provide all the advantages of stemming ani el.:im:i.nate
some of the major disadvantages of conventional material, and are
the fastest and most convenient means for stemming small diameter
holes.

As a safety measure in certain work where it is necessary

to have thorough confinement, suf.ficient stemming should always be
used to cover the charge to prevent sparks from reaching the explosive charge and avert danger from impact or friction from rolling
rook or other material.
Firing
Actual firing of the loaded charges is the final act in blasting.
An all important precaution to be used in the firing of blasts

is the safeguarding of all persons.

The shot firer should warn all

persons in the vicinity of the blast o.f his intentions before firing
a shot.

If necessary, guards are posted to keep persons away from

the shot.

A recomnended procedure is for the shot firer to go to a

safe position, connect the .firing cable leads to the blasting unit,
give warning by shouting "FJ.re" three times at 2-secorrl intervals,

(37)
give the location at the shot and then fire the shot.

(37)

u. s.

Bur. Mines Miners' Circ. 58.

-2£•

~., p.

69.
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When firing with fuse, it is necessary to adjust the lengths
of fuse by cutting varying amounts fran the fuse ends protruding
from the hole.

They should be trimmed so that the holes which are

intended to fire first wiJ.l have the longest length cut off, or the
most trim.

The amount to c\t. off depends upon the . length of fuse

being used.
per foot.

A good rUle is to use a minimum trim of one-half inch
The fuses are lighted in the expected order of firing.

Premature shots have been caused in sane instances by mistakenly
triJrming a fuse in some hole more than once.

This can be avoided

by coloring about an inch of the uncapped ends of' the fuse lengths
w:lth color dye or pa:int.

In this manner a fuse hanging fran a hole

w:lthout this color would warn that it had already been trimned.
An intense hot. flame is necessary for lighting fuse.

In light-

ing .fuse with matches, the match head should be held in contact with
the powder core at the slit end of the fuse a.o:i the match lighted
by scratching the box, or other means of lighting the match, against

the match head, not the match head against the box.

Matches are

not recommended, especially mere a number of fuses are to be lighted
at once, because they involve a nurnber of WlCertainties, they do not
give a sustained flame of effective intensity, a1d they are easily
fumbled.

A carbide cap lamp makes a good lighter and is camnonly

used in undergrourrl work.

Its use, however, involves a serious haz-

ard if a blaster is touching off a round alone.

He may accidentally

drop his lamp after lighting part of the rol.U1d and i f th:t lamp goes
out and he is unable to find it, he must find his way to safety in
complete darkness.

For this reason, it is best to have two men pre-
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sent when fuses are touched off.

The most convenient method for

multip1e firing and the safest method of lighting fuses involves
the use of one of the various fuse lighters that are available •
When fir:ing electricalzy, care should be taken to see that all
wire ends which are to be connected are bright and clean, and that
the joints and any other wires are insu1ated or that they do not.
touch other joints, w:ire, ralls, pipes, ground or other source of
electric current or path of electric leakage.

In using 'Wires of

waterproof or enameled wire electric firing devices, the enamel
coating must be removed before making connections.

The bare ends

of wires shou1d be scraped w:l th a knife b1ade before connecting
to :insure a good connection.

The leading wires must be kept in

good cOI'Idition and never be connected to the blasting machine or
come in contact with any source of electric current until inmediatel.y before firing and everyone is in a safe pl.ace.
After everything is ready to fire the shot., the blasting circuit should be tested for completeness.

This is done by touching

the leading wires to the t'WO terminals of a blasting galvanometer.
If the circuit is perfect it will have the calculated resistance,
and the galvenometer needle will move to the corresporrling number
on the dial.

A short circuit or a leak is indicated by the needle

moving too far.

A break in the circuit or some high resistance,

like a poor joint, is indicated if the needle does not move at all,
or not. as far as it should.
It is necessary to test the blasting galvenometer frequently
to make sure it is in good working order; when the battery cell becomes exhausted, it must be replaced 'With a fresh cell of the same
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type.
It is advisable to never connect caps of different manufactures
in the same series since their characteristics may differ greatly

and misfires will alm.ost certainly result.

It is not good practice

to use caps of different manufactures in the same blast, regardless
of the connection.
The blasting machine and leading wires should be under direct
control of the blaster at all times.

Blasting circuits must be

kept, shunted at al:]. times except 'When the firing circuits are ready
to be hooked up.

This serves as a safeguard against extraneous

electricity that may enter electric blasting circuits from the outside.

For the same reason, it is advisable not to handle explosives

during the approach or progress of an electrical storm.

All persons

should retire to a place of safety.
A blasting machine should be operated as forcibly as possible.
This is the only way to use it successfully and the machine is built
to stand it.

Blasting machine circuits should never be changed in

any wey- for any purpose.

If blasting machines are not functioning

properly, they should be sent to the factory for· repairs and no attempt, made to make repairs locally.
Miscellaneous
Explosives should never be purchased, stored, transported, handled, or used except in strict accordance with organizational, local,
state, and federal regulations.
Containers of explosives or detonators should be handled w.i.th
care at all times and never slid, thrown, or dropped.

f!'l.

Fresh supplies of explosives and detonators should be placed
in their respective magazines in such a mamer that the ol.d stock

is easily accessible.

Possible deterioration of axpl.osives will

be avoided if care is taken to see that the ol.d stock is used first.
Explosives that are obviously deteriorated shoul.d not be used.

Be-

fore attempting to use or reclaim explosives that have been watersoaked, even if' they have dried out, it is necessary that the manufacturer be consul.ted.
It is advisable to not open explosives inside a magazine or
within 50 .teet

ot

a magazine.

Only wooden wedges and wooden, rub-

ber, or .tiber mal.l.ets should be used for opening w:>oden containers
of expl.osives or detonators.

In opening, the bax: may be simply

split apart, or the top may be removed, l.eaving the body of the box
intact.

Obviously, the l.atter method is always used for opening

wooden cases of detonators.

There is only one way to open kegs of

black blasting powder properly and safely.

The metal clips on the

bung are pried up with a sharpened wooden stick and tressed back
with the same im.plensnt or the fingers.

The metal cap and under-

lying paper washes are then lifted out with the fingers.
Explosives

~ich

have been opened should not be left or stored

without replacing the cover.
Safe practice demands that explosive cases not be used for kindling and any paper product · used in the packing of explosives be destroyed by burning after they have been carefully examined to make sure
that they are empty.
Explosives must be destroyed only by experienced or competent

ss.
men.

If there is any question about the safety of the undertak-

ing, the explosives should not be handled or destroyed until a
representative of an eJtplosi ves manufacturer has been consulted.
Any unused or surplus explosives left aft.er loading should

be returned to the magazine before firing the blast.
Precautions After Blasting
EKamination Afi,er Blasting
No one should return to the face after blasting until sufficient time has elapsed to allow the smoke, dust, and fumes from the
explosion to clear away.

Adequate tine must be allowed to permit

any misfires or burning holes to explode.

It is a primary requirement that a working place be examined
carefully after blasting and before returning to the face.

The

first person to approach the face after a blast should be equipped
with a scaling bar to sound the ribs and the roo£ and to dislodge
loose rock.

The roof requires testing and removal of loose rock,

and the place must be adequately timbered.

In a gassy mine the air

should be tested for methane and if detected can be removed by proper~

directed ventilation before work proceeds.

It is also advis-

able to examine the place carefully to determine that no fire is
burning.
Asphyxiation from Noxious Gas
Asphyxiation from fumes of explosives are responsible for many
accidents.

The prevalence of this type of accident in anthracite

and metal mines may be attributed to the fact that many of these
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mines work inclined veins where ventilation of breasts and stopes
is not sufficient to readily dilute the gases given off by explosives.

Also, in sane cases large quantities of explosives must be

used with proportionally heav,y concentrations of noxious gases.

In most instances of asphyxiation from noxious gases _the victims
returned too soon after the blast.
All high explosives when detonated produce some toxic gases
such as carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide, or oxides of nitrogen.
The amounts produced will deperr:i on the class and grade of fue explosive and the con:litions under which it is stored and used.

Im-

proved ventilation is required under these con::litions and rules
should prohibit return to the place after a Qlast until sufficient
time has elapsed.

Carbon monoxide is usually one of the gases pro-

duced by the detonation of high explosives.

It is the most hazar-

dous to workmen, even men breathed in small quantities.
The waiting pericxl

bet,-~een

the bl.as.t. and t.he retum. to the face

can be considerably shortened by ventilation.

A good ventilating

system removes the smoke and fumes produced by the blast and also
assures a supply of fresh air to the men at all times.
Also, in underground operations conditions may be improved by
spraying the face and muck pile with water.

Visibility is improved

by using such a spray to help l..ay the smoke and dust.

It also ser-

ves to dissolve certain toxic gases rapidly and if sufficient water
is used, it displaces the fumes in the muck, thus making them more
easily swept out by the ventilation.

Misfires
In the foregoing discussion on explosives ma.ny precautions

have been stated that must be taken to prevent misfires.

I.t the

proper methods of making up primers, loading, priming, tamping,
and firing are followed, the failure of a charge to explode should
be a rare occurrence.
Much can be done toward the prevention of misfires by the selection of proper explosives, by using the explosives before they
are unduly aged, and by careful procedure in storing, priming, charging, and firing of the explosives.
Electric shot-firing offers the best means of reducing the number of misfires, although it is not foolproof.

In electric fi!!ing

misfires may result from conditions outside the borehole.

Replace-

ment of fuse by electric detonators, however, has resulted in a
marked reduction in the number of misfired holes.
When a misfire occurs in electric blasting, the blasting cable
should be disconnected from the source of power and the battery
ends short-circuited before electrical connections are examined or
before returning to the face.
Investigation of a misfire must never be attempted too soon.
All applicable rules and regulations should be followed.

Host state

mining laws or company rules provide for a time interval before men
may return to a misfire.
specified.

There is great variation in the tine limit

The question of how much time should elapse before re-

turning to a misfire has been much debated.

At least 15 minut e s is

recommended before men may return to the face when electric deton-
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ators are used.

This is an absolute minimum and should be increased

greatly when conditions permit because of the possible hazards of
loose rock or coal, or smoke, dust and gases in the air i t other
holes have fired.

A reasonable tine should be permitted to elapse

before returning since any misfire may prove to be a hangfire or a
delS\Ved blast.

When retuming to the face it · should always be as-

sumed that there is a missed hole in the face until proved otherwise.

If no rules are in effect, it is a good rule to wait at least

an hour before investigating a misfire and preferably several hours
before attempting to handle it.
Under most conditions, the safest way to dispose of a misfire
is to shoot it.

Other methods are specified in the laws of certain

states, particularly w.i. th respect to coal mines.
The method prescribed by most state mining laws for handling
misfires in coal mines is that the explosives be removed by drilling a new hole at least 2 feet away from and paral.lel with the misfired charge, charging it lightly, and blasting in the usual manner.
The object of the blast in the new hole is to detonate the missed
charge by propagation or expose the charge in the misfired hole so
that it can be recovered.
A careful search should be conducted toward the recovery of the
Wldetonated charge when a separate shot is fired.

The parallel hole

must be drilled, loaded, and fired under most careful end experienced
supervision.
The common procedure in handling a misfire in metal mining and
tWlneling is to blow the tamping or stemming out with compressed air

or wash it out with water under pressure, then insert a new primer
and fire.

The l.east dangerous nethod of removing the tamping is by

washing it out with water.

This method should be used when possibl.e.

It is often possible to ex.pl.ode the missed charge by Ebooting the
primer on top of the stemming when the hol.e contains only a foot
or 15 inches of stemming.
A misfire in a well-drilled hole in a quarry or open-cut mine
is a much more serious matter than in a coal or metal mine •

With

well-drill holes or with holes that have been sprung, it is neither
safe nor practicabl.e to drill another hole near them and blast out
the charge.

The usual. method of handling a misfire in a well-drill

hole is to remove the tamping from the hole, and insert a new primer.
It probably wil.1 be necessary to remove both tamping and explosives
do'Wll to the bottoPt charge.
1-iisfires should be handled only by competent persons and i f
it develops that the circuit outside the borehole is not the source
of failure, the misfire should be handl.ed under the direction and
immediate supervision of the foreman or as sistant foreman.

}.:lis fires

are preferably handled on the off-shift and, until they are recovered, no persons should be allowed to work in or relatively close
to the area in which they are present.
Responsibility

£9I....!:.r:.~vention

of Explosives Accidents

Maximum safety in the transportation, handling, and use of explosives has not been accomplished by any means.
made, however.

Progress is being

Education, supervision, and adherence to recognized

safe practices must be maintained to continue the recent progress
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experienced with exp1osives to the em that accidents from this
source will be reduced to the 1owest possib1e number.

The responsi-

bi1ity for preventing accidents from exp1osives rests 1argely with
the mine operator.

He must sa1.ect the proper type of ex:pl.osive for

his particu1ar purpose and see that the exp1osives are sa!e1y stored,
transported, and hand1ed.

Tm operator must a1so furnish adequate

supervision and emp1oy on1y competent men to hancUe exp1osives, and
he should formu1a.te well-thought-out and p1ainq worded rul.es governing the hand1ing and use of exp1osives and demand strict adherence
thereto.
The imi vidua1 worker who hand1es exp1osives a1so has a responsibi1ity.

It is his duty to hand1e and use exp1osives in accord-

ance with oanpany ru1es and state laws and regulations.

The cause

of most exp1osives accidents can be traced to misjudgment or some
human weakness.

Since the human element is a large factor in the

cause of accidents from explosives, it would seem that the logical
means of prevent ion is elimination of the human factor as much as
possible.

The fewer the men exposed to the hazards of explosives

at an operation, the fewer the explosives accidents that

,.nu

occur.

Instead of having every miner hand1e explosives, one man can do this
and thereby greatly reduce the exposure to explosives hazards.
It would be well if all persons who engaged in blasting were
required to have a certificate of competency issued by the state
only after the applicant had passed a rigid test embodying fundamental facts on the characteristics, hazards, and proper use of
exp1osives.
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SHAFT ACCIDENTS AND FALlS OF PERSONS

SHAFTS

Reduction in shaft accidents can be brought about by improvements in hoisting equipment, and providing safeguards at the collar
of shafts, at shaft landings, and in cages and skips.

Improved

methods of handling cars on and off the mine cages and of handling
men in hoisting shafts and slopes are also essentiai far safe operation.
Falling do"WD shafts is the principal cause of shaft accidents
in shaft mines.

Riding the cage, skip, or bucket is second.

The

collars of shafts a.n:i shaft stations should be well guarded and
self-closing doors or gates should be provided when possible.

Need-

less to say, riding on skips or buckets and unauthorized ridi11.g of
cages must be prohibited at all times.
Hoisting
The f'unda..aental. causes of hoisting accidents a.re unsafe practices; use of

equip:n:~ant

designed prima.rillT to handle ore or rock

and poorly adapted to transporting men; and the use of makeshift

(38)
equipment without proper controls and safeguards.
-------------~------- · ·· ·------------ - ~- - --

(38)

Accidents frolll hoisting and haulage in metal mines:
Mines Miners' C:irc. 61, P. 4, 19h6 ..

u.s.

Bur.

Certain standards of safe operation apply to all uses of
hoists.

These apply regardless of the material handled and the

type of opening through which it is handled.

These standards must
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be met in one form or another to g;i. ve protection from serious accidents.

The alertness and ski.ll of the hoistman are the only assur-

ance against disaster where some of the safety ecpipnent mentioned
in the following paragraphs is not provided.

The hoistman would be

powerless in many cases of failure of some part of the equipment..
The fullest protection possible must always be given men who are
transported into and out of mines by these hoists.
A detailed study of safe practices in hoisting made by the
(39)
Bureau of Mines
gives as needed standards:

(39)

lbid •• p. 6
l.. Hoists shoul.d be of standard design. The use
of makeshift equipnent should not · be permitted.

2. Hoists should have enough power to hoist the
loaded cage, skip, ar cars and should bEt equipped with
brakes adequate to stop and hold the f'ull load at any
point in the shaft or slope.

3. An accurate and reliable indicator of the position of the cage, skip, or cars should be in easy view
ot the hoist:man. Marking the hoist rope should not suPplant use of the indicator.
4. The hoist should be provided with an automatic
overwind and overspeed devices, with the possible excePtion of hoists at shallo\tt 1-rorkings Where the hoistman has
a clear view of the movement of the cage or skip. These
devices should be kept in effective operating condition
at all ti:~res and tested at regular intervals.

5. In most instances, electric-and steam-powered
hoists should be equipped 't-rith devices that w:i.ll cause
automatic application of the brakes in case of power
failure. They should permit the lowering of the cage,
skip, or cars by means of the brakes.
6. Hoists should be placed or housed so that the
noise of other machinery, such as a compressor, will not
prevent the hoistman fro.m hearing signals.

7.

All hoists by which men are handled should be

equipped with at least two independent brakes.
8. The hoistman should be physically fit and
should undergo yearly examinations to determine his
continued fitness.

9. A second engineer should be in attendance at
all times while men are being hoisted or lowered unless
the hoist is equipped with automatic overwind, overspeed,
and stop controls.
·
......._

Ropes
The best safety measure that can be provided in hoisting is
a good rope.

Hoisting ropes should be large enough to perform the

d'Ul;y required of them.

The working load. must never exceed that

specified·by the manufacturer.

Rope manufacturers have issued

many publications covering correct handling, inspection, and lub-

rication of hoisting ropes and standards have been adopted by the
American Standards Association covering certain phases of using
"Wire ropes.
An exact method of determining when a hoisting rope is no lon-

ger safe has not been devised.

For this reason it is essential. that

known precautions be taken to inspect the hoisting rope at frequent
intervals and remove it from service before it has weakened sufficientl.y to be potentially dangerous.
Hoisting ropes used for hoisting men Should be of multiplewire construction of recognized standard character.

Specifications

of the A.merican Standards Association are reconunended.
Hoisting ropes must have a factor of safety as defined in wirerope standards.

The safety factor allows for

~ar,

corrosion, and

mechanic a1 shock at the beginning of the hoisting cycle.

Mininrum
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factors of safety for new rope should not be less than

sho~

in the

following table:
TABLE

ri

Safety Factor for Hoisting Ropes for Shafts

(40)

of Various Depths

Length of Rope, Feet
500 or less • • • •

g

6.4

500 to 1,000. • • •

7

;.s

•

6

5.0

3,ooo • • • •

5

4.3

4

3.6

1,000 to 2 _,000. • •
2,000 to

3,000 and more. •

(40)

Minimum Factor of
Min:imum Factor of Safety Safety when Rope
Must be Discarded
for New Rope

..
.

Ilsley, L. c., Mosier, McHenry, Inspection and maintEname
of mine hoisting ropes: u. s. Bur. Mines Tech. Paper 602,
p. 7' 1939.
The factor of safety is the ratio o.f the static load to the ta-1-

sile strength of the rope.

It is calculated by di. viding the break-

ing strength of the rope, as rated by the manufacturer or obtained
by testing, by the sum of the maximum weights to be tested.

This

sum :includes weight of the skip or car and cage plus the weight of
material to be hoisted, plus the total weight o.f rope 1Nhen extended to the bottom of the sha.ft.
The rope is properly attached to its load by a thimble with
cable clips and bridle chains, or by a spelter-filled socket and

bridle chains.

The proper method of attaching a rope socket is an

important safety step a'ld only experienced persons should prepare
spelter-filled sockets for hoisting rope.

The method of connecting

spelter-filled sockets to hoisting cable, or the method of connecting a hoistmg cable to its loa.d with thimbles, clamps or clips, and
bridle chains, should meet the specifications of the American Standards Association. (Pamphlet M-ll, pp. 29-30, PP. 26-28.)
It is good practice to resocket a socketed 'Wire rope once every
six months, regardless of whether broken wires are evident.

All

hoisting cables used for raising and lowering men in vertical shafts
should be cut off and refastened every two months, or sooner if' inspection indicates the rope to be unsafe.

A piece of rope equal in

length to half the circumference of the sheave is tb! proper amount
to cut off 'When a fastening is renewed.

This brings a new part of

the rope in contact with the sheave where the wear is greatest.
It is recommended that a hoisting rope be removed from service
(41)
for lowering and raising men under the following conditions:
(41)

Harrington, D., East, J. H., Jr., Safe practices in mine
hoisting: u.s. Bur. Hines :rviiners• Circ. 61, p. 13, 1946.
(a) When more than six broken wires show in any
pitch length or lay of rope.
(b) When the wires in the crown of the strand are
worn to less than 65 percent of their original diameter.
(c) When inspection indicates a dangerous amount of
corrosion or distortion.

It is good practice to keep a record of the life of each hoist(42)
ing rope. The record should include the following data:
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(42)

Idem., p. 18.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Name of manufacturer
Size of rope
Material and type of construction of rope.
Lengt;h

Date when placed in service.
Number of trips made or tonnage hoisted.
Dates on ~lich rope was refastened.
Date when rope was reversed.
Dates on which rope was lubricated.
j • Date rope was removed from service.
k. Disposition of rope.
1. Record of any unusual happening that might affect
the life of the rope.
m. Reason rope was ranoved from service.
Safe operation requires that ropes be replaced a s soon as there
is evidence of undue weakness or other indications of failure.
A new hoisting rope should be of sufficient length to permit
several short lengths to be cut from each end for refastening; to
have after the final cut at least three wraps on the drum of the
hoist ltlen extended to its maximum distance; and tO make at least
one full lap around . the drum shaft or around one of the web members

ar

the drum frame.
Hoisting ropes, links, chains, and rope sockets shouldbe in-

spected daily and given a thorough and canplete inspection at weekly
intervals by a competent person. ·Special attention must be given
the rope just above the socket or cable clips, where the rope rests
on the sheaves, arrl where it leaves the drum at each em of the
hoist.

A written report should be made of the condition of the rope

found during the inspection.
The correct lubrication of a hoisting rope is essential in pro-
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l.onging the length of service that can be expected.

Proper lubrica-

tion reduces wear and prevents internal and external corrosion.
The foregoing description gives only a few of the factors that
must be dealt -with in considerat:ion of hoisting rope.

A more thor-

ough unierstandhlg of the proper appl.ication and care of wire rope
used in hoisting will do much toward increasing the safety of this
mining operation.
Cages and Skips
Safely designed cages used for hoisting and l.owering men are
substantiall.y caJStructed ld.th fully enclosed sides.

They are

equipped with adequate steel. bonnets that extend over the cage deck
to protect the men, gates extending at least 5
for closing the end openings

v~hen

~eet

above the fl.oar

men are transported, and handholds

that will provide each man with an easy and secure hold.
are kept in good repair and inspected daily.

The cages

Bridle or safety chains

are provi.ded as a secondary connection in addition to the principal
rope connection to the cage.
A necessary safeguard on all cages is safety catches or "dogstt
of sufficient strength to hol.d the cage or skip, with its maximum
l.oad, at any point in the shaft i f the hoisting rope breaks.

These

should be inspected daily and a drop test made at least once every

two months.

A written report should be made of the inspection.

During a drop test, efficient safety catches engage and hol.d

to the guides a.rter not. more than 3 feet of descent. Safety catches
ehould be kept clean and tbe mechzism kePt well-l.ubricated to insure
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effective act.ion at all t.imes.

In like manner, shaft guides should

be thoroughly" inspected at. weekJ.y mtervals by a canpet.ent person.
Each deck of a multiple-deck cage is properly" provided 'With
sa..tety doors or gates.
transported.

These are kept, closed when men are being

Any opening in a cage floor should be covered before

men are permitted to ride the cage.
Hen should not be carried m a cage with tools or other mater-

ials •

When cages are used to transport mine cars, they must be

equipped with safety blocks to prevent. any movement. of' the mine car
while the cage is :1n motion.
Conveyances used for carrying men in inclined sha..tt.s require
a safety rope as a safeguard against. possible main-rope failure.
Where men are hoisted and lowered in steeply inclined shafts, the
conveyances used should be provided with level seats and haiJihoJds.
Riding the bail of a skip should be forbidden.

This includes

skip tenders, unless sane special provision is made, such as a small
platform with a railing.

No one must be allowed to ride on a loaded

skip.

§ignalirlg
In most states having shaft mines a code of hoisting signals is

prescribed by law and posted at the collar of each hoisting shaft and
at each shaft station.
Safe practice demands that at least two independent methods of
giving signals be provided bet"W'8en the hoist house and each landing.
One of . these · should be audible.

Cal.ling and rapping on pipes is not

considered as one of such methods.

Signaling devices that can be
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operated from a moving cage are recommended.
One of the standard methods of signaling is electrical signaling devices of the pull-switch type, wi.th a signal light on each level, and bot.h light and gong in the hoist room.

This is supplemented

by an auxiliary s;ys tern consisting of a counterbalanced rope suspended
in the shaft and accessible from a stopped or slowly moving cage and
attached to a gong in the hoist house.

The electrical station signal

should be within easy reach from the cage.

A separate call system

:may be installed for calling cages or skips which is imependent of

the signal system.
ed by lights.

Signals can be sounded by bells or homs, or nash-.

Mar17 mines also :install telephones at each station level.

A signal system lilereby the man on the cage can signal to the
hoisting Engineer while the cage is moving has decided safety advantages in event of emergency as well as in shaft repair work.
Signals that are fully understood by both the engineer and bell
ringer is the essential feature in any signaling system.

Thus,

~en

men are being hoisted or lowered signals given by a bell ringer must
be returned by the engineer.

In this manner, the bell ringer wi.ll

know that the engineer understands his signal.

After the retum sig-

nal is given, the engineer should allow adequate time for the bell
ringer to correct the signal,. i f necessary.
Speed of Hoisting
.The type and condition of the hoisting equipment and the condition of the shaft deterndnes the safe speed for hoisting and lovrering men.

The maximum speed at which men may be hoisted has been

established by law or regulation in many states with the provision
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'that t.he state mine inspect.or mq set. a lower speed as a liiAJdrmun
in individual m:ines, if conditions warrant.

Allowable hoisting

speeds vary from 1500 feet. per minute in, one st.ate t.o 500 feet per
minute in another state.

When hoisting men :in a bucket, the speed

permitted is usually at least 50 per cent lower than when a cage
or skip is used.
The speed of hoisting at any mine must be such that a reasonable
degree c4 saf'et.y can be at.tained.

Also, it should not exceed the

ma·x::iuam legal limit as set by the state.

Many operators consider

900 feet per minute to be a safe max:imwn speed for hoisting men unier
normal. average conditions.

Han Trips
Men are being handled with greater care ani safety today than
in the past.

Better-built cages an:i man-cars are now in use for

taking men into and out. of the mine.

Many mines use enclosed man-

cars fitted with seats.
Every hoisting engine at shafts where men are hoisted should
be equipped with overwind and overspeed devices, which automatically
control the speed of the hoist and prevent overwinding if the hoisting engineer suffers a heart attack or otherwise

tated.

It is also desirable,

"men

handling

men~

bec~Aes

incapaci-

to have a standby

hoisting man to operate the hoist in the event of sudden disablement
of the hoistman.
Safety in the operation of transporting men depends upon

m~

factors including type and ccnditic:n of equipment, discipline in
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loading and unloading, clearance above cars, number of persons permitted in each cage or car, care by motonnan or hoistman, and cype
of waiting places.
All. sa:fety rules pert;aini.ng to the handling of man-trips must
be strictly enforced.

It is desirable to provide a suitable place

with seats at junction points where m!tn congregate while waiting
for a man-trip or man-cage.

An official should be in charge of

and accompany each man-trip or cagers should be in complete charge
of their cages and see that hoisting rules are obeyed.
It is ot prime importance to .t'urnish enough cars to permit all
men to ride inside the man-trip w.ithout being crowded.

Likewise,

the company or the state mine inspector should designate the maximum number of men permitted to ride on the cage at one time.

This

should be posted prominently at each landing and the requirement
must be rigidly enforced.
Man-trips should come to a full stop before men load and unload and no one should get into or out o:f a cage, skip, or bucket
while it is in .motion or after a signal to move has been given to
the hoistman.

If men proceed in an orderly manner to and from man

trips pushing or crowding at cages is eliminated.
Only tools and supplies that can be carried entirezy inside

a separate car or cars can be safely hauled on man-trips.

In the

same manner, tools ani loose material can not be handled on the
same deck o:f a cage, or in a skip with men who are being hoisted
or lowered •
No person, other than the brakeman, should be permitted to
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ride on the rear bumper of a man-trip, and no one fhou1d be allowed
to ride between cars.

Men should ride on the side of the car OP-

posite the trolley wire when riding in a car that is not suitably
covered on a trolley haulage road.

The car next to a trolley loco-

motive is preferably not used for carrying men in man-trips, unless
such car is specially designed to afford front-end and overhead protection.

The trolley wire must be well guarded at loading and un-

loading stations.

If there is any danger of men contacting the trol-

ley wire at these stations, it is imperative the power be cut of£
while they are loading or unloading.
Hoisting accidents to employees are generally severe, i f not
fatal.

Hoisting accidents to equipnent usually cause serious delays

with consequent loss of production.

The economic loss may be great

i f both personal injuries ani equipnent are involved.

The adoption

of standard safe practices in hoisting and rigid enforcement of
reasonable safety rules will reduce the inherent hazards of this
phase of mining.
Protection at Shaft Landings
Shafts must be properly protected at the collar and at shaft
staticns.

By properly protected is meant that the shaft is entirely

enclosed by adequate fences and gates, except when the cage is at
the landing.
Safety gates should be kept closed at all times when the cage
or skip is not at the landing.

Cage gates of the automatic type

that ma.Y be opened onlJ' when the cage is at a land:ing and that will
close

auta~aticall.y

as soon as the cage has left the landing insure
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ma.x.imum safety •

Automatic gates can be found to fulfill the require-

ments for eaoh class of landings.
Gates that are properly placed are as near tm shaft as possible,
so as not to interfere with caging.

Well designed gates operate in

a vertical rather than a horizontal plane both to reduce the space
required and to eliminate the possibility of sweeping men into the
shaft when closing.

The gates are constructed so that materials

will not go through or urder them into the sbart and are high enough
to prevent un leaning over them.

The gate or door is sufficiently

strong to resist the .ordinar.y rough usage and prevent men or material from fal.ling through it into the shaft.
Pos:i.tive stop blocks or derails should be placed on all tracks
leading to a shaft or shaft. landing to prevent cars from being
pushed accidentally through the shaft gate and into the shaft, or
to prevent rtmaway cars from reaching the shaft.
Underground landings can be protected from material falling
do'Wl'l the shaft by a screen or metal guard suspended from the roof
and hung on hinges so that it may be raised to swing out of the way
l>lhen long materials are handled.

A substantial roof that extends

over the rurface landing, will protect the eager and those 'Who
may be waiting for a cage from falling material.
M:is cell.aneous Shaft Hazards
A small number of shaft accidents has resulted from falls from
some point in the shaft 'While
bers, guides, or piping.

~k

was being done on the shaft, tim-

Workmen should be required to wear safety
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belts while engaged in repair work in or above shafts.

Protective

hats should also be warD as protection against being struck on the
head with falling material.

When staging is being used the cage

or a second safety platform is proper1y placed not more than 10
feet beneath the -working platform to prevent tools, material, or
men (in the event of safety-belt failure) from falling down the
shaft.
Some shaft accidents are caused by objects falling down shafts.
These can be eliminated by preventing objects from falling and keeping men out of the danger zone.
surface, 'Where either they are

A few of the objects fall from the

accidental~

thrown or fall into the

shaft; a few fall from timbers in the shaft; rut the majority are
pieces of rock or coal falling from the cars as they are baing hoisted
or dumped at the top.

To prevent tre latter, the more modern cage

dumps are designed so that the car is carried sane distance from.
the shaft. before actual dumping commences.

Thus, there is little

likelihood of any material falling back into the shaft.
Accidents from foreign objects falling into the shaft at the
surface can usually be prevented by suitable fences and toe

board~.

Those caused by objects falling from timbers can be eliminated only
by unfailing care on the part of shaft inspectors and repair man.
The most effective remedy is to keep the men out of the danger
zone at shaft landings.

This is quite possible by the use of auto-

matic caging devices.
Numerous injuries, serious and fatal, have occurred to men
cleaning the sump at hoisting shafts when the cage has been accidentally lowered onto them.

This can be prevented by placing heavy

108.

timbers across the swnp or chaining vertical posts, resting on the
bottom:, to the guides.

The cage on the side where men are working

can be lowered to within a short distance of the bottom to protect
the men from material falling down the shaft.
Runarounds or passageways should be maintained at the bottom
of hoisting shafts to enable employees to go from one side of the
shaft to the other.

Numerous accidents have resulted from operation

o:t the cage while men were attempting to cross it.

A runarowxi

offers sa:te passage from one side of the shaft to the other.

It

should be kept, well-lighted and at no time be blocked by cars or
ot:.her equipoent or used as a storage place :tor material or supplies.
It is very necessary that all cage 1andings be well light.ed.
This is particularly true of surface landings at upcast shafts
where the moist air coming up the shaft forms a fog in the winter
when it strikes the cold out side air •
FALLS OF PERSONS

Falling do1rm chutes or raises or into \d.nzes is an importcnt
cause of' underground accidents in mini.ng..

Guarding the entrances

to raises and chutes and the use of grizzly bars are the corrunon
methods of preventing accidents of this type.
A connnon means of' protection used for a mamm.y raise is a gate
over the raise that has a '\rood frame covered with heavy meshed-wire
screen to prevent material from falling and. to permit free circulation of air.
der.

A handrail should be provided at the top of the lad-

Many compan,y rules state that ladders shall project 3 feet

above the collars, or otherw.i.se handrails shall be provided.

Thus
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a secure handhold is provided when ascending or descending the ladder.
A weided pipe guardrail and concrete toeboard may be used to prevent
men or material from falling into the opening.
Accidents from falls can be reduced

great~

by providing and

maintaining effective ladders ani sollars.
Ladders are

preferab~

inclined instead of vertical, wherever

possible, and offset at regular intervals.

Sollars or platforms

should be :installed to limit the height of a fall.

At least 3 inches

ot space must be provided between the rung and any ma.terial behind
the ladder to permit placing the foot

secure~

on the ladder rung.

Ladders should be ot substantial construction and maintained in good
condition.

They are often made partly or

who~

or iron mere they

must withstand hard usage or extended lengths or service.
Passes for ore or Wlste can be covered with a grizzly which will
....~

give protection to men who might slip · or misstep into the opening.

Planks may be used to cover the open spaces in the grizzly W:len material is not being dumped into it •

Screen guards or railings may be

placed around the sides of the openings.

Unused chutes or manways

should be tightly covered or fenced orr.

Shaft openings or old

prospect holes on the surface should be similarly protected.

Sorre

mines place electric lights at each raise, winze, or chute to give
t.he employees warning of danger.
Stepping or tripr;ing may be caused by poor footing or by obstructiona. left in places used for foot travel.
frequently due to poor housekeeping.

Such hazards are

Tools or materials are often

left scattered about in wrking places or are piled so that they
_for.m tripping hazards.

Spillage along haulageways may be responsi-

no.
ble for poor footing where men walk.

The grol.Uld in a mam-rey- may

became dangerously slippery from moist or wet conditions if not
corrected b,y drainage or by a raised plank walk.
The preventions of falls of persons while

~rk

is being done

in high places consists of providing safe means of access to overhead locations apd of safeguarding the worker 'While he is performing the l«>rk.

Insecure footing and failure to provide _a proper

platform or bench from which to 11110rk are the usual causes of "small
falls'~

The worker should be provided with a secure platfonn and

protected by handrails, safety belts or ropes, or both.

Safety

belts and ropes must be kept in safe condition, as they may be weakened by wear or abuse, cr from storage in l.Ulfavorable atmospheres.
Maintenance o:f manways in safe condition and providing protective measures against falls is a joint responsibility of management
and workers.
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PREVENI'ION OF MINE ElCPLOSIONS

Coal-mine explosions are accidents that can and certainly
shoul.d be prevented.

.Explosions resulting from ignition o:f gas

or bituminous-coal. dust, and mine :fires, which are sometimes fol.low-ed by explosions, haver esulted in a l.arge number of coal.-mine
disasters.
The necessary :factors :for an explosion are ever present in
al.l soft-coal and many hard-coal mines.

The occurrence of expl.os-

ions and the number o:f men l:d.lled by them can be reduced if the
lmoll'l poocedures as to vent.ila.tion, inspection for gas, rock dusting, blasting, and installation and use of electrical equipment,
are maintained to a reasonable degree.
The greatest number of mine explosions occur in so-called
11

nongassy" mines.

In this type of mine that contains littl.e gas,

the necessary precautions as to ventilation and other safeguards
are not. usually taken.

In a

11

gassy 11 mine where gas exists in a

known heavier concentration, the necessary safeguards are usually
practiced.
Causes
Common sources of mine explosions are: arcs and sparks from
· def'ective wiring and electrically operated machinery, arcing from
short-circuited trolley and cable conduits, open lights, de:fective
flame safety lamps 1 smoking, use of nonpermissible explosives or
faul.ty handling, end overheated current-carrying parts such as
cables.
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Data as to causes of explosions for the period

1947

1929

through

are shown in Table XVI.
The use of black blasthlg powder and dynamite resul.ted in

many mine explosions until. about 30 years ago.

Todq, permissible

explosives are used almost universally in gassy mines and very
extensively in nongassy mines.
In similar manner, about half the gas and dust ignitions that

occurred until. a quarter of a century ago were attributed to open
lights.

The rapid increase in the use of permissible el.ectric cap

lamps has greatly reduced this source of ignition..

Many states

prohibit by law the use of open lights in gassy ·mines, and sane
prohibit their use in any coal mine.
Matches used for smoking and relighting non-permissible flame
safety lamps has been an important cause of mine explosions.

Car-

rying matches for relighting a safety lamp if the flame is extinguished can be avoided by the use of ma.gnetical.ly locked, permissible flame safety lamps with internal igniters.
Electric arcs or sparks are probably the most prolif'ic source
of mine explosions today.

Such an arc or spark from defective elec-

tric '-Tiring or machinery may ignite an accumulation of gas that is
sufficient. to cause a mine explosion, or the gas ignition mey- raise
and ignite a dense cloud of coal dust.

This, in turn may propagate

the explosion •
VEntilation
Adequate ventilation is an effective method of preventing accumulations of explosive gas.

Air that is famished to all 1-rorking
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TABIE
ComEarison of

Year

~losion~ities 1

lg}.1ition by
electricity
Number Percent

bl Causes of Igeition 1 Fiscal Years

Ignition by
open lights
or smoking
Number Percent

1929 .
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
19.39
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947

93
147
131
11
25
21
29
20
53
24
13
99
145
133
66
59
20
41
27

66,9 .
76.6
63.9
12,7
20,5
75.0
. 53.7
52,6
85.5
14,1
81,3
48.3
89,0
87.5
43.4
62,8
31,3
70.7
17.5

14
21
56
33
63
2
6
10
3
77
2
2
15
3
86
5
4

10,1
10,9
27.3
37.9
51,6
7.1
11,1
26.4
4.8
45.3
12,5
1,0
9.1
2,0
56,6
5.3
6,2

4

Total

1157

53.7
53.7

Average 60 •.9

m

26
24
18
42
29
2
3
4

18,7
12,5
8,8
48,3
23.8
7.1
5.6
10.5

61

35.9

103
3
2

49.7
1,9
1,.3-

2,6

1
17
17
123

406

18,8

475

1,1
26,6
29,3
79.9
22,0 .

21.4

18,8

25,5

22,0

w.

J,, Humphrey, H. B.,

. - . _ . _ _,

Inclusive

(43)

Ignition due to
Ignition by
unknown or mis- ·
explosives
cellaneous causes
Total
Nwnber Percent Number Percmt
Number Percent
6

4.3

1
5
3
16
4
6
8
1
2

1,1
4.1
10,8
29,6
10,5
9.7
4.7
6,2
1,0

14

9.2

29
23

30,8
35.9

118

u.s.

-- ·

6,2

170

16
206
163
152
152
94
64
58
154

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

5.5

2156

100

5.5

113.5

110

139
192
205
87
122
28
54
38
62

·- ··- - ·
Bur, Mines Inf, Circ, 7456, p, 9, 1948 •
·--· ~-o

(43) Harrington, D., Fene,

1~2-~1 1

---
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places in suf.ficient vol1.m1e to dilute and carry away any flammable
or harmful gas that :rnq be present maintains the atmosphere o.f such
places in a sa.fe and healthful condition.

Minimum requirements of

air in cubic .feet per minute per man are usually specified by l.aw
o.r coal-producing states.

Requirements range from 100 to 150 cubic

feet per man in nongassy mines.

In a gassy mine 200 cubic .feet. per

·minute per man is the usual minimum. required.

Such requirements o.r

air are ample for the health of workmen; the weakness in many laws
is that they do not specify how much air must be conducted to the

face workings.
The Bureau of Mines reconmends that the volume reaching the last open crosscut in any p air or set of working

entries should be at least 6,000 cubic feet per minute
and that each warking place should be ventilated by a percePtible air current sufficient to dilute and carry away any
flammable or harmful gasses that may be present. Air that
has ventilated piLlar workings should not be coursed
through other active workings, and air that has ventilated caved areas or unsealed, abandoned sect~ons should
not be coursed through active workings. (43)

(44)

Ex.plosions and fires in bituminous-coal mines:
Miners' Circ. 50, p. 5, 1946.

________ ______ ---------- --_...;,..._

U.s.

Bur. Mines

··--------------

Adequate volumes o.f air .for di.fferent working shifts should
not be provided by diverting air currents from idle to active sections.

Changes in ventilation that may affect the workmen can only

be made saf ely when a mine is idle.
Suitable splitting of mine air is advantageous for several reasons.

Better air can be furnished each group of men in the mine 11hert

it is divided into splits because the air in each travels a shorter
path.

Poisonous gases from a local explosion or fire may be confined
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to one section

~en

the air current is sectionalized.

Likewise,

the force of expl.osions and gases nay kill men in that part-icular
section but not affect other sections of the mine.

When a mine is

ventil.ated by a continuous current of air men on the return side
of the air course will probably be killed or overcame by the poisonous gases; splitting of the air is a sateguard against this hazard.

Spl.itting is also desirable because it serves as a measure of

control. of a:i.r vel.oci.ties.

Economically, splitting the air is ad-

vantageous because mare air can be circulated with the same power
expenditure than with a si.ngl.e continuous system.
of mine ventilation. can be reduced.
(44)
the Bureau of Mines state:

Thus, the cost

Ventilation reconunendations of

---------·-----~---·,...,_._ ~--·· ~- - ------

(45.)

Ibid.,

----- -~ -

P. 7

,0. -----·- ·-·-·· --·-. ..-.

·----~-·M----------··-· - · --

. ·----··· -.. . . . .__.,_

Ventilation should be improved i f the air 1n worktravel~s contains less than 20 percent ax.ygen or more than 0.5 per cent carbon diOKide or any poisonous gas, as determined by chemical ana.lJrsis. The Bureau o:r Mines considers undesirable a mine atmosphere that
does not meet these specifications.
ing places or

If the air of a ,,rorking place contains flammable gas
as detected with a flar.o.e safety lamp or if it contains more
than one per cent of flaumable gas as determined by an
electric methane detector or by chemical analYsis, the
ventilation should be improved irmnediately. If it contains more than 2 per cent fla.nunable gas (slightly less
than !-inch cap on a nonluminous flame of a safety lamp), the
workers should be withdrawn until the ventilation is improved. Air of a working place refers to air not nearer
than 1 foot from the face. Tests of air for gas should be
made at such points as conditions may warrant •
If the air inmediately returning from a split that ventilates any group of active workings contains more than 0.5
per cent of flammable gas as deterndned by chemical analysis in duplicate or by other recognized means of accurate
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detection, the ventilation should be improved
immediately i f at a11 possib1e; if' it cc:ntains
more than 1.5 per cent, the workers shou1d be
withdrawn unti1 ventilation has been improved.
Proper and adequate venti1ation depends primarily upon surface fans of proper capacity and design and sufficient, unobstructed, well mainta:ined air courses.
Adequacy of the mine venti1ation both as to quality and quantity is determined by frequent tests of the mine air.

Air measure-

ments should be taken by certified mine officials at least once a
week near the mouths of the main intake and main return of the
mine and a1so in or adjacent to the last crosscut of' each air
sp1it ~

Teste as to quality are made w.1. th a permissible flame safe-

ty 1amp or other methane detector in such sp1its and in the main
return.

It is advisable to keep a record of' measurements and

tests.

Inspection for Gas
Most of the explosions in bituminous-coa1 mines have resulted
from the ignition of accumulations of explosive gas, chiefly methane.

Thus, it is apparent that frequent and thorough inspections

must b e made t o detect the presence of explosive gas.
Recommended practice is to emp1oy enough .fire bosses, or mine
(45)
examiners, to inspect gassy mines. They should:

---------------------------------------------------------------··-·--(46)

U. S. Bur. Mines Miners' Circ. 50, ~·

ill•,

-----------------------------·----------------

P. 37.
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1.

Begin examinations of the mine not more than ·
t~ mine.
In multiple-shift operations such exa.minaticns may be made with~
in 3 hours of the next shift by qualified officials of
the shift on duty.

3 hours before each shift enters

2. Examine every 'WOrking place, all places adjacent
to live workings, every roadway and travelway, every unfenced road to abandoned workings, and all accessible falls
in the mine. The examinations should be not only for explosive gas but for all hazards.

3. Mark their initials and the date at or near the
face of each place examined; such markings should be readily discernible and serve as evidence that the p;~.rticular
place has been visited •

.4. Place a danger sign across each entrance to every
place where a dangerous condition is found. The danger
sign should be removed only by a certified official after
the danger has been removed.
·
5. ~eport to the proper off'icial on the surf'ace or
at designated underground stations any dangers f'ound bef'ore the men enter the mine or pass such designated stations.

6. Record in ink the result of' their inspections
in a book kept on the s urf'ace exclusively f'or this purpose. Similar records also should be kept at designated
underground stations.
All working places in gassy mines should be inspected for gas
by a certified mine of'ficial during each shift.
al"Vrays

nec~ssitate

Pillar workings

examination fur gas and other dangers before a

cave or fall is made.

If gas can be detected \'lith a permissible

flame safety lamp, the cave is not made until the gas is removed.
If removal of the gas is not feasible, precautions must be taken
to safeguard the underground v10rkrren.
The most common means of detecting methane or a deficiency of
o;xurgen, vtl.ich is equally important in a mine atmosphere, is by use.
of the flame safety lamp.

Safety depends largely upon the way lamps

are maintained and used.
be locked magnetically.

All permissible flame safety lamps must
Such a devi.ce insures against the disman-

tling and relighting of safety lamps in mine atmosphere.

Flame

safety lamps should be cleaned, filled, r !'Paired and locked by a
lamp attendant or ather competent person.
be carefully explained to every person

~o

Their limitations must
uses them.

An experienced perscn with good eyesight can detect methane

percentages as l.ow as one per cent Vllith a flame safety lamp.

So~

persons, although these are exceptional, can detect percentages
less than one per cent.

Others cannot detect less than 2 per cent

methane and some are unabie to detect it until it reaches tre lower
explosive limit.

This fact makes it imperative that only persons

who have been instructed in its use and have actually made tests
to determine their capability use the fl.ame safety lamp.
A few methane detectors, other than the flame safety l.amp, are
available to the mining industry.

Two general types of porlabl.e

detectors that are classifj_ed as permissible are: (1) detectors of
the indicating type that shOW' the percentage concentration of methane in air wi. thin certain limits of error and (2) detectors that are
less accurate but will reliably show the presence of methane in mine
atmospheres.

These instruments, especially those that sho'\'l the per-

cent age cone entration of :methane, are more accurate than flame-type
detectors, particularly for determining gas concentrations below
one per cent.

Methane can be readily detected 'With a flame safety

lamp above one per cent, but the quantitative value cannot be determined accurately.
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An advantage o:r the :!lame sa:Cety lamp over other types o:r methane detectors is t.hat it can iniicate an atmosphere deficient in
oxygen.

This is of utmost :importance and gives the flame sa:ret.y

lamp a considerable advantage, notwit.hstanding its known limitations.

Alt.hough permissible portable detect.ing devices such as the
:!lame sa:rety lamp, methane detectors, and carbon monoxide det.ectors,
are widely used tor examining mine at.m.ospneres, their range of detection is limited by a definite lower and upper limit •

Also • they

are designed primarily for the determination of a single gas constituent.

In many cases a canplete analysis of all the constitu-

ents of tbe mine atmosphere is necessary.
Where the information desired is outside the scope of portable
detecting apparatus samples of t.he mine atmosphere are collected
and later subjected to chemical analysis, usually by gas-volumetric
methods.

The analyses may be completed in the field or sent to a

test.ing laboratory.

Where extreme accuracy is not required anal-

yses can be made in the field with apparatus of a portable type which
can be taken t.o a place near t.he site o:r collection of the samples.
I£ analysing apparatus is not available, or if a more accurate anal-

ysis is desired, it is usually possible to collect samples o:r the
atmosphere in bot.tles or t.ubes that can be tightly sealed and then
sent to a la.borator,y.
Coal Dust
The menace o:r coal. dust and the active part it plays in t.he
propagation o:r mine explosions has long been- realized by the mining
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industry.

Fine, soft coal dust in suspension is but little less

dangerous than a similar quantity of fine black powder in the air.
Very little coal dust is required to start an explosion or keep one
going.

Coal dust is evel"Y"'Jhere present in bituminous-coal mines

and there is relative:cy- little hope of stopping its accumulation as
this is virtually impossible.

It therefore follows that tt.e logical

means of guarding against its danger is to make dust as imffective
as possible.

The two general methods commonly employed :for overcom-

ing or at least reducing the hazards :from coal dust are: (1) the

introduction or moisture by sprinkling or turning steam into the
airwqs, and (2) rock dusting.
It has been brought out that gopd ventilation and proper methods o:r determining the ];resence and amount of explosive gas in a
mine atmosphere are important in the prevention o:r m:lne explosions.
Proper ventilation protects against the accumulation of explosive
gas but not dust.

In fact, good ventilation may intensi:fy the dust

hazard unless suitable precautions are taken.
A general explosion does not usually result :from gas ignition
alone.

In most cases, a local gas ignition throws fine coal dust

into the air, and the coal dust propagates the explosion •. 1-ioreover, a large nunber of both general and localized mine explosions
of coal dust have been initiated by means other than explosive gas.
Bituminous-coal dust is readily a...'1d violently explosive without the
presence of explosive gas.

If a bituminous-coal dust cloud of suf-

ficient dEnsity is raised by a large fall of roof; a bad4'" placed,

,

over-charged, or blOlal-out shot; a wrecked trip; or any other means•

121.

the dust can be ignited by .flame •

The fl.all¥3 may be from

arc or spark, an open light 1 smoking, or explosives.

an

electric

The resulting

actia'l when a cloud o.f bituminous-coal dust is ignited is similar to
a gas ignition.

The pressure produced raiMs additional dust in

advance of the flame and thus carries along or propagates the explosion.
Ex:tensive tests by the U. S. Bureau of Mines have shown that
all coal dusts, except anthracite dust, if suspended in a dense

enougJ'l cloui in air may be ignited by a name or spark and mq produce a violent elCPlosion.
Safegy.arding Against Coal Dust Explosions
Practically all coal dust formed in mines is prcxluced at the
working .faces by such mining operations as cuttingt drilling, blasting, and loading.

Much can be done to reduce the formation and dis-

tribution of coal dust at its source.
Cutting machines provided with a water spray attached to the
cutter bar allay much objectionable dust.

It is generally believed

that the most effective methods of wetting are to apply water on
the intaking bits or at the en:l of the cutter bar.
Sprinkling the roof, ribs, ani .floor 1 i f done frequently, is
effective in allaying dust.

Sprinkling will be ineffective, however,

if the season and atmospheric conditions are such that the air current in passing through the mine absorbs moisture.
Coal dust should not be permitted to accumulate on gobs, ribs,
roof or timbers.

Nor should it be pennitted to accumulate in road-

ways and along conveyor lines.
possible are preferred.

Mine cars that are as tight as

From this standpoint, fixed-and cars such

as those used in connection with rotary dumps are most Slitable.
Careful loading of coal ldll prevent spillage in transit.
Whereas much can be done to reduce the formation and distribution of dust at its source, it cannot be eliminated.

It is essen-

tial, therefore, that residual dust in ·a mine be treated in some
manner to render it nonexplosive.
Effect of water
The use of water to allay dust

not

only reduces the explosion

hazard but also affords same protection to the health of the miner
against respiratory disease.

Water has a definite value because of

its effectiveness in preventing dust from being throw into the air
and causing or contributing to an eq>losion of gas or dust.

It
./

also supplements rock dusting between the face md the erd of the
feasible limit fran the face beyond lhich rock dusting cannot be
done.

Water, if applied in sufficient amount, ma.y ·cause the dust

particles to adhere together and prevent them from being raised
into the air as a dust cloud.
\'later is most ef'fective i f used fairly freely in the face
region beyond the rock-dusted area, especially during such operations as cutting, shooting, and loading.

It has been found that

water sprayed on coal dust at the face is very effective because
it is here chiefly t.hat

t~

dust is formed.

Thus, the dispersion

of the dust bhroughout the mine can be reduced materiaJ..ly.

Al-

though the use of water in haulage roads and passageweys helt=e to
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prevent. dust from being raised into the air; it does not; render the
coal dust nonexplosive because such wetting will not prevent the
propagation of flame in bituminous-coal. dust if an ignition occurs.
Wet dusts, although raised from the floor into the cdr with much
more difficulty than dry dusts, may be dislodged from high timbers
or surfaces and formed into a cloud of proper density that will
ignite and propagate tlaml.

It is difficult to keep coal dust. wet

that has bem deposited in mine passageways because of' the high.
surface tmsic:m of' water in contact with fine coal-dust particles •
The dust an the mine noor is usually most affected 'When
aine passages are sprinkled.

The finer dust in the more-inaccess-

ible places is unaffected unless the watering is

thorough~

done.

Sprays of' water applied to the tops of loaded cars prevent
the coal. f'rom drying while trips are being made to the dumping
point.

Nevertheless, several per cent of' moisture may be lost

between the working place and the dumping point during a trip
of a few miles in intake air at

relative~

high velocity.

There-

fore, high pressure sprays should be used at gathering partings
and at coal dumps as well as at any underground places or in connection with equipnent or processes that throw dust into the
air.
Water greatly reduces the loss of effectiveness of rock dusting.

The roof', timbers, and ribs of haulage roads will require

infrequent rock dustmg and back entries lllill never need to be
redusted where water is used at the face, along the bed or floor
of haulage roads, and at gathered partings.

In addition, if water
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is piped to working places the .fire hazard is decreased not only
because the water reduces chances of ignition of gas or dust but
also because the water is quickly available if a fire should start.
Watering methods in mines that install and use them efficient~

are instrumental in decreasing and alleviating health haz-

ards, reducing explosion and other accident hazards, and providing
added fire prot.ect:i:on.
Rock Dustin&
Many mines in the United States have been rock-dusted to pre-

vent propagation of an explosion.

Nevertheless,

relative~

few

of these contain enough rock dust to offer much protection filould
an explosion be initiated.

Many operators seem to believe that

one application of rock dust will render a mine immune from explosions during the remainder of its life and other operators apply
rock dust only to the main haulageways.

They hope that if" an ex-

plosion occurs it will not travel the air courses.

Such tmtbod.s

are, of course, false econonzy- and as a result of using them many
disastrous explosions have occurred in supposedly well rock-dusted
mines.
The U.

s.

Bureau of ¥.Lines recoJ.Ill'Ilends that all coal m.lnes, ex-

cept anthracite and lignite mines, be thoroughly rock-dusted to
prevent the propagation of mine explosions.

The inspection stan-

dards contain specific recommendations, with regard to biturn:inous-

(47)
coal mines, as follows:

(47)

U. S. Bur. Mines Miners• Circ. 50,

.2.£•

~., P. 58.
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1. All bituminous-coal mines should be kept thorougb]Jr ro9k-4usted in all 'open, unsealed places to within
at. least 40 feet. of the face. If the top, floor, and
sides of the mine (or any part thereof) are wet., rock
dusting is not. reqUired in such mine or part thereof.
However, if theN is any iDiicat.ion that the mine, or
any part. thereof, is becoming dry, the mine or portion
of the mine so affected should be rock-dusted.
2 • Where rock dust is applied, it should be distributed upon the top, floor, and sides of all open, unsealed places and maintained in such quantity that. the
incanbustible ccntent. w:UJ. not be less than 65 per cent.
In trackless entries and air courses protection in lieu
of generaJ.i zed rock dusting may be obtained by using bags
filled with rock dust pl.a.ced at regular intervals and (48)
staggered as described in Report of Investigations 3411
Ten pounds of rock dust mould be used per linear foot of
entry • The weight. of rock dust in each bag should not.
exceed 50 pounds.

3. When mthane is present in the ventilating current, the 65 percent min:i.rm.un incombustible should be increased 1 percent. for each 0.1 percent. methane.
4. }.iachme cuttings fror.a coal beds, unless the dust
therein contains more than 65 percent. incombustible,
should be loaded and hauled out of the mine i f at. all
practicab1e. If removal from the mine is not practicable, cuttings should be pl.a.ced back from the face and
covered with a layer of one-half inch or more rock dust..
5. Sampling of rock-dusted areas should be done
with sufficient frequency to determine i f additional
rock chs t is required •

6. A record should be kept showing the lcx:ation of
the places of sampling, the results of the tests made, apd
the amount of rock dust applied monthly as well as annually.

(48)

Greenwald, H. P., Hm'larth, H. c., Testing of a barrier using
rock dust in paper bags: u. s. Bur. Mines Rept.. of Inv. 3411,
16_.
pp. 19.38.

________ __________________________________________________________
The exact. manner in Which rock dust affects an
is not known.

~losive

wave

It. is t.hrought. that a probable effect is the ex:trac-
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tion of a sufficient quantity of heat by the rock dust from the
explosive wave to either hinder or stop its propagation.
Experimental tests have S'lown that the value of rock-dust
applicaticn is based upon the facts that coal dust when mixed 'With
sufficient · incombustible dust w.i.ll not explode, burn, or aid in
propagating an explosion and that dry, fine, incombustible dust
suspended in air in a sufficiently dense cloud will tend to check
and stop a coal-dust explosion.
All accumulations of fine coal should be removed and passageways should be washed ldth water before rock dust is applied :in a
partly developed mine.

It is advi sal:i. e to b egi.n rock dusting in

t.he sections of a mine where explosions would be most likely to
originate.
A mine is

Producing entries should be the first places dusted.
preferab~

as the faces advance.

rock-dusted from the faces outward and also
Dusting should be carried an into the cross-

entries, subsidiary entires and air courses.
The next step is to rock-dust the room necks and then extend
the rock-dusting up :into the rooms.

Rock-dusting is most effective

if carried to within 40 feet of the working face.

Although rock

dust close to the faces is desirable, it is not so vi tal as thoroughly dusting the entries.

An explosion started in a room will

c e ase to propagate in well-dusted entries.
The quantity of rock dust required in a mine 'dll vary with
the amount of in::ombustible material in the mine dust and also the
day-to-day possibility of coal-dust explosion.
of the

u. s.

Recommendations

Bureau of Mines state that a mininrum of 65 per cent
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incombustible should be maintained at all times, and an additional

1 per cent rock dust should be applied £or each 0.1 per cent methane in the ventilating current.

This minimum provides virtuall:y

no factor of safety in certain types of coal.

Rock dust in excess

of this minimum must be applied to provide a factor of safety and
to eliminate the necessity of in:mediate red.usting.

Although it is

impossible to lay down a hard cmd fast rule that w.Ul apply to all
coal mines, usually 3 to 4 pounds of rock dust per linear foot of
. entry is the minimum to apply 'When first dusting.

Accumulation of

co8J. frCIIl spillage along haulage entries, or coal dust that is
thrown into the air currmt by rapidly moving trains, will necessitate redusting at frequent intervals.

As much as 5 or 6 pounds

of rock dust should be applied for each linear foot in entries
before the track is reMoved.
Suitable rock dust is prepared from limestone, gypsum, anhydrite, or shale.

Less than 2 per cent of combustible material is

desirable and it should not exceed 10 per cent.

A 1 per cent in-

crease in amount of dust should be used for each 1 per cent of combustible material present.

Rock dust must be sufficiently free of

silica and never exceed the ma.xirnum permissible free silica or quartz
content of 25 per cent.

Rock dust is preferably light colored.

A

light colored dust permits ready observation of fresh accumulations
of coal dust and also increases the illumination of the passage1-1ays
which tends to prevent accidents from poor vision.
Application of rock dust may be done either by hand or by
machine.

Machine dusting is the preferred method of applying it.
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}<liners' Lights and Smoking
The use of open lights and snoking are causes of a surprizing
number of mine explosions.

Both these sources of explosions should

be eliminated from coal mines.

They are in no way essential to

mine operation and indicate outmoded and definitely hazardous practices.

The rapid replacement of open lights by permissible cap

lamps and the growing acceptance of regulations against smoking
have sanewhat limit-ed this hazard.
Most mine explosions initiated by open_ lights have been methane ignitions.

)Jevertheless, numerous ignitions of coal dust by

open lights have occurred where methane was never detected.

Dust

explosions of considerable flame and violence ha. ve also occurred
in surface tipples where methane is not found.
The use of permissible electric lamps is imperative i f maximum safety is to be obtained.

Permissible portable electric caps,

preferably cap lamps, should be used by all persons for illmuination in a mine.

Electric cap lamps are dependable, unaffected by

the quality of mine atmosphere, air velocity, or blasting and give
superior illumination.

The quality and intensity of underground

lighting are of major importance in accident prevention.
of the electric cap

~~p ~th

The use

its improved lighting qualities com-

pared with the open light should reduce accidents caused by poor
illuminati on.
The practice of smoking has not been eliminated from either
anthracite or bituminous-coal minESbut it must be prohibited eventually in every coal mine, regardless

a:r

its classification.

Com-
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pany regulations and some state mining laws usually prohibit the
carrying of matches and smoking material :into a gassy mine.

These

regulations are often violated by some miners as well as some mine
officials.

Consequently, it is advisable to search employees for

smoking material, matches, and other lighting devices often enough
and in a manner to assure that such articles are not being carried
into the mine •

Most state mining laws inclule some penal.ty for

v:i..olation o:t the

11

no smoking" rule in gassy mines.

Canpa.n.v regu-

lations include disciplinary penalties up to dismissal for smoking.
Continuous education is necessary to enlist cooperation in preventing smoking.

Violations of this rule have been common end have

caused numerous explosions and fires.

It is much more acceptable

to stop the practice rather than to catch the violator after the
act has been committed.
Blasting
Nonpermissible explosives have caused a large proportion of
explosions in lohich less than five lives were lost.

The fla.TYte of

a black-po-wder shot '\'rl.ll ignite gas or coal dust and, in past
years, black powder and dynamite have frequently caused explosions
or fires.
Penaissible explosives should be used not only for blasting
coal but also for

11

sho<?ting do"-0 11 roof, lift:ing bottom, or in rock

tunneling "here explosive gas is likely to be liberated.

Permis-

sible explosives are designed especially to prevent ignition of
gas or coal dust by blasting and should be used in all coal mines.
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They are mcplosives which have been tested by the

u. s.

Bureau of

Mines ani passed as safe for blasting in gaseous and dusty mines,
provided they are used in the prescribed manner.

Permissible ex-

plosives, unlike dynamites, have a flame of short length and duration and have low combustion temperatures.

Thus, if they are used

in a permissibl.e manner, there is littl.e likelihood of
of

gas or dust.

an

ignition

They are not absolutely safe but may be used more

safely in. the presence of explosive gas or coal dust than any nonpermissible explosives.
Pennissible e.xpl.osives of the detonating type are prefGrably
electrically fired.

No hole should be shot

11

on the soljd 11 and no

more than 1! pounds of explosives used to the hole.
should not be employed for stemning.

Fine coal

Clay, sand, or rock dust

should be used and the hole tamped to the mouth.
plosives must not be fired in the presence of gas.

Permissible exThey are def-

initely hazardous i f fired in a place where methane can be detected
with a flame safety lamp or >-here more than 1 per cent can be detected by an electric methane detector.
The usual precautions recom.r::lended in firing Cardox shells are
similar to those for permissible e."'Cplosives.

In addition, the

device should not be fired until everyone is 100 feet or more from
the shot and protected by adequate cover.
having

t'~o

Such cover consists of

or more intervening right angles between any person

and the blast.
Fortunately, permissible explosives are used exclusively in
the majority of naturally dangerous mines.

The record of explos-
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ions and mine .fires caused by the use of nonpermissible explosives
emphasizes the necessity of' eliminating them .from all coal mines.
Installation and Use of' Electrical Equi;enent
The increased use of electricity in coal mines during recent
years has incrf:lased the hazard of' ignition of' gas and dust owing
to arcing and sparking of electrical devices and equipment.

Elec-

tricity has become the principal source of' gas and dust ignitions
in many coal mines with the diminishing use of open lights ani
nonperndssible explosives.
Arcs or sparks .from the electrical parts of mining, drilling,
and loading machines have ignited gas and coal dust.

Electrical

arcs in mines come from nonpermissible mining machines, locomotives,
and other electrical equipment.

Other sources of' arcs are .faulty

•·rjr:Lng, trolley wire, and signal wires.

Sparks an:i arcs .from trol-

ley 1..ftleels or shoes have ignited pockets of' gas.

Trolley wires and

other electric-power conductors have been short-circuited and have
caused mine .fires or explosions when caught under falls of roof or
rib.

Poorly insulated el.ectrical conductors that pass through wooden

doors or stoppings have fired the wood because of sparking and arcing.

This has resulted in short-circuiting the air current and sub-

sequent gas ignition.

Fires and explosions have been initiated by

auxiliary blower-fan motors •

Run-a,..ny trips or "t"lrecked trips

m

entries with trol.ley or other power-wire suspensions have raised
dust clouds that were ignited by arcs from the short-circuited wires.
Fires and explosions have also resulted from falls of roof or poorly
attached, arcing rail bonis.

All of these conditions and maey others
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have resulted :in gas and dust ignitions from electricity.
Permissible electric equipnent is available which, if kept in
suitable condition, will not ignite gas or dust.

In a gassy mine

special precaution must be taken against ignition of gas and dust
by s~rks from the machines during their operation.

Important steps

in prevent:ing such ignitions have been the replacement of "open"
type machines with explosion-proof types approved by the U.

s.

Bur-

eau of Mines.
Motors used in gaseous mines should be of the types which have
been approved as permissible by the Bureau.
approved must be explosion-proof.

A motor to be thus

This signifies that it is construc-

ted in such a manner as to prevent the ignition of gas surrounding
the motor by any sparks, flashes, or explosions of gas or dust which
may occur inside the motor cas:ing.

A motor is not. approved by the

Bureau unless the motor casing is strong enough :mechanically to withstand the pressure caused by internal explosions of mine gas; all
openings, such as relief openings, and jo:ints are designed to cool
escaping flames to a point below the ignition temperature of firedamp; and terminal leads and control wires are carried through the
motor frame in such manner that flame cannot pass from the :interior
of the motor at these points.

A motor is not. considered permissible

even after approval by the Bureau, if it is used without its caution
plate, if removable covers are not in place, if it is used with openings other than those present when the motor was approved, or if it
is not complete with all parts.
Motor control equipment, switching equipnent, telephone and
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signal apparatus, lighting units, and other electrical equipment
used in gaseous mines should be a.lso of approved types.

The need

for this is apparent when it is noted that an explosion of mine
gas may be caused by the breaking of an iro andescent lamp or by
an extremely small spark in a telephone set.
Much of the electrical equipment used at the working faces is
nonpermissible or, if it is of a suitable type, it is often not
maintained as such.

It is the duty of mining companies to pro-

vide permissible electric equipment and of . those who harxile the
equipment to maintain it so.
Barricades
The natural impulse vrhen a worker survives an explosion is to
escape as quickly as possible.
to do.

This is normally the best thing

Nevertheless it may sometimes be safer to stay in the work-

ing place or in some other suitable and accessible location.

Quick

decision is necessary upon the part of mine workers to deterraine
the best procedure.
After mine explosions or dur:ing mine fires noxious gases are
generally found throug1lout the vrorkings and imperil the men v!ho
survive the violence or heat.

It is imperative that each under-

ground worker know the system of ventilation in the section of the
mine where he v.crks and the course of' the intake and return air.
This enables him to recognize the meaning of movemmts of air following an explosion.

Generally the best way to proceed, i f the air

is moving, is toward the incoming fresh air.

Even at best, some

gases will be present in the intal<e if the explosion has occurred
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outside the section of a mine in \<Jbich a man is working.
worker is far in the mine

~d

If the

the snoke and gas are considerable,

he should not try to go out through the bad air as he is very likely
to be overca:ne by the gases, called afterdamp.

If the incom.:tng

air to the sectiCl'l in 1-tlich a man is present is the return. air
current from the section in which the explosion occurred, · and i.f
the air is not already gassy or smoky, it mey be advisal:il.e to go
with the current, i f there is any.
I.f the ciir is very bad because of smoke, heat, or other reasons and the miners

S~"e

trapped by a mine fire or are alive after

an explosion, the· workers should not try to penetrate it but rather
retreat toward the face and :i.mnediately make an effort to protect
themselves by selecting a suitable place in which to erect a barricade.

The ventilation should be short-circuited as soon as poo-

sihle by opening doors or d estroy:ing stoppings.
It is recommended that the permanent barricade be started about
50 feet from temporary barricades that lnay be erected by hanging
brattice cloth or by :moving a door to a ne1-r place,
entry.

aero ss another

A barricaded area forms a refuge ch a.'ll.ber for the men 1·lithin.

'£he cubic content of the enclosed space determines the nu;uber of
men and the lensth of time the--; can safely remain there.

As much

territory as possible should be included in ti1e barricaded area,
regardless of the nur.aber of men in the party, so as to provide a
maximum quantity of air.
Obviously all openings to the barricade must be sealed or closed as
effective~

as possible.
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The value of barricades cannot be emphasized too strongzy.
have saved hundreds of lives in coal and metal mines.

They vdll

save many more lives if men are properly instructed in their use
and construction.

They
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ELECTRICAL ACCIDENI'S AND THEIR PREVENTION

The

increasin~

extensive use of electric power in mining

operations has presented
ation of the industry.

~~ny

additional hazards to the safe oper-

Electricity in and about mines can cause

shock, burns, and fire as well as serve as a source of ignition
of gas and dust explosions.

Hechanization has brought many elec-

trical. problems l-rhich must be handled safely.

Electricity defin-

itely promotes efficiency, but, unless it is carefully installed,
used, and maintained its presence in a mine is likely to increase
rather than reduce accidents.
Accidents caused by electricity have been largely due to the
use of nonpermissible or open equipment, but some serious accidents
have been caused by permissible equipment that has not been maintained in a proper condition.
Direct current is generally considered to carry less shock
hazard than alternating current at voltages under 1,000 and electrocutions from contact with direct current are rare.

It is a_;reed

by most authorities that considerable personal hazards can be avoided
by using equipment operated at voltages under 150 volts, l::ut vrellprotected high-voltage circuits and equipment are safer than poorly
protected low-voltage circuits.
Rescue and Resuscitation
In electrical accidents death is often only apparent.

victim of electric

~ock

If the

has ceased breathi.'1g, it is imperative that

artificial respiration be applied imnediately if his life is to be
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saved.

The prone-pressure method should be used at once and main-

tained 'ltrithout interruption until natural respiration is restored
or the victim is proved dead beyond all doubt.

The most essential

points in successful treatment of victims of electric shock are
prompt removal from contact 11d th live conductors and the start of
artificial respiration.
In attempting to rescue a victim from contact with a charged
conductor, the rescuer must not make the mistake of coming also in
contact with the live circuit.

Before attempting to ranove the

victim from contact with the conductor the current circuit should
be broken or the injured person must be forcibly separated from the
charged corrluctor.

When ·it is not possible to break the circuit or

forcibly break the contact without delay the person can be removed
safely if the rescuer stands on an insul.atfug sub stance such as a
dry board, wraps his hands w:i.th nonconducting material, uses a dry
stick to pry or push the victim free of the conductor, or pulls the
victim ai-JaY with a loop of dry cloth or rope •
Persons working with or around electrical equi:pnent should be
thoroughly trained in the

r~thods

of rescue from live conductors,

in the giving of artificial. respiration and the treatment for shock.
Electrical Hazards
Electricity

~

cause personal injury through abnormal condi-

tions of electrical equipment such as short circuit, accidental
grounding, overload, or poor contact.

In addition, every year some

fatal accidents are caused by persons touching live wires which are

normally exposed.

These accidents usually occur through movements

of persons in the vicinity of wires at places not generally frequented, or by accidental. contact with live circuits when handling
metal objects.

Electrical hazards can be minimized by the selec-

tion of proper equipment; by standard installation; by the enclosure
or elevation of current-carcying parts; by providing anple working
space around equipnent; by adequate insulation; by locking switches
in the open or closed position under certain circumstances; by the

use of identifying and warning dev:l.ces; by protective grounding; by
the use of insul.ating flooring, platfonns, or rubber gloves; end by
regular and proper inspection and maintenance.
Accidents from electricity can be avoided or at least reduced
by proper training.

Persons are better prepared to avoid unwitting

contact with electrical equipment if they are instructed in the
hazards and simple means of protection before being put to work
where they
ines.

m~

come in contact with electrical conductors or mach-

Instruction must be given not to rely on the insulation or

grounding and to accept no assurances that power is cut off a circuit until the fact is established by their own observation or that
of a competent supervisor.

The location of control switches a.r:d.

their proper method of operation should also be known.
Bare vlires
Trolley

'"~ires

and uninsulated high-tension wires are usually

thouglt. to be placed where tl1ey 'dll not be touched.

Nevertheless,

they are sometimes placed dangerously close to places '\'here men
are expected to pass.

Nearly half of the electrical-contact deaths
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in coal mines are attributed to improperly placed or unguarded
trolley wires.

The trolley wire presents the most common hazard

of several hazards that exist underground in electrically equipped
mines.

Men frequently come in contact with live wires when perform-

ing some duty that temporarily brings them :in close proximity to
the wires.

However, the trolley wire in underground \-torkings is

usually in places where men move about.

Where it cannot be pro-

tected by raising it to a height of 7 feet above the rail, it must
be guarded.

Trolley wires should always be guarded, regardless of

height, in front of manways, chutes, car dumping stations, mantrip stations and in similar places wher.e men frequently pass under
them.

Clearance should be provi.ded on one side of the haulageway

am the carrying of tools on the shoulders of perscns in proximity
to trolley wires should be prohibited.
It is necessary that trolley and bare power wires be located
on the opposite side from rooms and refuge holes and the clearance
side.

They are pre:ferably sectionalized by proper switches at int.er-

vals not exceeding 2,500 feet and switches should be placed near
the beginnine of all branch lines.
Power vrires should be fully insulated when passing through
doors or stoppings and be guarded on both sides of all doors :for
a distance of at least 16 feet.

It is recorr.mended that power 1."lires,

Whether bare or insulated, not be supported on or by timbers.

Well

designed and installed insulators should be used.
Fatalities from the operation of cranes, shovels, and other
large mobile machines close to and under power lines are reported
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every year in mining.

Similar hazards are presented in the han-

dling of wires, pipes, tapes, or other metallic objects in places
where it is possible for them to touch bare conductors.
procedure is to have the .power cut off the line.

The safe

If this is not

feasible, suitable guards nmst be provided to prevent contact 1olith
the line, or the line moved . to a safe distance.
Insulation and Groundin&
Mine wires that may be touched should have the strongest and
most durable insulation available.

If' proper insulation is not

provided the protection offered by it m8i,V easily fail urxier the conditions to which mine wires are subjected undergro1.m.d.
lation may be worn through or cut away.
of

mois~ure

Weak insu-

It may fail also because

or overheating.

:Host electrical codes give tables showing the current carrying capacities of different-size conductors.

These capacities are

based upon the minimum amount of heating in the conductor.

The in-

sulation on these conductors is prepared to withstand normal conditions and, i f used properly, will prevent grounds or ftlort circttits.

\<Jhen conductors are overloaded they become heated.

As a

result, the insulation is subjected to t enperatures that gradually
decompose or crack the insulating material or cause it to burn.

In

similar manner, the insulation on the 1rJiring in motors is designed
to withstand definite conditions, and when the equipment is overloaded the insulation may be ruined.

Motors are available that are

enclosed in special cases to prevent dust and moisture from collecting inside them.

These special motors will f'urrotion without mishap

141.

under severe working conditions.

Ordinary motors are a constant

source of trouble under the same conditions.
\ihere lead-sheathed power cables are used, complete reliance
for protection from shock should not be placed

on

the insulation.

The cable sheath is effectively grounded for greater safety.

Fai-

lure of the cable insulation can be detected by tests or by the
functioning of a circuit breaker or fUse.
Guarding of power cables
moved out of reach.

is recommended i f they ,cannot be

Where power lines are installed in shafts or

manwqs a guard must be provided to protect men using the manway

from contact w.i.th the wires or cables and to protect the conductors
from being broken by falling objects.

Special care should be taken

to insure that signal wires and telephone wires cannot be accidentally crossed with power lines.

Junction boxes that are properly

placed in protected positions on each level W"lere leads are taken
from the power cables will prevent poor splices in exposed locations.
Host persons handling insulat..ed wires will rely on the insulation
for protection.

Thus, any defect 't>rill be a possible som-ce of

accidEnt.
Portable

To~~~

and Heay:y: Equil]llen t

Portable electric tools and other movable equipment are sub j ect
to breakdo'Wns 'l.•rhich cause dangerous grounds, faults, or short circuits.

Accidents from the improper use of porta1)le electric tools

are far too prevalent.

Many of these result from failure to pro-

perly ground the tool.

Defective insulation permits the frame to

be energized, thus exposing the workmen to mock.

The injury from

shock is often minor compared to

the

injury resulting from a fall

because of the shock.
The frames of portable electric tools and eq..1ipnent , \thether
of high or low voltage, should be grounded by connecting a separate
wire between the frame am a good ground •
.

I

As portable electrical

equipment is usually supplied with power by means of extension cords
or trailing cables, it is recommended that the
part· of the cable with the power wires.

gro~

wire be a

A three-wire cord provides

:for carrying a grounding conductor arid the two power w:i.res.

Plugs

and receptacles may be so cc:nstructed that W"len the connection is
made the ground wire will tit only in the proper slot.

In the in-

stallation of a three-wire s.ystem, it is essential that the responsibility for wiring be given to qualified people.

Thus, the possi-

bility of connecting a live ,tf.ire as a grounding conductor, which
>-Tould cause the frame of . the appliance to become energized, is reduced.
Frequent insulation-resistance tests should be made of portable
equipment because of the hard usage and handling which they often
receive.

The cords are .best insulated 'With a heavy, high-grade

rubber and plugs of the moulded, nonbreakable type are advisable.
Trailing cables carrying

hi&~

voltages for the operation of

electric shovels and other surface equipment are subject to hazards
and must be protected by careful maintenance and adequate systems
of grounding.

The possible grotmd current must be eliminated or

reduced to a quantity that will not involve sufficient voltage be-

-

tween shovel frame and earth as to result in a shock hazard.
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The trailing cables used on shovels should have shielded conductors that are well insulated and contain ground li'Jires :for connecting the shovel :frames with a suitable ground connection.

The

cables should be sectionalized and suitable plug-type connectors
used for connecting the cables to the shovels and also to the extension cables.
A "cable boa.t" is recommended :for carry:ing and protecting the
excess Pow-er cable -le'ading to an electric shovel.

The boat is at-

tached to the shovel and as the shovel advances, the boat slides
behind it and the cable is plqed out.
It is a wise precaution to not connect damaged cables to a
power source and to avoid the use o:f temporary splices.
ation requires that unsuitable cables be replaced

Safe oper-

imr~diate~

and

taken to the shop vrhere all splices are vulcanized.
Energized shovel trailing cables ares a:fely handled only ,dth
rubber gloves and insulated tongs.

It is recommended that cable

bridges be used at alJ_ road crossin0s.

The uprights may be metal

pipes 1-rl th circular or SC{Uare bases and the cross member \•rood with
rounded shoulders.
Stationary machinery or electrical equipment is ordinarily considered to be installed ".rith well-insulated conductors, and to have
other current-carrying parts protected against wear and short circuits.

Nevertheless, accidents have been caused by defective insu-

lation or :failure through \-rear along 't-rlth careless workmanship in
the installation and lack of inspection and repair.
instances no attention was given to grounding.

In many o:f these

144.
In the use o£ most kinds o£ electric equipment there is a

pos-

sibility of a dangerous voltage on the frame of an electric machine
or on the sheath of a cable.

As the result of a failure which pro-

duces a connection between a power

·~.-d.re

and the frame or sheath,

persons touching such charged equipment usually will provide a path
for the flow of current directly to the earth or by some metallic
conductor with which they are in contact.
cause heating or arcing.
equipnent.

Short circuits may also

This may severely damage or destroy the

Providing a connection to the ground should be standard

practice to eliminate such differences in voltage between accidental.l.y charged equipment and the ground.
The frames or casings of all tools or structures

~ ~tlich

tric devices or circuits are present should be grounded.

elec-

The gro'Wld

wire must be of lo1-r resistance and of sufficient size to resist mecha.."lical breakage and to carry off the heaviest flat-v of current that
might result from any insulation breakdown or other failure.

Details

as to conductor sizes, nature of grounds, etc., may be obtained by
reference to the National Electrical Codes.
Sv·r itchboards

~2. Qo_:r~:~r_c?l

Units

'rransfori<ters an:i resistw.tce boxes that contain exposed live
connections should be provided ·{Jith a screen enclosure or guard railing "!hen in a place accessi'ule to unauthorized persons.

Enclosures

about live electrical units, i f kept locked, will prevent access to
them

other than by regular attendants.
Well-designed undergro1.md transformer stations are ccanpact,
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fireproof, well-arranged :installations with all equipnent properly
insulated or isolated.

A concrete curb placed around the base of

transformers coofines the oil in the event of a ruptured transfonxer
case.

Underground stations are also weli ventilated to prevent

hazardous increases in the t em.perature or accumulations of harmful
gases within such stations.

The a rea is posted, thus warning of

high vol.tage.
Similarly, properly installed surface transformers are placed
on poles at least 8 feet above the gE"ound or enclosed in a transformer house or surrounded by substantial fence at least

high.

6 feet

These stations are kept locked against unauthorized entry

and signs warning of high voltage are posted.

Surface installations

containing oil-immersed apparatus are separated from other equiPment and buildings by fire-resistant barriers, or otherwise adequately isolated.

Provisions are made for the draining of any

spilled oil.
Switches are desirably located in easily accessible places
so they can be operated >·:i thout danger of accidental contact 1.-dth
"live parts" of the apparatus.

Fuses and circuit breakers should

be so designed, located, or shielded that persons will not be
burned by their operation.

Open s1.dtches or fuse blocks are likely

to produce arcs \ben the connection is !i1aoe or broken on live circuits.

This hazard can be elbd.nated by enclosing fuses and swit-

ches in fire-resistive cabinets.

Enclosed safety svdtches are so

constructed that the fuses are inaccessible until. the switch has
been opened.
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Also, the switch cannot be closed mile the cabinet door is
open.

Circuit breakers are recommended because they are more ef-

ficient than the fused switch and provide more ef'fecti ve protection
against personal injury.
It is of greatest importance that controlling switches alvm.ys
be locked in the
nected machinery.

11

o££ 11 position when any work is being done on conLocking clamps are available lbich permit £rom

one to five locks to be attached.

Thus, if more than ore person is

engaged in wcrk on thee quipment, each has a lock on the switch
and the switch cannot be closed and the equipment started until

all locks are removed.
Fires
Fires of electrical origin are common both underground and on
the surface.

The hazard may be expected to increase as more elec-

tric-powered equipment is brought i.nt o the mines.

The main fire

hazards are those from bare or poorly insulated conductors contacting flrumnable material, arcing or heating at poorly made cable connections, failure of high-tension cables, and overheating of povrer
circuits because of overloading or lack of proper fuses.

Short

circuits caused by unexpected contact of '\-tires -.,,Jith metal objects
are a well-kno1.-m. hazard.

VJhat mav not be so ...,.ell known is thl t

i 'i rcs may be caused by contact of electric conductors vri'tll HOOO or
other combustible substances.

Overheating or arcing at a short-cir-

cuit may cause worn-out or overloaded equipment to take fire.

Flam-

mable :material. placed close to switches, fuses, or circuit breakers
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may ignite from flashes.
failures occur.

Oil-filled apparatus may be ignited '11\hen

Heat generated by coils and resistance grids have

been known to set fire to nearby combustible material.

A small

number of fires have resulted through the contact. between incandescent. lamps and flamnable materials.
Electrical equipnent. must. be chosen to ruit the demands put.
upon it.

It. should be installed with every reasonable care to avoid

overheating or breakdown, and it. must be kept, in this condition.
Adequate insulat.i oo is necessary between electric conductors and
substances that might carry an electric current.

El.ectricai equiP-

ment should alwey-s be placed 'lrhen practicable in fireproof surroundings.

Flammable tupes of insulation and oil-filled electrical equiP-

ment. are not. recommended for use in underground installations.

It

is vitally important, from the standpoint of fire prevention, that
every electric circuit be equipped with fuses and circuit breakers.
Fire extinguishers for use on fires involving electrical equiPment nru.st be composed of a nonconducting extinguishing agent in
order to protect the individuals who are fighting the fire.
dioxide and dry powder extingu_i.shers are preferred.
ide type may be used in

~rell

Carbon

The tetrachlor-

ventilated mines.

It is best in most mines to use equipment made with nonflammable insulation and transformers filled with inconbustible liquid because of the importance of reducing the danger from underground fires which involve electrical equipment.

Such equipment

is available and has advantages over former types, especially under
extreme conditions of service and where fire safety is a factor.
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Installing and Using Electrical Equipnent
The underlying and often the direct cause of accidents from
electricity in and about mines is the use of equipnent that is
unsuited to the work• improperl.Jr installed, or not inspected and
maintained

m

a safe condition.

Electricity, used properly and

suitably controlled, presents virtually no tire hazard.

All work

of installation, maintenance, and repair should conform to state
regulations and be equivalent to the standards set by the National
Electrical Code and the National Electrical Safety Code.
The foregoing discussion on the prevention of electrical accidents has included a
application.

discussi~n·or

some of the rules

o~

general

Reference mq be made to the codes mentioned and to

rules published by the U. S. Bureau of Mines for more complete
standards and safety rules concerning installation and proper use
of electrical equipnent.
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MINERS HEALTN.
Health is probably of greater val.ue to the miner than to most
workers engaged in other industries.

His occupation usual:cy demands

the possession of more than ordinar.y physical. abilities.

Industrial

hygiene in the mining industry is rapidly increasing in importance
as appreciatia'l grows of the responsibility to provide "WOrking conditions for miners that ares afe from danger to health as well as
from chances of injury.

The purpose af industrial hygiene services

is the protection of health, the improvement of efficiency, end
the prolongation of li.te of workers.

Intensive efforts are being

made by the industry to determme health hazards and to eliminate
them or supply protective methods.

Great strides have also been

made in the developnent of instruments for accurate study and control o:f conditia'ls causing occupational. di·s eases.
Occupational diseases take a great toll in money, as well as
in health.

The efficiency of a \\'Orker suffering :from such a dis-

ease or unrelated illness is impaired long before he is unable
to work or is awarded compensation.

Attempts to estirmte the total

costs of occupational health hazards in mining show that, in general, they are much greater than those from accidents.

Such e sti-

mates should include time lost through sickness, inefficiency of
affected v.or kers on the job, accidents due \'molly or in part to
illness o:f ,10rkers, compensation, and medical care of disabled l"fOrkers.
Reasons for the increased attention given the subject of industrial hygiene and health hazards by the mining industry in recent
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years are the desire to improve ef'f'iciency and economy of' operation,
promote higher standards of' health and living, and secure the enactment of' compensation laws.
Air Tenperature and H\!llidity
The mine worker in well-conducted mines generally has almost
ideal working conditions as to temperature ani humidity.
exceptions.

Many deep mines have high temperatures.

have both high temperatures

There are

Other mines

and high humidities and open or shal-

low mines are exposed to extreme changes of' weat-her.
Working under conditions of' high temperature and high humidity
decreases the ef'f'ic:i.ency of' workers and makes them more susceptible
to disease.

Studies of' human comfort in relation to temperature

and humidity have been made by the American Society or Heating and
Ventilating Engineers in cooperation with the
and the Federal Public Health Service.

u.s.

Bureau of' Mines

These showed that the best

1rorking conditions were between 50° and 75o F., with the hunrl.dity
(49)
bet1-reen 20 and 95 per cent.
(49)

Health and miscellaneous hazards in metal mines:
Mines Miners• Circ. 57, p. 4, l946.

u.s.

Bur.

Pulmonary Diseases
Certain dusts are a serious menace to the health or the miner.
They :Produce a lung disease known as pneumoconiosis, but more commonly called silicosis, or miners• consumption.

Other respiratory

diseases :rnq cause more suffering and economic loss.

These dis-
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eases are usually attributed to abnormal air conditions underground,
such as sudden changes from high to low temperatures, excessive
dust and noxious gases.

The principal respirator.y diseases to which

the miner is subject are bronchitis, influenza and pneumonia, pulmonary tuberculosis• anthrasilicosis, and silicosis.
Bronchitis is an infla.mma.tian of the bronchial tubes caused,

amana

other things, by the inhalation ot irritants such as organic

and inorganic dusts.

Bxposure to atmospheres polluted by irritat-

ing gases also carries with it the risk of bronchitis.

In some cases, the highest incidence of silicosis or tuberculosis, or both, is found among men lobo have had either bronchitis,
pleurisy, or asthma.
(50)
According to Collis

the prevalence of bronchitis, pneu-

(50) Collis, Edgar L., Occupational dust diseases: Bull. Hygiene,
Vol. 6, pp. 663-670, 1931.
monia, and tuberculosis is high among those exposed to silica dust,
but the incidence of these diseases is not always the same under
conditions such as exposure to other dusts, heat, and fumes, <r
"WOrking indoors.
Anthrasilicosis is the name given the chronic disease among
miners caused by breathing air containing dust generated in the various processes involved in the mining and preparation of anthracite.
This is a descriptive title for the form of pneumoconiosis commonly
called miners' asthma.
There are various definitions of silicosis.

It is a term

applied to the lung trouble of miners, 'Which in the past has been

152.
re.ferred t.o as asthma, lung consumption, or miners• disease.

It.

is generall.y agreed that the cause o.f the disease is the inha.la-

t.ion of silica or quartz dust..

Silica dust. enters the lungs and

goes into solution, thus causing chemical reactions that. impair
or cestroy the lung tissue.

It. seems probable that. the harmful

act.iCil is o.f both chemical and mechanical orig:in.
Pulmonary diseases are excessive in the mining industr,y as a
result. o.f exposm-e t.o large amoW'lts of dust. in the air breathed.
Consequently, control o.f the dust. hazard is necessar,y to prevent.
these diseases.

-

Dmt.

E£fect.s of Inhaling
Ex:posure to certain kinds of dust, such as those containing
considerable quantities of .free silica, has increased the morbidity
and mortality rate .from respiratory diseases, lbile some metallic
dusts such as lead and its compounis, have been associated with
general systemic poisoning.
(51)

u. s.

The U. S. Bureau o.f Mines states:

(51)

Bur. Mines Miners• Circ. 57 1 ~· ~., P. 6.

(52)

•

According to Drinker,
.four different types of
reaction are produced in man by the inhalation o.f dust..
The .first and most. important. are the pneumoconioses, such
as silicosis and asbestosis, which cause specific lung
pathology and often are .followed by pulmonary tuberculosis. The second type of reaction is caused by toxic
dusts, like lead, cadmium, and radium. A third type of
malady .follows inhalation of finely divided metallic,
.fume particles, such as zinc oxide, and is lmown as metal.fume .fever. The .fourth reaction, allergic in character,
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is caused by inhaling organic dusts, such as pollen and
certain types of pulverized wood and flour. · In all four
the sole cause of the disability may be dust inhalation,
but the reactions from toxic dusts result from swallowing
as well as inhalation.

(52)

Drinker, Philip, The causation of Pneumoconiosis:
and Toxicol., P. 524, October, 19,36.

Ind. Hyg.

Numerous ill effects to human organs other than the lungs may
be caused by breathing more or less insoluble or sol.uble dusts.
Many dusts, both organic and inorganic, have harmful effects of
various kinds on

E~Ye s,

ears, and other parts of the body and on

the skin from ex:t.ernal. c<ntact.

Some dusts cause hann to health

by absorption through the skin •

.Many cases of lead poisoning occur in the :m:ining industry.

Most cases of lead poisoning are contracted by inhaling air laden
"t>r.:i..th lead carbonate dust.

The opport\D'lity to contract lead poi-

soning varies in proportion to the solubility of' the ore mined,
the quantity of lead dust thrown into the atmosphere, and the

VEn-

tilation afforded.
Although pulmonary disease and its various ram:ii'ications such
as pneumoconiosis, silicosis, and anthracosis are vitally important, they constitute by no means the only detrimental effect to
hurnan beings in coming in contact with dust, externally or internally.
Allowable Concentrations
The quantity of dust taken into the respiratory organs is a
controlling factor in harmfulness of dust to the respiratory system.
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Exposure to certain concentrations of harmful dusts tor a known
time causes varying degrees of respiratory disability.

Below

these concentrations disabling pulmonary diseases do not seem
to occur within a working lir etime •
It is generallJr agreed by most authorities that the size of
the dust pa,rt,icles that damage the lung is below 12 microns in
largest dimensions and most of the particles are 5 microns or less.
Those that are under 10 microns in size are thought to affect health
adversely.

1
One micron .. 0.001 mm. or 25,000

inch.

As a micron

is much smaller than the naked eye can see, it is usuaJ..ly assumed
that the larger dust particles which can be seen floating in air
md which settle relatively quickly, are not harmful to health.

This is questionable, however, as the larger particles, if present .
in considerable quantities, clog the air passages leading to the
lungs.

This clogging allows the smaller and more dangerous dust

to enter the lungs unimpeded since sane of these air passages are so
constructed that, under ordinary circumstances, they intercept; larger dust particles before they can reach the lungs.
Data collected by the Feder·J.l p,iblic H•..!i..l.lth 3 e:rvice to determine safe limits of dust exposure show that employment in an atmosphere containing less than 50 million dust particles per cubic foot
produces a negligible nu:nber of cases of silicosis when the quartz
content of the dust is less than 5 per cent; \'Jhenthe silica content is about 13 per cent, 10 to 15 million particles appear to be

(53)
a safe limit.

(53)

U.s. Bur. Mines Miners• Circ. 57, 2£•

~., p.

9.
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Numerous contributing factors make tmworkable the establishment of regulations as to the allowable number of dust particles
on a sliding scale in proportion to the silica content of the dust.
Dust-prevention action should be taken in any atmosphere in
which dust can be seen with the naked eye.

Such an atmosphere is

too dusty, not only for health but •lso, at least in many cases,
for safety and efficiency.

I£ the visible dust is removed, DDlCh

of the more dangerous invisible dust will probably have been removed.

It mq be necessary, under some conditions, to make more

intricate investigations as to the occurrence of invisible dust,
using the impinger, konimeter , or other instruments.
Control
The principal method of preventing pulmonary diseases is to
eliminate as far as possible or to reduce to harmless concentrations the dust in the breathing zone of the worker.

The aim should

always be to eliminate the dust. entirely from the air breathed.
Where this is not feasible it is usually possible to reduce the
dust to a concentration that vrill not cause disability during a
\vorking life time.
The principal measures f'or controlling the ill eff'ects of'
dust· in mining operations are ventilation, wet methods, proper
blasting practice, the use of personal respiratory protection,
and physical examination of workers.
Ventilation is probably the most effective method of keeping
the dust concentration within safe limits, although under some con-
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ditions it ranks secom to wet m!)thocls.

Effective ventil.ation can

remove dust from the air or so dilute its concentration that it is
almost harmless.
Water and sometimes other liquids can be employed to control.
dust by suppression at its point of origin, by rf:Jlloval. from the
air surrounding the source, and by preventing settled dust from being Btirred up.
Proper blasting practice can do much toward controlling dust
and fumes in mines.

Blasting is preferably dcne at the end of the

working shift or an off shift, if at all possible.

The dust-and-

gas-l.aden air shoul.d be removed or thoroughly diluted before the
men re-turn to work.

Ventilation is essential. in cleansing the air

where blasting has been done.
Personal. respiratory protection as a method of control. of air
dustiness is unsatisfactory in underground mining; except far temporary use in emergencies.

Where harmful. contamination of air that

i ·s . breathed cannot be prevented, respirators wil.l be required for
protection.

Respirator types most conmonly used f'or protecticn

against dust hazards are the air-line or hose-type supplying pure
air from an out side source, and the mechanical-f'ilter type that
remove dust particles as air is breathed through a filter.
Although dust respirators give protection against dust, those
not of the supplied-air type, afford the wearer essentially no'protectioo against toxic or asphyxiating gases.

Respirators are also

inconvenient and uncomfortable for constant wear.
Physical examination is not in itself a dust-control measure,
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but it is an important means of determining the e.fficacy of the
methods emp1oyed to reduce the dust hazard.

Through periodic ex-

amination the occurrence of respiratory disease can be discovered
and meas'ltl:'es taken to reduce the amount of dust in the air or

remove any affected workers to a less hazardous environment.

Every

person emp1oyed under possibly hazardous dust conditions should
undergo a thorough pnysical examination before entering upon duty
and at least once a year thereafter.
Sanitation and ijygiene
Living and working places at mines must be kept clean to prevent infection and disease.
Good air containing not less than l9 per cent ozygen, nat
over 1.25 per cent carbon dioxide, and no carbon monoxide or other
poisonous gases must be furnished to the miners.

It is adv:i.sable

to maintain the air temperature below 800F ., i f possible.

In coal

mines the air should not contain over 0.5 per cent methane.
of course, is f'or safety rather than sanitary purposes.

This,

Condi-

tioning of air is one of the most essential factors to be considered in any under ground workings, nat only from the standpoint o:f
health and safety but also with regard to efficiency and productivity •

These ccnditions can be attained by hav:i.ng sufficient

and effective ventilation.
Drinking water nrust be o:f good quality.

It should be provided

preferably by fountains not requiring the touch of the lips, as in
the case of a faucet.

Tank cars that are kept in sanitary condi-

tion are recommended.
Sanitary latrines should be provided in easily accessible
places.

They shoul.d be taken to the surface daily and thoroughly

cleaned and disin:Cected.
Urderground pump rooms, engine rooms, and other plac.e s where
men gather shouJ.d be kept clean and frequently whitewashed or
painted..

It is desirable to provide containers for miners' lunch

and other refuse.

Good housekeeping should be practiced at all

times and in all sections of the mine.
Proper lighting aids sanitation and electric lights with wire
cages are recommended, except, where nat. permitted.

Manways, shaft

bottoms, and l.andings, if whitewashed, will ·aid illumination.
Provision of some type shelter is recamnended. for heated and
perspiring miners while waiting at shift ends at l.andings in downcast shafts.

Cages for hoisting men in such shafts are prefer-

ably enclosed.
Requirements on the surface are the s a.me as elemental sanitation underground.

Workers and their families should be provided

with good welfare and sanitation facil.ities, including mcxiern
houses, amusement halls, seltrage facilities, water flY'S tans, washing, bathing, and latrine acconunodations at mines, and other l.ike
features.
Miners coming from a warm mine must avoid prolonged exposure
to cold air whil.e in light-weight working cl.othes.

A warm build-

ing should be provided ,.,-ithin 100 feet of the mine entrance \-here
the miner may be checked in and out and which either adjoins or
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connects by a covered passageway with a well constructed and equiPped change house or "dry•"
kept,

c~othes

The instal.lation of adequate, well-

changing and washing

.faci~ities

the hea1th and efficiency of mine employees •

contributes much to
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CONCWSIONS

1. .The progress made in accident prevEntion in the mining
.industry, or any .industry, should be measured by comparing the
number of workers killed or injured in attaining the required
unit of production.

2.

Safety is

intimate~

related to health and efficiency

in mining.

3. Mine accidents are not inevitable. Most accidents can
be prevented.

4. Every accident is a sympton of sanething wrong in the
operation.

There is a cause for every accident.

5. Practically every injury can be prevented.

The way to

prevent accidents is to discover and eliminate the causes.

The

aim should be to discover the causative factors and apply adequ.a.te
corrective measures before the accident occurs.

6. Participation o:r both employer and employee is required
for effective accident prevention.

iilell-planned efforts give ex-

cellent return at a reasonab:IB cost both to management and "VJOrkers.

7•

An essential element of the carrying out of a 1-.rell-inte-

grated and effective safety program is the ability of safety""'"'"!inded raanagement to enlist labor1 s unqualified acceptance of safety
and accident-preventative measures.
8.

Elimination of mine accidents depends in a large measUre

on the exercise of good

9.

jud~aent

and common sense.

In the selection of a wining method, a procedure must be ·
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chosen that is safe as well as efficient.

10.

The purpose of safety in the mining industry, or any

industry, is the prevention of accidents and the alleviation of
human miser:r.

StJl.lMARY

The progress of safety in the mining industry has been one
of gradual improvement over a period of years.

Although the in-

dustry, as a whole, has made considerable progress in accident
prevention there remains Im.lCh to be done before opt.iJmml conditions, from the standpoint of safety, are reached.
This paper does not., by any means, present all the causes
of mine accidents nor all the means of prevention of such accidents.

It does, however, show the principal causes of mine acci-

dents and the funiamentals of the means by which these accidents
can be prevented.
The trend of :fatal accidents in coal mining indicates an.
over-all reduction.

Improvement in the safety record is shown

in bituminous-coal and lignite mines as well as anthracite mines.

The principal

c~uses

lignite mines

m~a:

of mine accidents in bituminous-coal and

(1)

falls of roof and coal, {2) haulage, (3)

t;as or dust explo::;lcns, (4) explosives, (5)
shaft.

elect.1~icity,

and (6)

The three principal causes of fatal accidents at und.er-

sround anthracite mines are: (1) falls of roof and coal, {2)
haulage, and (3) explosives .
The trend of fatalitie s at all non-coal mines is

do~ward.

The cornmendable record of metal and nonmetallic-mineral mines is
marred by the upward trem of fatal accid.ents in nonmetallic mining.

The need for more accident prevention is apparent.

Prin-

cipal causes of accidents in underground metal and nonmetallic-
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mineral mines are: (1) £alls o£ rock or ore from the roof (back)
or wall, (2) explosives, (3) haulage, and (4) falling down chutes
or raises or into winzes.
The quarrying industry, as a whole, has shown only slight improvement in its accident record.

This is attributed to the lime-

stone industry where the trend of fatalities is definitely upward.
Principal causes of fatalities in quarries are: (1) falls or slides
o£ rock, (2) explosives, and (3) haulage and t8.lls of persons •
The continuous efforts of both supervisors and men are required for the prevention of rock-fall accidents.
place must be provided.

A safe working

It is thought that adoption of uniform

timbering systems will do much toward reducing accidents from this
cause.
Haulage accidents generally entail great economic loss.

Their

prevention depends on the selection of proper equi:pient, ma.in:t;enance
of equipnent and haulageways, suitable lay-out, and the adoption and
enforcement of safe haulage practices.

Correction of the human char-

n.cteristic, v1b.ich often is a Jnrt of such accidents, can be accomplished by intelligent selection of employees and by following such
selections with adequate and proper job instruction, adequate supervision, and enforcement of safety regulations.
~tisuse

of explosives and disregard of well-known safety rules

covering the handling of explosives cause many fatal accidents.
human element is a large factor in the cause of these accidents.
Thus, the m.unber of men handling explosives should be reduced to
a minimum.

Proper education and supervision are e..'CcellEnt means

The
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· o:f preventing explosives accidents.
Prevention o:f shaft accidents and :falls of persons can be
accomplished by improvements in hoisting equipnent and methods
of handling cars and men and by guarding the entrances to r a ises
and chutes.

Providing safe access to overhead locations and safe-

guarding the worker while he is perfonning the ,.;ork will do nruch
toward preventing :falls o:f persons while work is being performed
in high places. ·

Mine explosions can and should be prevented.

Acci d ents of

this type will be reduced if the known procedures as to v entilation, inspection for gas, rock dusting, blasting, and installation
and use of electrical equipment are followed.
Since the introduction o:f the use o:f more electricity in mining operations, many additional hazards have been

pre~ented.

The

presence o:f electrical equipment in mines promotes ef:ficiency and
can reduce rather than increase accidents i:f proper equipment is
care:fully installed, used, and maintained.
Accident prevention is one of the major problems in mining.
It is a problem that can be solved i:f top management of:ficials
really become "sa:fety conscious" and insist that accidents must
be prevented.

Safety must be sold to everyone in the organization,

not only the management, but also the supervisory sta:f:f and the
vmrkrnen.

The causes o:f mine accidents must be discovered am act-

ion then taken to prevent the recurrence o:f such accidents.
As health is the greatest asset o:f the miner, it must be preserved at all costs.

Health, sa:fety, and e:f:ficiency are intimately

related in the a1ccessful operation o:f the mining industry.
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